OSS 2.0: Emphasizing the Importance of Human Intelligence in Irregular Warfare for Great Power Competition

As the global landscape shifts into an era of Great Power Competition, characterized by unconventional threats and complex geopolitical dynamics, the need for a reimagined Office of Strategic Services (OSS) framework has never been more pressing. The revival of an OSS 2.0 would empower the Department of Defense (DoD) with enhanced Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities that are critical for navigating the intricacies of Irregular Warfare (IW). Leveraging an updated OSS concept, the DoD could build deeper, longer-lasting relationships with foreign partners and local populations, laying the foundation for invaluable intelligence collection and clandestine or covert operations.

The Role of Non-State Actors as Proxies in Irregular Warfare and Malign State Influence

This paper explores the ways that states benefit from the activities of non-state actors (NSAs) as tools of irregular warfare (IW), with a particular focus on China and Russia. An examination of the historical relationships between state and non-state actors reveal that while proxies provide many potential advantages to their authoritarian patrons, they also present significant problems. The paper further demonstrates how China and Russia each utilizes a wide range of NSAs in a similarly broad spectrum of irregular warfare activities, including low-level persistent operations designed to erode adversaries’ institutions over time, to much more kinetic operations that directly challenge the territorial integrity of other sovereign states. Implications for how to respond to these activities are discussed.

The Essential Role of Policy, Doctrine, and Education in Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare (IW) is vital in today’s military planning. It’s complex and constantly changing, using methods that aren’t typical and adapting strategies as needed. Conventional warfare aims to fight and beat enemy forces. IW, however, works in messy political and social situations where standard rules of engagement don’t always fit. Because IW covers so many areas, the armed forces need to improve how they handle it. This means updating their policies, battle plans, teaching, and practice to meet IW’s demands. Policy needs to address new challenges like threat networks, information operations, terrorism, and cyber-attacks within a greater strategic framework.

When Rambo Meets the Red Cross: Civil-Military Engagement in Fragile States

When Rambo Meets the Red Cross takes a critical look at the trifecta of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), their relationship with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the beneficiaries of foreign aid. Stanislava Mladenova collects semi-structured interviews from actors on all three sides of the civil-military relationship to search for the answer to her central question: “Can SOF and NGOs be effective partners in low-intensity conflict?”

American Irregular Warfare in Latin America

History is a matter of perspective; one of the best examples is American involvement in Latin America. The United States’ interest in Latin America is generally perceived to be centered upon gaining access to commodities or serving political and economic interests. It is argued that American economic involvement is of recent origin, a consequence of post-World War II policies establishing both the Pax Americana and the Open Door of universal access to resources.

Reframing the Term “Irregular Warfare” in Times of Peace into the Contemporary Idea of “Defense Support to Strategic Competition”

In contemporary global security dynamics, the terminology used to describe military and strategic operations is crucial. The terms “irregular” and “warfare” often either fail to resonate with foreign partners and U.S. government interagency partners or raise red flags due to different organizational meanings, as they imply a state of conflict that is not necessarily present. This publication explores the shift from traditional concepts of Irregular Warfare (IW) to a more fitting term, “Defense Support to Strategic Competition,” to describe the Department of Defense’s (DoD) activities short of war in support of interagency organizations and foreign partners. Ultimately, various components within the DoD are capable of providing valuable assistance and support to interagency organizations to create enduring advantages in Strategic Competition. However, a barrier exists in understanding among organizations as to what “irregular warfare” is and how it can be applied in Competition and Crisis prior to an overt military conflict.

Stealth Surgery: Mitigating Signature Detection Risks for Special Operations Surgical Teams

In modern warfare, United States (U.S.) military special operations frequently employ unconventional and irregular tactics, often operating in environments denied by opposition forces. Special Operations surgical teams (SOST) provide immediate medical care in these high-risk environments, with their success and safety heavily dependent on avoiding detection of any kind. However, the electronic medical equipment used, such as patient monitors and ventilators, emit electromagnetic radiation that adversaries can detect with sensors and analysis systems. As nations like Russia and China continue to enhance their electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, the need for robust countermeasures becomes increasingly critical.

The Irregular Warfare Center and Hybrid CoE Cooperation: A Vital Partnership for the Future

The Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) and the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (HCOE) entered into a unique partnership in FY 24 making both institutions stronger and more globally connected. The HCOE was born out of a desire to strengthen NATO-EU cooperation on hybrid threats with the 2016 Joint NATO/EU declaration committing both institutions to counter hybrid threats in a cooperative manner. In this declaration, NATO and the EU voiced the realization that hybrid threats exploited the divisions between civil and military responses. Success in countering these threats requires combining individual strengths and areas of expertise. Finland answered the call in 2017 by creating the HCOE and, to date, 36 NATO Allies and EU Member States have become members of the Center.

SOF Should Not Be Used as Assault Troops: Lessons from the Russo-Ukraine Conflict

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and its subsequent transition into a large-scale war, has shown that conventional warfare maintains its relevance in a world of strategic competition. At the same time, however, it has also underscored the inherently hybrid nature of modern warfare, with blurred boundaries between conventional and irregular elements. For Russia and Ukraine, this means that the conflict is occurring at all levels, tactical to strategic, and in multiple domains simultaneously: the front lines, rear areas, areas of occupation, the cyber domain, the information environment, and beyond. In planning for national and territorial defense, countries must account for this element, or risk mismatching resources in ways that degrade their warfighting capability. In this complex threat environment, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven invaluable.

The Vital Role of Airlines and Commercial Aviation in Irregular Warfare

Commercial airlines and aviation have emerged as a critical yet often overlooked element in the context of irregular warfare (IW). These assets are not just part of a state’s infrastructure, but they also significantly contribute to a state’s response capabilities. A prime example of this was seen during the U.S. evacuation from Afghanistan, where commercial aviation extended beyond its traditional role of transportation. It played a crucial role in strategic operations and logistics, demonstrating how governments, like the U.S., are increasingly relying on commercial airlines for matters of national security and political significance. In the face of IW threats, commercial aviation’s capabilities encompass the ability to rapidly mobilize resources, ensure the continuity of critical services, and maintain the resilience of societal structures.