Influenced by Disinformation: What the U.S. Can Do to Counter Disinformation Operations

In February and March of 2022, as Russian troops crossed into Ukraine, Russian misinformation concurrently crossed over social media platforms to support them. Russia attempted to promote the idea that Ukraine housed bioweapons plants for the U.S. While the idea was swiftly debunked, it gained traction amongst conspiracy theorists in the U.S. The prevalence of these conspiracy theories in public debate eroded the public’s faith in U.S. institutions, capitalizing on disunity amongst Americans, lack of government efficiency, and lack of institutional transparency.

The Art of Partisan Warfare Is Not Dead: How old Russian military theories can give new insight into resistance to occupation in Ukraine

For both Ukrainians and Russians, the concept of partisan warfare is not new. Both countries have long histories of using irregular warfare to resist foreign invaders. As far back as the French invasion of Russia in 1812, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov, who has been immortalized by Leo Tolstoy using him as the basis for the character Denisov in War and Peace, used guerilla warfare to stymie Napoleon’s advance.

Foreign Governments’ Investments in Entertainment and Movies as Instruments of Soft Power and Influence in Irregular Warfare

In the ever-evolving landscape of irregular warfare, foreign governments recognize the potential of soft power as a means to wield influence, shape global perceptions, and conduct direct and indirect information operations. With a decrease in traditional conflicts and conventional war, the increasing importance of employing irregular warfare, characterized by non-traditional methods and asymmetric tactics, means that nations have recognized the importance of increasingly turning to investment, development, and control in the arena of entertainment as potent tools for projecting soft power and exerting influence both domestically and abroad.

The Fall from Grace of Russian SOF: The Danger of Forgetting Lessons Learned

As part of its ongoing efforts to help scholars and practitioners understand Russia’s approach to irregular warfare (IW), the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) translated a 33-page Russian special operations journal article, The Fundamentals of Partisan Warfare: Theory and Practice. The Russian article is now available for request on the IWC website. This Insights article is the first of a two-part series meant to introduce the Russian text and apply the concepts contained within to the current conflict in Ukraine.

The Newest Weapon in Irregular Warfare – Artificial Intelligence

On the morning of 22 May, 2023, an artificial intelligence (AI) generated image of an explosion at the Pentagon surfaced online and spread like wildfire throughout social media. Multiple news sources reported and shared the AI-generated image on their platforms. As a result, markets responded to the reports and image, and the S&P 500 index fell in just minutes after its reporting, causing a $500 billion market cap swing, even though this image was quickly proven as fake.

Three Lessons from the Front: Economic Warfare in Russia / Ukraine

A country’s economy is core to its ability to provide a better life for its people, develop and fund social services, and ultimately create the means for war. Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump both used speeches in 2017 to directly link economic might to the pursuit of national interests. It should therefore come as no surprise that economic warfare tactics are getting a much-needed refresh as we re-enter a multi-polar world with specific challenges to both the United States’ economic hegemony, as well as the international rules-based system.

Simple Sabotage 2.0: the Threat of Pro-Russian Civil Resistance in Ukraine

Resistance is an asymmetric tool that can be used by an underdog to fight against an oppressor or a foreign military occupation. However, the Russo-Ukrainian War has demonstrated that this concept can also be used by an occupying force. As part of the Irregular Warfare Center’s (hereafter, IWC) ongoing mission to illuminate and address irregular threats posed to the U.S. and its allies and partners, the Center recently obtained and translated a Russian handbook designed to instruct pro-Russian Ukrainian citizens on how to resist the Ukrainian government; something that is especially relevant in recently recaptured territories.

The Defender’s Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression

Elisabeth Braw’s central thesis in The Defender’s Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression is that gray-zone aggression has become an increasingly more pervasive and complex challenge for nations than traditional war and that defense strategies are often inadequate to address gray-zone aggression. Braw pointedly argues that gray-zone aggression, which refers to acts of aggression that fall between the traditional definitions of peace and war, has emerged as the preferred mode of modern conflict as states seek to assail Western institutions and values through non-traditional means, such as cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion.

The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in Europe

This report is the first in a series of volumes in which the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) explores the commonalities and differences of the conceptualization of irregular warfare across U.S. allies and partners. This initial volume compares and contrasts this conceptualization among five European academic institutions: the Netherlands Defence Academy, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, the Swedish Defence University, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, and the Military Academy of Lithuania. Each of these institutions replied to surveys the IWC designed, assessing how these institutions individually conceptualize and teach irregular warfare and related concepts.