This study is the third in a series of volumes in which the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) explores the commonalities and differences of the conceptualization of irregular warfare across U.S. allied and partner stakeholders in regions important for U.S. national security. This volume focuses on the African region and is based on surveys and semi-structured interviews with five defense thought leaders drawn from across the continent.
Quantum computing represents a paradigm shift in computational technology, poised to revolutionize industries including national security and defense. While the abilities of quantum computing still remain largely theoretical, significant progress is being made. Notably, experiments from companies like Google and IBM have demonstrated early examples of quantum supremacy, where quantum computers outperform classical systems on specific tasks. These breakthroughs suggest that quantum computing is not only on the horizon but is considered an inevitable advancement that stakeholders should prepare for now.
Since Russia’s ambiguous intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the concept of hybrid warfare has gained attention in Western academic, defense policy, military practitioner, and media circles. Despite its rising popularity, the concept hybrid warfare is analytically problematic. One of the reasons for this is that the existing conceptualization of hybrid warfare is too broad for theoretical analysis and defense policymaking.
As the global landscape shifts into an era of Great Power Competition, characterized by unconventional threats and complex geopolitical dynamics, the need for a reimagined Office of Strategic Services (OSS) framework has never been more pressing. The revival of an OSS 2.0 would empower the Department of Defense (DoD) with enhanced Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities that are critical for navigating the intricacies of Irregular Warfare (IW). Leveraging an updated OSS concept, the DoD could build deeper, longer-lasting relationships with foreign partners and local populations, laying the foundation for invaluable intelligence collection and clandestine or covert operations.
This paper explores the ways that states benefit from the activities of non-state actors (NSAs) as tools of irregular warfare (IW), with a particular focus on China and Russia. An examination of the historical relationships between state and non-state actors reveal that while proxies provide many potential advantages to their authoritarian patrons, they also present significant problems. The paper further demonstrates how China and Russia each utilizes a wide range of NSAs in a similarly broad spectrum of irregular warfare activities, including low-level persistent operations designed to erode adversaries’ institutions over time, to much more kinetic operations that directly challenge the territorial integrity of other sovereign states. Implications for how to respond to these activities are discussed.
Irregular warfare (IW) is vital in today’s military planning. It’s complex and constantly changing, using methods that aren’t typical and adapting strategies as needed. Conventional warfare aims to fight and beat enemy forces. IW, however, works in messy political and social situations where standard rules of engagement don’t always fit. Because IW covers so many areas, the armed forces need to improve how they handle it. This means updating their policies, battle plans, teaching, and practice to meet IW’s demands. Policy needs to address new challenges like threat networks, information operations, terrorism, and cyber-attacks within a greater strategic framework.
When Rambo Meets the Red Cross takes a critical look at the trifecta of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), their relationship with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the beneficiaries of foreign aid. Stanislava Mladenova collects semi-structured interviews from actors on all three sides of the civil-military relationship to search for the answer to her central question: “Can SOF and NGOs be effective partners in low-intensity conflict?”
History is a matter of perspective; one of the best examples is American involvement in Latin America. The United States’ interest in Latin America is generally perceived to be centered upon gaining access to commodities or serving political and economic interests. It is argued that American economic involvement is of recent origin, a consequence of post-World War II policies establishing both the Pax Americana and the Open Door of universal access to resources.
In contemporary global security dynamics, the terminology used to describe military and strategic operations is crucial. The terms “irregular” and “warfare” often either fail to resonate with foreign partners and U.S. government interagency partners or raise red flags due to different organizational meanings, as they imply a state of conflict that is not necessarily present. This publication explores the shift from traditional concepts of Irregular Warfare (IW) to a more fitting term, “Defense Support to Strategic Competition,” to describe the Department of Defense’s (DoD) activities short of war in support of interagency organizations and foreign partners. Ultimately, various components within the DoD are capable of providing valuable assistance and support to interagency organizations to create enduring advantages in Strategic Competition. However, a barrier exists in understanding among organizations as to what “irregular warfare” is and how it can be applied in Competition and Crisis prior to an overt military conflict.
In modern warfare, United States (U.S.) military special operations frequently employ unconventional and irregular tactics, often operating in environments denied by opposition forces. Special Operations surgical teams (SOST) provide immediate medical care in these high-risk environments, with their success and safety heavily dependent on avoiding detection of any kind. However, the electronic medical equipment used, such as patient monitors and ventilators, emit electromagnetic radiation that adversaries can detect with sensors and analysis systems. As nations like Russia and China continue to enhance their electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, the need for robust countermeasures becomes increasingly critical.