This paper explores the ways that states benefit from the activities of non-state actors (NSAs) as tools of irregular warfare (IW), with a particular focus on China and Russia. An examination of the historical relationships between state and non-state actors reveal that while proxies provide many potential advantages to their authoritarian patrons, they also present significant problems. The paper further demonstrates how China and Russia each utilizes a wide range of NSAs in a similarly broad spectrum of irregular warfare activities, including low-level persistent operations designed to erode adversaries’ institutions over time, to much more kinetic operations that directly challenge the territorial integrity of other sovereign states. Implications for how to respond to these activities are discussed.
The Essential Role of Policy, Doctrine, and Education in Irregular Warfare
Irregular warfare (IW) is vital in today’s military planning. It’s complex and constantly changing, using methods that aren’t typical and adapting strategies as needed. Conventional warfare aims to fight and beat enemy forces. IW, however, works in messy political and social situations where standard rules of engagement don’t always fit. Because IW covers so many areas, the armed forces need to improve how they handle it. This means updating their policies, battle plans, teaching, and practice to meet IW’s demands. Policy needs to address new challenges like threat networks, information operations, terrorism, and cyber-attacks within a greater strategic framework.
When Rambo Meets the Red Cross: Civil-Military Engagement in Fragile States
When Rambo Meets the Red Cross takes a critical look at the trifecta of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), their relationship with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the beneficiaries of foreign aid. Stanislava Mladenova collects semi-structured interviews from actors on all three sides of the civil-military relationship to search for the answer to her central question: “Can SOF and NGOs be effective partners in low-intensity conflict?”
American Irregular Warfare in Latin America
History is a matter of perspective; one of the best examples is American involvement in Latin America. The United States’ interest in Latin America is generally perceived to be centered upon gaining access to commodities or serving political and economic interests. It is argued that American economic involvement is of recent origin, a consequence of post-World War II policies establishing both the Pax Americana and the Open Door of universal access to resources.
Reframing the Term “Irregular Warfare” in Times of Peace into the Contemporary Idea of “Defense Support to Strategic Competition”
In contemporary global security dynamics, the terminology used to describe military and strategic operations is crucial. The terms “irregular” and “warfare” often either fail to resonate with foreign partners and U.S. government interagency partners or raise red flags due to different organizational meanings, as they imply a state of conflict that is not necessarily present. This publication explores the shift from traditional concepts of Irregular Warfare (IW) to a more fitting term, “Defense Support to Strategic Competition,” to describe the Department of Defense’s (DoD) activities short of war in support of interagency organizations and foreign partners. Ultimately, various components within the DoD are capable of providing valuable assistance and support to interagency organizations to create enduring advantages in Strategic Competition. However, a barrier exists in understanding among organizations as to what “irregular warfare” is and how it can be applied in Competition and Crisis prior to an overt military conflict.
Stealth Surgery: Mitigating Signature Detection Risks for Special Operations Surgical Teams
In modern warfare, United States (U.S.) military special operations frequently employ unconventional and irregular tactics, often operating in environments denied by opposition forces. Special Operations surgical teams (SOST) provide immediate medical care in these high-risk environments, with their success and safety heavily dependent on avoiding detection of any kind. However, the electronic medical equipment used, such as patient monitors and ventilators, emit electromagnetic radiation that adversaries can detect with sensors and analysis systems. As nations like Russia and China continue to enhance their electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, the need for robust countermeasures becomes increasingly critical.
21st Century Threats Require 21st Century Deterrence
Soon after the defeat of Germany in 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves in a global struggle for power and influence. In contrast to previous great power competitions, which had often led to conventional armed conflict, nuclear weapons dramatically changed the risk calculus for both sides. Since combat operations between nuclear armed adversaries could lead to their mutual annihilation, geopolitical competition between them would now reserve military force for “coercion, intimidation, and deterrence.”
Neither Narrow nor Nice: Economic Warfare, Disinformation, and Civil Society
A country’s economy is core to its national security, driving significant discourse regarding economic warfare. Current strategies, however, are driven more by political expediency than tactical efficacy. These strategies are based on the hope that “narrow” approaches targeting specific industry sectors or “nice” approaches avoiding harm to large population segments will drive impact. Hope, however, is not a strategy.
The Irregular Warfare Center and Hybrid CoE Cooperation: A Vital Partnership for the Future
The Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) and the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (HCOE) entered into a unique partnership in FY 24 making both institutions stronger and more globally connected. The HCOE was born out of a desire to strengthen NATO-EU cooperation on hybrid threats with the 2016 Joint NATO/EU declaration committing both institutions to counter hybrid threats in a cooperative manner. In this declaration, NATO and the EU voiced the realization that hybrid threats exploited the divisions between civil and military responses. Success in countering these threats requires combining individual strengths and areas of expertise. Finland answered the call in 2017 by creating the HCOE and, to date, 36 NATO Allies and EU Member States have become members of the Center.
SOF Should Not Be Used as Assault Troops: Lessons from the Russo-Ukraine Conflict
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and its subsequent transition into a large-scale war, has shown that conventional warfare maintains its relevance in a world of strategic competition. At the same time, however, it has also underscored the inherently hybrid nature of modern warfare, with blurred boundaries between conventional and irregular elements. For Russia and Ukraine, this means that the conflict is occurring at all levels, tactical to strategic, and in multiple domains simultaneously: the front lines, rear areas, areas of occupation, the cyber domain, the information environment, and beyond. In planning for national and territorial defense, countries must account for this element, or risk mismatching resources in ways that degrade their warfighting capability. In this complex threat environment, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven invaluable.