Africa Conceptualization of IW Study

About the Authors

Dr. Sandor Fabian (Morgan 6 Contractor) is a former Hungarian Special Forces officer with 20 years of military experience. Dr. Fabian served in multiple national assignments, including the senior Special Forces desk officer and advisor to the Hungarian Chief of Defense, and held the Force Assessment and Evaluation Branch Head position at the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (now Allied Special Operations Command).

Dr. Fabian is currently an instructor and curriculum developer supporting the NATO Special Operations education, training, exercises, and evaluation efforts. Dr. Fabian is also an adjunct faculty member at the University of Central Florida, where he teaches intelligence and international relations classes.

Dr. Fabian is a graduate of the Hungarian Miklos Zrinyi National Defense University, holds a Master’s degree in Defense Analysis from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, a graduate certificate in U.S. Intelligence Studies and a Ph.D. in Security Studies both from the University of Central Florida. Dr. Fabian’s additional training and education includes the U.S. Marine Corps Basic Officer course, Infantry Officer course, Expeditionary Warfare School and several courses at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University and the NATO Special Operations School.

Dr. Fabian is the author of the book titled “Irregular Warfare: The Future Military Strategy For Small States” and published several articles in peer-reviewed journals, including the International Studies Quarterly, the Strategic Security Journal, the Defense and Security Analysis Journal, the Special Operations Journal, the Combating Terrorism Exchange Journal, the British Defence Studies journal and the Hungarian Sereg Szemle and Honvedsegi Szemle journals. Dr. Fabian has also contributed several articles at the Modern War Institute at West Point, Small Wars Journal, and the British Royal United Service Institute. Dr. Fabian’s research interest includes irregular warfare, Russian and Chinese approaches to conflict, U.S. foreign security assistance and special operations.

Dr. Fabian is currently the Deputy Regional Advisor for Europe and Africa at the Irregular Warfare Center. As Deputy Regional Advisor, Dr. Fabian has led engagements with partners and allies across the region, drafted the Center’s strategy for the Europe and Africa region, and is the lead author of this study.

Matthew Heidel (Valens Global Contractor) is an analyst at the Irregular Warfare Center focused on the African and European regions. In this role, he has conducted interviews and reviewed surveys on the international conceptualization of irregular warfare. Matthew also supports the Center’s engagements in Europe and Africa. Prior to joining the Irregular Warfare Center, Matthew helped develop immersive wargames for academic, civil society, and government audiences at Valens Global. Matthew holds a B.A. in Government from the College of William & Mary.

Preface

This study is the third in a series of volumes in which the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) explores the commonalities and differences of the conceptualization of irregular warfare across U.S. allied and partner stakeholders in regions important for U.S. national security. This volume focuses on the African region and is based on surveys and semi-structured interviews with five defense thought leaders drawn from across the continent.

The African continent is the world’s second-largest by land area and population.[1] The continent boasts significant linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity, making generalized conclusions difficult. According to UN projections, by 2050, 25% of the world’s population will be in Africa.[2] Parts of the continent boast significant natural resources, including critical minerals and rare earth elements necessary for sensitive defense production, uranium, precious metals, and significant hydrocarbon deposits. The region also impacts critical shipping lanes, including along the Horn of Africa, which connect Europe to Asia. Violent Extremist Groups (VEOs), including ISIS and Al Qaeda affiliates, threaten lives and livelihoods across multiple parts of the continent. Both the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are exploiting economic and security ties across the continent, often while extracting payment through interests in natural resources. Despite these significant security interests, the African continent has not consistently ranked at the top of U.S. security priorities.

The current United States National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies the region as “central to addressing complex global problems” and that regional problems require “African-led efforts” to find solutions to these problems, a theme that will likely continue into forthcoming NSSs.[3] Supporting African-led solutions requires that the U.S. national security enterprise can understand Africa’s security challenges from a non-Western perspective and can communicate in a common lexicon.

The IWC has compiled this study series to understand commonalities and differences in the conceptualization of irregular warfare (IW) across U.S. allies and partners. Understanding different conceptualizations of IW is critical for the United States to better support allies and partners to build resilience to common IW challenges.

This study is based on IWC-generated formal surveys and semi-structured interviews from academic institutions or ministries of defense. The participants were drawn from the Angolan Institute for Higher Military Education; the Kenyan Counter Insurgency, Terrorism, and Stability Operations Organization; the Liberian Ministry of National Defense; the National Defence College of Nigeria; and the Zambian Defence Services, Command and Staff College.

Executive Summary

To maintain critical competencies and to develop new capabilities in IW, continued and wide-ranging study of the concept must remain a high priority. With a focus on the African region, this study is the third in a series of volumes exploring the commonalities and differences in ideas related to IW across U.S. allies and partners. Identifying baseline knowledge on the understanding of IW-related thought in allied and partner academic and professional military educational institutions and exploring areas of potential cooperation on issues relevant to IW is critical to U.S. national security interests.

While this study finds that there is not a unified African conceptualization of IW, most African conceptualizations of IW are focused on unconventional warfare techniques implemented by violent non-state actors. Representatives of institutions surveyed as part of this study were all willing to offer a definition of IW and had a familiarity with the term. Most often, IW was seen primarily or exclusively through a counterinsurgency (COIN) or counter-terrorism (CT) lens. Like in the second study of this series (Indo-Pacific region), survey and interview responses showed a strong relationship between IW tactics and violence, with multiple participants expressing skepticism that IW was possible without some level of violence. Every proposed conceptualization of IW has a nexus to violent non-state actors and many participants were either skeptical of state-on-state IW or did not consider it in their responses.

Many of the surveyed institutions’ understanding of IW is informed by their unique national history or regionally specific threats. When asked to identify primary current IW threats facing their respective countries, religiously motivated extremist organizations were the most commonly listed threat actors. Several respondents listed regionally unique IW threats that have not previously appeared in this study series, such as cattle rustling, illegal timber mining, maritime piracy, and banditry. Additionally, understanding of IW by surveyed individuals was informed by their country’s experience during decolonization when some pro-independence movements used IW techniques.

Acknowledgements

IWC would like to express its appreciation to all who contributed to the successful completion of this study. The Center is grateful for the support of U.S. embassy staff and the U.S. Defense Attachés stationed in Angola, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Zambia. Our greatest gratitude goes out to Lieutenant General Miguel Junior of the Angolan Institute for Higher Military Education; Major Martin Kasinga from the Kenyan Counter Insurgency, Terrorism, and Stability Operations Organization; Assistant Minister Charleson of the Liberian Ministry of National Defense; Brigadier General Olurotimi Adejoro of the National Defence College of Nigeria; and Brigadier General Phil Samatamba of the Zambian Defence Services, Command and Staff College for their support of this project.

Introduction

The United States has increasingly recognized the strategic importance of the African region. The United States has designated two countries, Morrocco and Kenya, within AFRICOM’s area of responsibility as major non-NATO allies and the Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly sought opportunities to work with partners on the continent. The continent is home to natural resource reserves that include critical minerals that are increasingly critical to modern technology with applications from batteries to defense infrastructure and computers.

Despite significant opportunities from a growing population and natural resources, IW threats are present across the continent. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and insurgents, some of whom are supported by outside powers, threaten lives and livelihoods across the continent. U.S. adversaries maintain a presence on the continent and are actively pursuing their own interests in strategic countries.

In order to productively engage with the continent, the United States needs to understand potential threats within their unique local context. Irregular warfare as a concept is uniquely relevant on a continent where there are few threats of conventional state-on-state conflict but many conflicts with non-state actors. Despite this, much of the existing literature on IW examines the context through a Western lens. The Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) serves as the DoD’s central mechanism for developing the IW knowledge of the Department. With this study, the IWC fulfills this role by creating an opportunity for U.S. stakeholders to understand IW through the eyes of local practitioners and policymakers, which could improve the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance efforts across the continent.

Methodology

As the third volume of this series, this study is based on the same survey and subsequent semi-structured interviews as the first volume that was published on European institutions and the second volume that was published on the Indo-pacific region. The respondents associated with the third volume are representatives of institutions from the African Region. The overall project was conducted between 15 September and 30 December 2024. The survey was conducted between 15 September and 10 November 2024. The in-depth semi-structured interviews were held from 10 November to 30 December 2024. The survey questions addressed the target institution’s conceptualization of IW; which irregular threats the institution considers and prioritizes; how the institution teaches concepts related to IW; whether the institution publishes on the topic; the level of the institution’s connection to a broader community focused on IW; and who makes up the institution’s faculty, courses, and target audience. The responses to survey questions directly shaped the interview portion of the research, providing potential avenues for further exploration. When reporting each institution’s survey and interview responses, this study strives to utilize language that is as close as possible to how the institution itself responded to preserve fidelity to the original answers provided. Several themes arose from the survey and the interviews, serving as guidance for future areas of cooperation or potential areas of contention between the United States and its allies and partners on the African continent.

The five subject institutions were specifically selected to ensure sufficient variation in the sample while maximizing response quality. The subjects were drawn from the Angolan Institute for Higher Military Education; the Kenyan Counter Insurgency, Terrorism, and Stability Operations Organization; the Liberian Ministry of National Defense; the National Defence College of Nigeria, and the Zambian Defence Services, Command and Staff College. The strategy behind the case selection was to harvest data from institutions with different levels, purposes, and training audiences while also ensuring geographical dispersion within the African region.

Republic of Angola: Higher Military Technical Institute of Angola

The modern Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) were created in 1991. The FAA is composed of three branches: the army, air force and navy.[4] The Angolan Higher Military Technical Institute of Angola is a professional military education (PME) institution for FAA. The institute was created in 2007 and offers courses in medicine, nursing, computer engineering, mechanical engineering, and construction and fortification engineering.[5]

Definition of irregular warfare

Irregular warfare is seen at the Higher Military Technical Institute of Angola as a way of waging war without conventional means. The study participant identified examples including “insurgency, guerrilla warfare, armed struggle, war of liberation, counterinsurgency, and asymmetric conflict.” In this understanding, IW has long been used as a way to achieve a goal with all available instruments of conflict. In Angola, the understanding of IW is informed by the use of insurgent tactics during the struggle for liberation from Portugal and the Angolan civil war. These conflicts also demonstrated how outside forces could seek to influence an IW campaign through support for insurgency or counterinsurgency efforts.

Identified irregular threats

When looking to the broader region, the participant identified IW as a common technique used across Southern Africa. In Angola’s region, both insurgencies and illicit narco-trafficking organizations pose potential IW threats. Generally, the IW threats in Angola’s region, as understood at the institute, seek to change the political order.

Teaching irregular warfare concepts

In instruction, the institute teaches that irregular warfare uses different means than conventional warfare and requires different resources to combat.  The understanding of irregular warfare at the institute is informed by the Angolan War of Liberation and the counterinsurgency efforts used by Portugal during the conflict. Angola’s experience with IW during decolonization has led to significant interest in IW. The study participant has published on topics related to irregular warfare during the Angolan War of Liberation.

Course material is drawn from around the world. Most of the students are military though there are occasionally civilian students. The participant suggested that Angola has a lot of institutional knowledge about IW in Southern Africa. The participant suggested that the U.S. should engage with IW from a regional as well as an international level. The main IW threats in the region require not just a military response but also political and economic response, which requires significant amounts of local context.

While the institute does not have a defined IW network, there is contact on IW with the Military History Commission of Portugal focused on counterinsurgency and the war of liberation. The Angolan Institute for Higher Military Education does not have a public-facing platform for IW content.

Federal Republic of Nigeria: National Defence College

The National Defence College (NDC) of Nigeria was established in 1992 as the highest professional military educational institution in Nigeria. Located in Abuja, the college offers a curriculum divided across nine modules and three terms.[6] The college’s class of 2024 had 111 graduates drawn from across Nigeria as well as foreign militaries.[7]

Definition of irregular warfare

The NDC does not have a handbook definition of IW, but it does have definitions for insurgency/counterinsurgency as well as terrorism/counterterrorism. The study participant noted that warfare in Nigeria’s region was significantly more irregular than regular. Nigeria’s understanding of IW is shaped by the country’s recent conflicts, which have been either counterinsurgency or counterterrorism instead of conventional state-on-state conflict.

According to the study response, states may also resort to IW techniques because they do not have the resources to wage conventional conflict. It is also possible for non-state IW threat actors to be sponsored by a state or that the non-state IW threat actors are merely an organic product of their environment.

In the interview portion of the study, the participant identified violence as a necessary component for something to be IW, though the participant noted that there are varying levels of violence that may be employed in IW. When fighting organized IW threats, the participant identified that targeted violence was needed at each stage of an IW conflict. To be successful in countering IW, the participant felt that large-scale violence should be targeted against the armed wings of IW actors, and not the population, to serve as a deterrent to further IW.

The study participant also identified cybercrime and operations in the information environment (OIE) as related to IW in Nigeria. Nigeria has established a cyber command which confronts electronic and cyber-based threats. The participant described countering disinformation as one way to counter IW. In Nigeria, countering IW threat actors in the information space often requires cooperation with local religious leaders. Additionally, the participant pointed to the success of BBC Hausa as one of the most effective ways of spreading information across the regions most affected by IW threats.

Identified irregular threats

While conventional warfare is the most common type of conflict in military instruction, it is the least common in the region. Nigeria faces religiously motivated insurgents such as Boko Haram and armed banditry (a term used in Nigeria to describe ongoing conflicts over land and organized robbery common in parts of the countryside). While there is not a formal prioritized list of IW threats, the main priority for Nigeria is Islamic insurgents, followed by bandits, pirates, para-militants, and highway robbers or urban criminal groups.

According to the study participant from the NDC, IW is often targeted at or used by non-state armed groups rather than targeted at another nation-state. When the state is targeted with IW, the participant suggested several possible responses, including an authoritarian approach, an enemy-centric approach, or a population-centric approach. The authoritarian approach involves using curfews or other measures to mitigate the risk of successful IW. The enemy-centric approach is more narrowly focused on eliminating an insurgent force. Finally, states can deploy a population-centric approach, which the participant explained was part of Nigeria’s current approach. This method is primarily a non-kinetic attempt to reduce the ability of IW actors to draw new members or support. Successful implementation requires a whole-of-society to involve security services alongside traditional, faith-based, and civil society leaders. The effort in Nigeria is coordinated through the office of national security advisor.

Teaching irregular warfare concepts

In Nigeria, IW education is normally part of operational and tactical level instructions at the staff college. There is instruction for IW strategic planning, but there are not many educational opportunities on specific doctrine for IW. At the NDC, instruction on IW is informed by experiences across the region with IW, including British counterinsurgency during the colonial period and multi-national missions to Liberia and Sierra Leone. More recently, crises in the Niger Delta with para-militants and Boko Haram has informed IW instruction and the demand for understanding IW in a regional context.

While the NDC does teach on topics related to IW, there is not a dedicated publication on IW. However, members of the NDC often publish material related to IW internally or in journals.

Republic of Zambia: Zambian Defence Services, Command and Staff College (DSCSC)

The Zambian Defence Services, Command and Staff College (DSCSC) is the highest professional military educational institutions in Zambia. DSCSC was established in 1995 to provide professional military education for Zambian Defence Force’s officers within the country.[8] DSCSC offers a one-year course of study in strategy and tactics for majors and lieutenant colonels.[9]

Definition of irregular warfare

While the Zambian DSCSC does not have a specific definition of IW, it does have one for Low-Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO), which covers IW. According to the DSCSC study participant, LICO covers conflicts that are “usually localized between two or more states or non-state actors below [the level of] conventional warfare.” This kind of conflict generally uses violence to cause fear in a broader population. In Zambia’s understanding of IW, nation-states can take part in IW, especially in the context of fighting insurgents.

Zambia’s conceptualization of LICO, and by extension IW, is influenced by its experience with insurgent groups. While the country has not faced a major insurgent threat since the 1980s, the country’s support of international peacekeeping missions informs the understanding of IW. The participant pointed to peacekeeping missions to Sierra Leone in 2001 and 2004 as informing their conceptualization of IW. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) demonstrated how insurgents could use brutal, unconventional tactics, to instill fear in a population in an attempt to disrupt the political order. Zambia and the DSCSC also looks to other definitions of IW around the world, including the United States.

Identified irregular threats

The main IW threat facing Zambia is from extremist groups, especially ones using terrorist tactics. Many of these groups are also involved in transnational crime. The participant pointed to the M23, a rebel group in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as an example of an organization using irregular warfare tactics. Both Mozambique and the DRC face IW threats from insurgents and share a border with Zambia. Within the armed services, there are anti-terrorist groups that prepare to fight IW threat actors. Zambia prioritizes terrorism, followed by human and drug trafficking, illegal migration, illegal timber harvesting, and cybercrime as the main IW threats.

Since IW, as understood in Zambia, is generally used by terrorist organizations, IW is often used against soft targets instead of directly at the armed services. Often IW threat actors, as conceived in Zambia, employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and AK-47s, which are easily accessible in the region in their attacks.

Teaching irregular warfare concepts

IW, as covered under LICO, is part of the education at all of the professional military education (PME) institutions in Zambia. Instructors use lectures and group discussions to teach about IW, culminating in a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) to test students on what they have learned. The education is targeted mostly at military personnel as well as police and the Department of Immigration. Instruction is provided by military instructors. Instruction by civilian lecturers who are not based at the DSCSC is available through cooperation with the University of Zambia, which offers a Defence and Security Studies program. There is not currently an IW-specific publication or regional network for publication. The DSCSC participant noted that there is a lack of IW materials specific to the region for use in instruction or to support a regional conceptualization of IW.

Republic of Kenya: Kenyan Counter Insurgency, Terrorism, and Stability Operations Organization (CISTO)

Kenya’s Counter Insurgency, Terrorism, and Stability Operations Organization (CISTO) provides training and education for members of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and other members of the security services. The KDF was established in 1963 following independence. The modern KDF includes an army, air force, and navy.[10]

Definition of irregular warfare

Irregular warfare is seen at the Kenyan Counter Insurgency, Terrorism, and Stability Operations Organization (CISTO) as a type of conflict where “belligerents utilize asymmetric tactics,” according to the CISTO participant in the study. Generally, IW is seen as involving nonstate actors that challenge the state or use violence as a means to achieve political ends. Actors who use IW, as conceived of at CISTO, often focus on gaining the support or control of a local population. IW, as a type of conflict, allows weaker groups to challenge more conventionally powerful forces by using unconventional tactics in a decentralized way.

Looking to the broader region, the participant also pointed to groups like Al-Shabaab (which Kenya has dispatched police officers to confront as part of an African Union-led mission to Somalia). The tactics, techniques, and procedures identified by the participant apply to many modern insurgencies, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and using civilians as shields in violation of the laws of armed conflict.

Identified irregular threats

The primary IW threat actor discussed in the interview was Al-Shabab, the Somali-based Al-Qaeda affiliate. Al-Shabab has conducted attacks in Kenya and Kenya has deployed troops to Somalia under African Union missions to fight the group.  Kenya does not maintain a single, prioritized list of irregular threats, but it has outlined in national security documents major threats, most of which have an irregular component. These threats include terrorism, especially Al-Shabaab, local radicalization, ethnic or communal violence, election-related violence, organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, maritime piracy, resource-based conflicts such as cattle rustling, cybercrime, political instability, and wildlife poaching.  

Teaching irregular warfare concepts

CISTO primarily looks at the threat of terrorism and insurgents in Kenya. While CISTO does not have an overarching IW strategy, it does look to best practices around the world. Currently, the training is primarily aimed at security professionals drawn from the Kenya Defence Forces, intelligence services, and police. While there is not currently an IW-focused publication, there are opportunities for commanders to publish on lessons learned from their recent deployments. These publications then inform the training and tactical needs of units preparing to deploy into the field as well as informing the understanding of current irregular threats.

Republic of Liberia: Liberian Ministry of National Defense

The Liberian Ministry of National Defense (MoD) oversees the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The modern AFL traces its origin to the Liberian Frontier Force established in 1908. Today, the armed forces boast a navy, air reconnaissance unit, and infantry.[11] The MoD was formed in 1972 as the civilian oversight of the armed forces.[12] The MoD is based in the capital, Monrovia.

Definition of irregular warfare

The Liberian MOD does not have its own definition for IW, but it does look to globally accepted definitions. The University of Liberia, according to the study participant, considers IW “a form of conflict that involves the behavior of non-state actors employing asymmetric tactics to achieve political or ideological objectives, distinguishing it from conventional warfare.” Under this understanding of IW, unconventional means might be guerrilla or terrorist tactics or could be cyber-based. Like other institutions examined in this study, violence is seen as a necessary condition for IW.

Identified irregular threats

According to the study participant, the primary IW-related security challenges facing Liberia are internal rather than stemming from foreign threats. These threats include violent protests, threats to the rule of law, and cybersecurity. Liberia’s understanding of IW as involving violent non-state actors is also informed by its history with militia and insurgency. While terrorist threats are not as high as other states in the region, instruction at the university is increasingly considering the threat of terrorism. Additionally, violent criminal organizations and drug smuggling fall under the definition of IW explored above.

Teaching irregular warfare concepts

The University of Liberia, as the main public university, teaches courses related to IW. Instruction that includes education on IW includes courses on political science, conflict resolution, and international relations. Additionally, the university offers a Reserved Officer Training Course that includes instruction related to IW. While there is no specific training material on IW, the government is conducting a security sector reform program for the armed forces and police which includes aspects of IW.

There is not a specific, Liberian-based publication dedicated to IW, but the University Press of Liberia has published works related to IW. Additionally, internal government publications may touch on IW. However, there is a lack of specific educational materials on IW that address Liberia’s unique context.

Conclusion

While there is not a unified conceptualization of IW, there are significant commonalities across survey institutions and individuals. Generally, IW is seen as a tool of non-state actors, and it is seen as part of insurgency or terrorism. This study supports the conclusion already reached in the previous volumes on Europe and the Indo-pacific that the United States cannot assume that its allies and partners all utilize a similar definition of IW to its own. In the Africa region, IW is most commonly thought of as a tactic used by weaker non-state groups to either combat the state, participate in criminal enterprises, or influence a population for a political end. Given the resonance that the term irregular warfare had with participants, under this understanding, it is easy to expect that there could be miscommunication or missed opportunities if the United States does not recognize the regional understanding of IW. The 21st century has often been called the “African century.” As Africa becomes increasingly important as a continent of great economic potential, natural resource wealth, and a growing population, understanding conflicts on the continent will become even more central for broader great power competition. This study showed that defense thought leaders from across the continent see IW, as they conceive of it, as a major threat.

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[2] Andrew Stanley, “African Century: A Demographic Transformation in Africa has the Potential to Alter the World Order,” IMF Finance & Development Magazine, September 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2023/09/PT-african-century.

[3] “National Security Strategy,” October 2022, 12, 44, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.   

[4] “História Cultura Forças Armadas Angolanas,” Forças Armadas Angolanas, 2025, https://faa.ao/pagina/historia-cultura.

[5] “Instituto Superior Técnico Militar,” Forças Armadas Angolanas, 2025, https://faa.ao/pagina/istm

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[7] “National Defence College Graduates 111 Participants Of Course 32,” Nigerian Defence College, August 24. 2024,  https://ndc.gov.ng/national-defence-college-graduates-111-participants-of-course-32/.

[8] Maj. Innocent Chewe, “An Examination of Professionalism in the Zambia Army,” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2014), 36, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA613529.pdf.

[9] Chewe, 58.

[10] “History and Evolution of the Ministry of Defence,” Ministry of Defence, Kenya, accessed January 2025, https://mod.go.ke/history-and-evolution-of-the-ministry-of-defence/.

[11] “Brief History of AFL,” Ministry of National Defense, accessed January 2025, https://mod.gov.lr/the-forces/brief-history-of-afl/.

[12] “Contemporary Structure of The Ministry of National Defense,” Ministry of National Defense, accessed January 2025, https://mod.gov.lr/the-ministry-2/about-the-mod/.