The contemporary space race is primarily about securing strategic, military, technological, and economic advantages over rivals, more than scientific discovery or symbolic status. Although space has often been portrayed as a domain of international cooperation – embodied most visibly by the International Space Station – competition has always remained central to humanity’s expansion into orbit.
Militaries around the world have always mapped the world in terrain features, borders, and lines of advance. Yet in recent crises, the most consequential pressure has often been applied elsewhere – shipping slows without a port being seized; energy prices spike without a pipeline being destroyed; and supply chains fracture without a factory being struck.
For decades, U.S. policymakers have returned to a familiar operational formula in the Middle East: American airpower, intelligence, and advisory support paired with local ground forces willing to do the hardest fighting. Kurdish partners fit that formula in Iraq and Syria, where their battlefield effectiveness gave Washington a relatively economical way to generate pressure without introducing large conventional formations.
Since mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died in a plane crash in 2023, the Kremlin has assumed more direct control over his Wagner Group and its operations in Africa. As Russia becomes more assertive with its strategic approach to Africa, African nations hosting Russian private military companies (PMCs) may find themselves facing a dire security threat.
Since mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died in a plane crash in 2023, the Kremlin has assumed more direct control over his Wagner Group and its operations in Africa. As Russia becomes more assertive with its strategic approach to Africa, African nations hosting Russian private military companies (PMCs) may find themselves facing a dire security threat.
The West is losing because the information revolution creates a “fragmented, networked enemy,” and adversaries use the asymmetric advantages of the information environment (IE) to build networks that work to create fissures in democratic societies and weaken democratic states’ political will and institutions, which can later advantage adversaries in conventional confrontations.
The main battle space in the conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States is not land, sea, air, space, or even cyberspace. It is the American economy. In this Second Cold War, the principal U.S. combatants do not fire weapons, sail ships, or fly aircraft; they run businesses. Although commonly referred to as the “Second Cold War,” it remains putative and is not officially recognized by the U.S. government.
Cognitive Warfare can be functionally defined as “the activities conducted in synchronization with other instruments of power, to affect attitudes and behaviors by influencing, protecting, and/or disrupting individual and group cognitions to gain an advantage.” From the point of view of technique, we can say that “Cognitive Warfare is therefore the art of deceiving the brain or making it doubt what it thinks it knows.” Deception is no less than an attack on cognitive abilities. In discussions of Cognitive Warfare, emotions are often described as limitations to cognitive abilities that must be overcome.
As the global landscape shifts into an era of Great Power Competition, characterized by unconventional threats and complex geopolitical dynamics, the need for a reimagined Office of Strategic Services (OSS) framework has never been more pressing. The revival of an OSS 2.0 would empower the Department of Defense (DoD) with enhanced Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities that are critical for navigating the intricacies of Irregular Warfare (IW). Leveraging an updated OSS concept, the DoD could build deeper, longer-lasting relationships with foreign partners and local populations, laying the foundation for invaluable intelligence collection and clandestine or covert operations.
Irregular warfare (IW) is vital in today’s military planning. It’s complex and constantly changing, using methods that aren’t typical and adapting strategies as needed. Conventional warfare aims to fight and beat enemy forces. IW, however, works in messy political and social situations where standard rules of engagement don’t always fit. Because IW covers so many areas, the armed forces need to improve how they handle it. This means updating their policies, battle plans, teaching, and practice to meet IW’s demands. Policy needs to address new challenges like threat networks, information operations, terrorism, and cyber-attacks within a greater strategic framework.
Join us at this year's IW Symposium
Irregular Warfare in the Homeland: Adapting for a Secure Future
August 4-6, 2026
The Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) is hosting a 2.5-day symposium on the Defense of the Homeland. This symposium embodies the NDS's call for a clear-eyed realism that leverages all elements of national power.
