
J.D. Maddox, Irregular Warfare Center – Operations in the Information Environment Subject Matter Expert (Contractor)
Implementing new controls over the cognitive conditions of illicit markets for weapons, drugs, contraband and people would address underlying enablers of a vexing border security challenge.
Since its beginning, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) foreign terrorist organization has deliberately used violence as a strategic means of influencing its targets. The spectacle of its first attack – the 2009 mutilation and display of three rival cartel members’ bodies, accompanied by a note reading, “we are the new group Mata Zetas [Zeta Killers] and we are against kidnapping and extortion, and we will fight them in all states for a cleaner Mexico”– was the first demonstration of CJNG’s clever use of cognitive warfare as it rapidly ascended to a position of power. The note falsely justified the killings to the Mexican public while defiantly announcing more attacks to come, and hijacked the Mexican media – hallmarks of an influence campaign that would effectively circumnavigate state controls for years to come.
In February 2026, CJNG’s leader Oseguera Cervantes (“El Mencho”) was killed during an attempt by Mexican special forces to capture him in Jalisco state, according to Mexico’s defense secretary. The CJNG influence tactics that followed were not the death throes of a defeated cartel; instead, they were a demonstration of well-delegated media responsibilities within the cartel. CJNG quickly staged actual retaliatory attacks, such as setting up roadblocks and setting fire to buses and stores, and these attacks were conflated on social media and in traditional media outlets by false depictions of broader violence, such as reports of the takeover of the Guadalajara airport by “assassins,” a church set on fire in Puerto Vallarta, and other AI-generated images of destruction. The goal, according to cartel watchers, was to reinforce fear of CJNG and to depict a geographically unrestricted organization. Believable or not, CJNG’s online content hijacked the media again, turning the death of its leader into a declaration of continued market control. That market control continued despite his death.
Adapting Irregular Warfare Concepts to Emerging Conditions
The extreme importance of cognitive warfare for CJNG – one of nine major drug cartels operating in Mexico that employ similar principles – presents challenges to recent U.S. models of intervention. If military strategists equate these transnational criminal organizations with ideologically motivated terrorist organizations of the “GWOT era,” for example, they will generate imperfect analogies and misdirected operations. In contrast to these recent adversaries, the cartels are “a network of subordinate gangs, tenuous alliances, and illicit collusion with politicians and police at all levels of government. All of these components are linked to global illicit economic flows […] that transcends territorial boundaries both within and across national frontiers,” according to a recent study of the Mexican criminal landscape.
Putting those global illicit economic flows into perspective, the 2020 National Drug Threat Assessment estimated that the cartels generated $19-29 billion annually from drug sales to the U.S. alone. The cognitive warfare activities of the cartels are almost certainly intended to defend and expand those illicit market operations. It seems to be their core motivation… and their weakness. This core motivation should also be the focus of counteroperations. However, a review of cognitive warfare strategies for border security and counter-cartel operations reveals significant research gaps across multiple domains. These include limited empirical studies on the effectiveness of cognitive defense tactics, insufficient integration of psychological research with border security operations, inadequate legal frameworks for cognitive operations, and underdeveloped models for measuring cognitive impacts. Researchers should focus on developing comprehensive theoretical frameworks specifically tailored to border security contexts, conducting rigorous empirical studies on cognitive warfare effectiveness, exploring ethical implementation approaches, and creating standardized measurement methodologies.
As U.S. defense strategy radically turns away from its post-9/11 focus, fresh research into U.S. operations in Afghanistan highlights the effectiveness and limits of counterterrorism operations as a model, and requires analysts to question the replicability of these operations against emerging adversaries. The strategy used against the terrorist group al-Qaida was not directly transferrable to the Taliban, for example, and was susceptible to drift from the original intent of operations in Afghanistan. It is also unlikely to serve as the useful basis of a current counter-cartel strategy, requiring new and creative thinking. A useful new strategy against the cartels would publicly define and quantify objectives to avoid mission creep, perhaps beginning with the stated principle of “preventing the illicit movement of weapons, drugs, contraband and people”– a principle that intentionally or unintentionally implies the underlying market causes of the problem. Supportive influence initiatives would reflect those objectives.
What’s certain is that it’s been extraordinarily difficult to beat the cartels at their own psychological games, and to address the underlying causes of the problem. Successful historical influence operations against the cartels have mostly been reactive, such as anti-gang campaigns in Central America, publicization of prosecutions of corrupt officials in Mexico, or publicization of economic alternatives of drug production and trafficking. These tactics often are intended to reduce the obvious symptoms of the illicit drug trade, while falling short of addressing underlying motivations. Perhaps the least effective influence campaigns are online only, often contributing to colorful and escalatory discussion, but lacking a clear behavior change objective – such as recent online state condemnation of narcocorrido drug ballads, which may unintentionally reinforce cartel status.
Reducing Illicit Market Participation with Cognitive Tools
Under the assumption that market opportunity compels participation in illicit drug production, and trafficking, the main focus of effective counter-cartel influence operations would go much deeper than simply addressing the symptoms of the market. Controlling the cognitive conditions of market participation may offer new opportunities for influence over the cartels. Examples of influence options against these foreign organizations may include the following:
Acknowledging the Risk of Meddling with Illicit Markets
All of these options, and the greater concept of a cognitive warfare approach to countering illicit markets, come with a frustrating caveat: that there has never been an effective national counter-cartel policy, if the goal is the elimination of trafficking into the U.S. Tampering with illicit drug markets in Mexico has historically created significant and unintended risks, sometimes leading to heightened violence, the diversification and militarization of criminal organizations, the displacement of cartel activity to other areas (the “balloon effect”), and the development of more potent adulterated drugs. Preparing for these risks is essential to new policy development.
Ultimately, these interventions have often aggravated rather than solved the underlying drug problem, leading to profound socioeconomic and political costs. Cognitive approaches to the problem must be integrated into a well-constructed strategy that accounts for supply-side and demand-side factors, as well as both causes and symptoms of the problem.
This Insights article follows up on concepts discussed during a February 2026 Pinnacle conference panel moderated by the Irregular Warfare Center’s Operations in the Information Environment expert J.D. Maddox, and featuring Dr. Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera (George Mason University), Dr. Jonathan Schroden (Center for Naval Analysis), COL Xavier Colon (Joint Staff J37), and Mr. Doug Turner (Agenda LLC).