The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging rogue, unconventional espionage to target U.S. civilian companies and critical infrastructure. By straying from the international norms surrounding espionage, the PRC has gained asymmetric strategic advantage that must be countered. To do so, the United States needs to engage in international action to create a comprehensive response across the range of U.S. and foreign apparatus needed to establish a level playing field in the global arena.
The main battle space in the conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States is not land, sea, air, space, or even cyberspace. It is the American economy. In this Second Cold War, the principal U.S. combatants do not fire weapons, sail ships, or fly aircraft; they run businesses. Although commonly referred to as the “Second Cold War,” it remains putative and is not officially recognized by the U.S. government.
United States industry and national security supply chains are vulnerable because they are reliant on adversaries for critical materials necessary for advanced technology and high-end weapons systems. However, the Department of Defense (DoD), American industry, and African partners can implement coordinated measures to reduce these deficiencies.
Cognitive Warfare can be functionally defined as “the activities conducted in synchronization with other instruments of power, to affect attitudes and behaviors by influencing, protecting, and/or disrupting individual and group cognitions to gain an advantage.” From the point of view of technique, we can say that “Cognitive Warfare is therefore the art of deceiving the brain or making it doubt what it thinks it knows.” Deception is no less than an attack on cognitive abilities. In discussions of Cognitive Warfare, emotions are often described as limitations to cognitive abilities that must be overcome.
This one-page quick reference consolidates foundational definitions and associated terms for irregular warfare, distilling their common themes—like influence, indirect approaches, and asymmetry—and listing key activities from information operations to civil-military engagement. It’s designed as a quick reference guide for our operational partners to align on the core concepts and terminology of irregular warfare. [ Download the IW Quick Reference (PDF […]
This study is the third in a series of volumes in which the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) explores the commonalities and differences of the conceptualization of irregular warfare across U.S. allied and partner stakeholders in regions important for U.S. national security. This volume focuses on the African region and is based on surveys and semi-structured interviews with five defense thought leaders drawn from across the continent.
Quantum computing represents a paradigm shift in computational technology, poised to revolutionize industries including national security and defense. While the abilities of quantum computing still remain largely theoretical, significant progress is being made. Notably, experiments from companies like Google and IBM have demonstrated early examples of quantum supremacy, where quantum computers outperform classical systems on specific tasks. These breakthroughs suggest that quantum computing is not only on the horizon but is considered an inevitable advancement that stakeholders should prepare for now.
As the global landscape shifts into an era of Great Power Competition, characterized by unconventional threats and complex geopolitical dynamics, the need for a reimagined Office of Strategic Services (OSS) framework has never been more pressing. The revival of an OSS 2.0 would empower the Department of Defense (DoD) with enhanced Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities that are critical for navigating the intricacies of Irregular Warfare (IW). Leveraging an updated OSS concept, the DoD could build deeper, longer-lasting relationships with foreign partners and local populations, laying the foundation for invaluable intelligence collection and clandestine or covert operations.
This paper explores the ways that states benefit from the activities of non-state actors (NSAs) as tools of irregular warfare (IW), with a particular focus on China and Russia. An examination of the historical relationships between state and non-state actors reveal that while proxies provide many potential advantages to their authoritarian patrons, they also present significant problems. The paper further demonstrates how China and Russia each utilizes a wide range of NSAs in a similarly broad spectrum of irregular warfare activities, including low-level persistent operations designed to erode adversaries’ institutions over time, to much more kinetic operations that directly challenge the territorial integrity of other sovereign states. Implications for how to respond to these activities are discussed.
Irregular warfare (IW) is vital in today’s military planning. It’s complex and constantly changing, using methods that aren’t typical and adapting strategies as needed. Conventional warfare aims to fight and beat enemy forces. IW, however, works in messy political and social situations where standard rules of engagement don’t always fit. Because IW covers so many areas, the armed forces need to improve how they handle it. This means updating their policies, battle plans, teaching, and practice to meet IW’s demands. Policy needs to address new challenges like threat networks, information operations, terrorism, and cyber-attacks within a greater strategic framework.
Join us at this year's IW Symposium
Irregular Warfare in the Homeland: Adapting for a Secure Future
August 4-6, 2026
The Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) is hosting a 2.5-day symposium on the Defense of the Homeland. This symposium embodies the NDS's call for a clear-eyed realism that leverages all elements of national power.
