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Photo by NDU Audio Visual



On Thursday, May 23, 2013, President Obama gave a televised speech at the National Defense University on the Administration's counterterrorism policy

Remarks of U.S. President Barack Obama at National Defense University

May 23, 2013

It's an honor to return to the National Defense University. Here, at Fort McNair, Americans have served in uniform since 1791—standing guard in the early days of the Republic, and contemplating the future of warfare here in the 21st century.

For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that defined who we are as Americans, and served as our compass through every type of change. Matters of war and peace are no different. Americans are deeply ambivalent about war, but having fought for our independence, we know that a price must be paid for freedom. From the Civil War, to our struggle against fascism, and through the long, twilight struggle of the Cold War, battlefields have changed, and technology has evolved. But our commitment to Constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end.

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad, and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived at home. For a moment, it seemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. Then, on September 11th 2001,

we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us, as clouds of fire, metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning. This was a different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could.

And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade. I won't review the full history. What's clear is that we quickly drove al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, but then shifted our focus and began a new war in Iraq. This carried grave consequences for our fight against al Qaeda, our standing in the world, and – to this day – our interests in a vital region.

Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses – hardening targets, tightening transportation security, and giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror. Most of these changes were

sound. Some caused inconvenience. But some, like expanded surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance we strike between our interests in security and our values of privacy. And in some cases, I believe we compromised our basic values – by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law.

After I took office, we stepped up the war against al Qaeda, but also sought to change its course. We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s leadership. We ended the war in Iraq, and brought nearly 150,000 troops home. We pursued a new strategy in Afghanistan, and increased our training of Afghan forces. We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the rule of law, and expanded our consultations with Congress.

Today, Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure. Fewer of our troops are in harm’s way, and over the next 19 months they will continue to come home. Our alliances are strong, and so is our standing in the world. In sum, we are safer because of our efforts.

Now make no mistake: our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. We must recognize, however, that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11/2001. With a decade of experience to draw from, now is the time to ask ourselves hard questions – about the nature of today’s threats, and how we should confront them.

These questions matter to every American. For over the last decade, our nation has spent well over a trillion dollars on war, exploding our deficits and constraining our ability to nation build here at home. Our service-members and their families have sacrificed far more on our behalf. Nearly 7,000 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many more have left a part of themselves on the battlefield, or brought the shadows of battle back

home. From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions we are making will define the type of nation – and world – that we leave to our children.

So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us, mindful of James Madison’s warning that “No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. What we can do – what we must do – is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. To define that strategy, we must make decisions based not on fear, but hard-earned wisdom. And that begins with understanding the threat we face.

Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on a path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They have not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11/2001. Instead, what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP – the most active in plotting against our homeland. While none of AQAP’s efforts approach the scale of 9/11/2001, they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.

Unrest in the Arab World has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and Syria. Here, too, there are differences from 9/11/2001. In some cases, we confront state-sponsored networks like Hizbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Others are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. While we are vigilant for signs

that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. That means we will face more localized threats like those we saw in Benghazi, or at the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives – in loose affiliation with regional networks – launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies, and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations.

Finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States. Whether it's a shooter at a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin; a plane flying into a building in Texas; or the extremists who killed 168 people at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City – America has confronted many forms of violent extremism in our time. Deranged or alienated individuals – often U.S. citizens or legal residents – can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent jihad. That pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood, and the bombing of the Boston Marathon.

Lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates. Threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad. Homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We must take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11/2001. In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our Embassy in Beirut; at our Marine Barracks in Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; and on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center; at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia; and at our Embassy in Kenya. These attacks were all deadly, and we learned that left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11/2001.

Moreover, we must recognize that these threats don't arise in a vacuum. Most, though not

all, of the terrorism we face is fueled by a common ideology – a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West, and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam; and this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, who are the most frequent victims of terrorist acts.

lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates. Threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad. Homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism

Nevertheless, this ideology persists, and in an age in which ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism cannot depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills and ideas. So let me discuss the components of such a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. First, we must finish the work of defeating al Qaeda and its associated forces. In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counter-terrorism force which ensures that al Qaeda can never again establish a safe-haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.

Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless “global war on terror” – but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America. In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries. Thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists. In Yemen we are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP. In Somalia we helped a coalition of African nations push al Shabaab out of

its strongholds. In Mali we are providing military aid to a French-led intervention to push back al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and help the people of Mali reclaim their future.

Much of our best counter-terrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing of intelligence; the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. That's how a Somali terrorist apprehended off the coast of Yemen is now in prison in New York. That's how we worked with European allies to disrupt plots from Denmark to Germany to the United Kingdom. That's how intelligence collected with Saudi Arabia helped us stop a cargo plane from being blown up over the Atlantic.

But despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain a foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth. They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains.

In some of these places – such as parts of Somalia and Yemen – the state has only the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity or will to take action. It is also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. And even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians – where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with surrounding tribal communities that pose no threat to us, or when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis.

To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case were immense; the likelihood of capture, although our preference, was remote given the certainty of resistance; the fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an extended firefight, was a testament to the meticulous planning

and professionalism of our Special Forces – but also depended on some luck. And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan – and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory – was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership.

It is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones. As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions – about who is targeted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law; about accountability and morality.

Let me address these questions. To begin with, our actions are effective. Don't take my word for it. In the intelligence gathered at bin Laden's compound, we found that he wrote, "We could lose the reserves to the enemy's air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives." Other communications from al Qaeda operatives confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers, and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.

Moreover, America's actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11/2001. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war – a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.

And yet as our fight enters a new phase, America's legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic

is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance. For the same human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power – or risk abusing it. That’s why, over the last four years, my Administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists – insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance that I signed yesterday.

In the Afghan war theater, we must support our troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. That means we will continue to take strikes against high value al Qaeda targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces. However, by the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we have made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.

Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces. Even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists—our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute them. America cannot take strikes wherever we choose – our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty. America does not take strikes to punish individuals – we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured – the highest standard we can set.

This last point is critical, because much of the criticism about drone strikes – at home and abroad – understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There is a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties, and non-governmental reports. Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S.

strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in all wars. For the families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify their loss. For me, and those in my chain of command, these deaths will haunt us as long as we live, just as we are haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred through conventional fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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But as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties – not just in our cities at home and facilities abroad, but also in the very places –like Sana’a and Kabul and Mogadishu – where terrorists seek a foothold. Let us remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes.

Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their territory, the primary alternative to targeted, lethal action is the use of conventional military options. As I’ve said, even small Special Operations carry enormous risks. Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and likely to cause more civilian casualties and local outrage. And invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying armies; unleash a torrent of unintended consequences; are difficult to contain; and ultimately empower those who thrive on violent conflict. So it is false to assert



TSgt. Efrén Lopez

A U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle prepares to take off Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan

that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths, or to create enemies in the Muslim world. The result would be more U.S. deaths, more Blackhawks down, more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.

So yes, the conflict with al Qaeda, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy. But by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us, and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life. Indeed, our efforts must also be measured against the history of putting American troops in distant lands among hostile populations. In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred. In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the courage and discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have been killed. So neither conventional military action, nor waiting for attacks to occur, offers moral safe-harbor. Neither

does a sole reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or security services – and indeed, have no functioning law.

This is not to say that the risks are not real. Any U.S. military action in foreign lands risks creating more enemies, and impacts public opinion overseas. Our laws constrain the power of the President, even during wartime, and I have taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. The very precision of drones strikes, and the necessary secrecy involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.

For this reason, I've insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action. After I took office, my Administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat that – not only did Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every strike that America takes. That includes

the one instance when we targeted an American citizen: Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operations for AQAP.

This week, I authorized the declassification of this action, and the deaths of three other Americans in drone strikes, to facilitate transparency and debate on this issue, and to dismiss some of the more outlandish claims. For the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen – with a drone, or a shotgun – without due process. Nor should any President deploy armed drones over U.S. soil.

But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America – and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens; and when neither the United States, nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot – his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT team

That's who Anwar Awlaki was – he was continuously trying to kill people. He helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S. bound cargo planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009. When Farouk Abdulmutallab – the Christmas Day bomber – went to Yemen in 2009, Awlaki hosted him, approved his suicide operation, and helped him tape a martyrdom video to be shown after the attack. His last instructions were to blow up the airplane when it was over American soil. I would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot. But we couldn't. And as President, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took out Awlaki.

Of course, the targeting of any Americans raises constitutional issues that are not present in other strikes – which is why my Administration submitted information about Awlaki to the Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed, and briefed the Congress before this strike as well. But the high threshold that we have set

for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent dignity of every human life. Alongside the decision to put our men and women in uniform in harm's way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups – even against a sworn enemy of the United States – is the hardest thing I do as President. But these decisions must be made, given my responsibility to protect the American people.

the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion about a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Because force alone cannot make us safe

Going forward, I have asked my Administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond our reporting to Congress. Each option has virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process, but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority. Another idea that's been suggested – the establishment of an independent oversight board in the executive branch – avoids those problems, but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national-security decision-making, without inspiring additional public confidence in the process. Despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging Congress to explore these – and other – options for increased oversight.

I believe, however, that the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion about a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism,

a perpetual war – through drones or Special Forces or troop deployments – will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in troubling ways.

So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism, from North Africa to South Asia. As we've learned this past decade, this is a vast and complex undertaking. We must be humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolve deep-rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred. Moreover, no two countries are alike, and some will undergo chaotic change before things get better. But our security and values demand that we make the effort.

we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are

This means patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya – because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will serve as a rebuke to violent extremists. We must strengthen the opposition in Syria, while isolating extremist elements – because the end of a tyrant must not give way to the tyranny of terrorism. We are working to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians – because it is right, and because such a peace could help reshape attitudes in the region. And we must help countries modernize economies, upgrade education, and encourage entrepreneurship – because American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with peoples' hopes, and not simply their fears.

Success on these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will also require resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular expenditures – even though it amounts to less than one percent of the federal budget. But foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our national security, and any

sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism. Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent. For what we spent in a month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training security forces in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in Pakistan, and creating reservoirs of goodwill that marginalize extremists.

America cannot carry out this work if we do not have diplomats serving in dangerous places. Over the past decade, we have strengthened security at our Embassies, and I am implementing every recommendation of the Accountability Review Board, which found unacceptable failures in Benghazi. I have called on Congress to fully fund these efforts to bolster security, harden facilities, improve intelligence, and facilitate a quicker response time from our military if a crisis emerges.

But even after we take these steps, some irreducible risks to our diplomats will remain. This is the price of being the world's most powerful nation, particularly as a wave of change washes over the Arab World. And in balancing the trade-offs between security and active diplomacy, I firmly believe that any retreat from challenging regions will only increase the dangers we face in the long run.

Targeted action against terrorists. Effective partnerships. Diplomatic engagement and assistance. Through such a comprehensive strategy we can significantly reduce the chances of large scale attacks on the homeland and mitigate threats to Americans overseas. As we guard against dangers from abroad, however, we cannot neglect the daunting challenge of terrorism from within our borders.

As I said earlier, this threat is not new. But technology and the Internet increase its frequency and lethality. Today, a person can consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to a violent agenda, and learn how to kill without leaving their home. To address this threat, two years ago

my Administration did a comprehensive review, and engaged with law enforcement. The best way to prevent violent extremism is to work with the Muslim American community – which has consistently rejected terrorism – to identify signs of radicalization, and partner with law enforcement when an individual is drifting towards violence. And these partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a fundamental part of the American family. Indeed, the success of American Muslims, and our determination to guard against any encroachments on their civil liberties, is the ultimate rebuke to those who say we are at war with Islam.

Indeed, thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because of our proud commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home. That's why, in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities of law enforcement, so we can intercept new types of communication, and build in privacy protections to prevent abuse. That means that – even after Boston – we do not deport someone or throw someone in prison in the absence of evidence. That means putting careful constraints on the tools the government uses to protect sensitive information, such as the State Secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a strong Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to review those issues where our counter-terrorism efforts and our values may come into tension.

The Justice Department's investigation of national security leaks offers a recent example of the challenges involved in striking the right balance between our security and our open society. As Commander-in Chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field. To do so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their commitment to protect classified information. But a free press is also essential for our democracy. I am troubled by the possibility

that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government accountable.

Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs. Our focus must be on those who break the law. That is why I have called on Congress to pass a media shield law to guard against government over-reach. I have raised these issues with the Attorney General, who shares my concern. So he has agreed to review existing Department of Justice guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters, and will convene a group of media organizations to hear their concerns as part of that review. And I have directed the Attorney General to report back to me by July 12th.

Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That's what history advises. That's what our democracy demands.

All these issues remind us that the choices we make about war can impact – in sometimes-unintended ways – the openness and freedom on which our way of life depends. And that is why I intend to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorists without keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing.

The AUMF is now nearly twelve years old. The Afghan War is coming to an end. Core al Qaeda is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States. Unless we discipline our thinking and our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don't need to fight, or continue to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation states. So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF's mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to

dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That's what history advises. That's what our democracy demands.

“That flag,” he said, “will fly there long after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom.”

And that brings me to my final topic: the detention of terrorist suspects.

To repeat, as a matter of policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects. When we do detain a suspect, we interrogate them. And if the suspect can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian court or a Military Commission. During the past decade, the vast majority of those detained by our military were captured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we turned over thousands of prisoners as we ended the war. In Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the Afghans, as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bring law of war detention to an end, and we are committed to prosecuting terrorists whenever we can.

The glaring exception to this time-tested approach is the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. The original premise for opening GTMO – that detainees would not be able to challenge their detention – was found unconstitutional five years ago. In the meantime, GTMO has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law. Our allies won't cooperate with us if they think a terrorist will end up at GTMO. During a time of budget cuts, we spend \$150 million each year to imprison 166 people – almost \$1 million per prisoner. And the Department of Defense estimates that we must spend another \$200 million to keep GTMO open at a time when we are cutting investments in education and research here at home.

As President, I have tried to close GTMO. I transferred 67 detainees to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively

prevent us from either transferring detainees to other countries, or imprisoning them in the United States. These restrictions make no sense. After all, under President Bush, some 530 detainees were transferred from GTMO with Congress's support. When I ran for President the first time, John McCain supported closing GTMO. No person has ever escaped from one of our super-max or military prisons in the United States. Our courts have convicted hundreds of people for terrorism-related offenses, including some who are more dangerous than most GTMO detainees. Given my Administration's relentless pursuit of al Qaeda's leadership, there is no justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from closing a facility that should never have been opened.

Today, I once again call on Congress to lift the restrictions on detainee transfers from GTMO. I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States where we can hold military commissions. I am appointing a new, senior envoy at the State Department and Defense Department whose sole responsibility will be to achieve the transfer of detainees to third countries. I am lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen, so we can review them on a case-by-case basis. To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries. Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts and military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available for every detainee.

Even after we take these steps, one issue will remain: how to deal with those GTMO detainees who we know have participated in dangerous plots or attacks, but who cannot be prosecuted – for example because the evidence against them has been compromised or is inadmissible in a court of law. But once we commit to a process of closing GTMO, I am confident that this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.

I know the politics are hard. But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our fight against terrorism, and those of us who fail to end it. Imagine a future – ten years from now, or twenty years from now – when the United States of America is still holding people who have been charged with no crime on a piece of land that is not a part of our country. Look at the current situation, where we are force-feeding detainees who are holding a hunger strike. Is that who we are? Is that something that our Founders foresaw? Is that the America we want to leave to our children?

Our sense of justice is stronger than that. We have prosecuted scores of terrorists in our courts. That includes Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit; and Faisal Shahzad, who put a car bomb in Times Square. It is in a court of law that we will try Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is accused of bombing the Boston Marathon. Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, is as we speak serving a life sentence in a maximum-security prison here, in the United States. In sentencing Reid, Judge William Young told him, “The way we treat you...is the measure of our own liberties.” He went on to point to the American flag that flew in the courtroom – “That flag,” he said, “will fly there long after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom.”

America, we have faced down dangers far greater than al Qaeda. By staying true to the values of our founding, and by using our constitutional compass, we have overcome slavery and Civil War; fascism and communism. In just these last few years as President, I have watched the American people bounce back from painful recession, mass shootings, and natural disasters like the recent tornados that devastated Oklahoma. These events were heart-breaking; they shook our communities to the core. But because of the resilience of the American people, these events could not come close to breaking us.

I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent of her body, who said, “That’s my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I move on.”

I think of the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car bomb as if nothing had happened.

I think of the proud Pakistani parents who, after their daughter was invited to the White House, wrote to us, “we have raised an American Muslim daughter to dream big and never give up because it does pay off.”

I think of the wounded warriors rebuilding their lives, and helping other vets to find jobs.

I think of the runner planning to do the 2014 Boston Marathon, who said, “Next year, you are going to have more people than ever. Determination is not something to be messed with.”

That’s who the American people are. Determined, and not to be messed with.

Now, we need a strategy – and a politics – that reflects this resilient spirit. Our victory against terrorism won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony on a battleship, or a statue being pulled to the ground. Victory will be measured in parents taking their kids to school; immigrants coming to our shores; fans taking in a ballgame; a veteran starting a business; a bustling city street. The quiet determination; that strength of character and bond of fellowship; that refutation of fear – that is both our sword and our shield. And long after the current messengers of hate have faded from the world’s memory, alongside the brutal despots, deranged madmen, and ruthless demagogues who litter history – the flag of the United States will still wave from small-town cemeteries, to national monuments, to distant outposts abroad. And that flag will still stand for freedom.

Thank you. God Bless you. And may God bless the United States of America.

Ambrogio Lorenzetti



Good Government

Securing the State: National Security and Secret Intelligence

By David Omand

Consider the artist Michelangelo standing in front of a block of Carrara marble rough-hewn from the quarry. As he later described that moment, “I saw the angel in the marble and carved until I set him free.” Sculptors need the patience to recognize that many small steps will be needed to realize their vision. The sculptor needs a strategic sixth sense that can continuously adapt the design to the conditions of the material while testing whether each small incision, however immediately appealing and easily achieved, will end up weakening the final structure. The sculptor needs the confidence to know that the design can be adjusted in response to the inevitable small slips and misjudgments made along the way. Call it the ability to hold the desired ends in mind while being continuously aware of the ways open for achieving them and the means that are at hand. Even the most technically skilled sculptor equipped with the sharpest chisels needs to have a clear sense of the end state – to see at the outset, “the angel in the marble” – that could be the final result of all the labor to come. That is the strategic cast of mind needed for planning modern counter-terrorism.

In building a strategy for countering a terrorist threat there are certainly enhanced means available to governments today. The latest defense equipment technology – from advanced night vision devices, multi-spectral imaging, real time imagery fusion, all the way to high endurance drones armed with high precision missiles – gives forces assigned to counter-terrorism missions a reach and clout and an ability to shape the battlefield

unimaginable to previous generations of warriors. New digitized sources of intelligence provide unparalleled insights into the movement and activities of individual suspects and their networks both domestically and overseas. At a tactical level there are these many new tools and much to be learned about how best to apply them.

Yet, these very reassuring strengths can lead to a pursuit of immediate gains only to find later

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that they may be at the expense of risking longer-term goals. Measures taken with the best of intentions to neutralize terrorist threats overseas can through collateral damage build long-term hostility and provide propaganda opportunities that help breed future threats. Local security clampdowns on minority communities can discourage the flow of information to the authorities. Providing overseas military support for combatants against today's adversaries can end up arming tomorrow's enemies. Domestic security measures (such as restrictions at airports and major events) can over-tax the patience of the public. The search for pre-emptive intelligence on suspect individuals can lead governments into disproportionate intrusion by agents of the state into personal privacy and private life. The understandable desire to find ways of bringing terrorists to justice can strain the limits of the rule of law. In sum, there comes a point when the search for even greater security becomes burdensome and oppressive, and when the public will cavil at what it is being expected to give up to provide it. Yet, the public rightly sees the provision of security as government's first responsibility: government cannot avoid these dilemmas.

How Much Security is Enough?

It is thus not just the choices of ways and means that can be problematic, but also of the ends of counter-terrorism strategy. In essence, the issue again today, as for many countries in the past, is how much security is enough? How can government best set out to exercise its primary duty to protect the public in the face of a substantial terrorist threat, and yet also maintain civic harmony, uphold democratic values and promote the rule of law at home and internationally? The initial need to combat the jihadist terrorist campaign at home and abroad justified itself, robust measures have been taken and have reduced the immediate threat. The harder policy question that is now arising is in relation to the longer-term ends of counter-terrorism strategy: how much security do we think will

be enough, in a world of competing priorities for government attention and resources and where terrorism, however dramatic, is only one of many risks facing the public that have to be managed?

In the UK, an all-party consensus has held now for over a decade over what should be the objective of the UK national counter-terrorist strategy (CONTEST, short for COuNter-TErrorism STRategy).¹ When we started work on the strategy after the 9/11/01 attacks on the U.S. we debated whether its ends should be couched in terms of defeating or eliminating terrorism. We concluded such an aim was unrealizable since terrorism would inevitably remain an asymmetric tactic of choice for violent extremist groups, and no government can ever give a complete guarantee to the public that terrorists might not at some point be able to slip below the security radar however sophisticated it is. Absolute security is a chimera. Instead, we focused on ways of denying the jihadist terrorists what they most seek which is to shock and disrupt and thus erode public confidence in the ability of government to protect them. The narrative was of fortitude and resilience, setting the objective as a vigorous, collective and communal effort to sustain the normality of everyday life. The formal aim of CONTEST – which *is* being achieved – is therefore to reduce the risk from terrorism so that people can go about their normal life freely (that is, with the rule of law upheld and without the authorities having to interfere with individual rights and liberties) and with confidence (for example, with people still travelling by air and on the underground, visitors vacationing in the UK, with financial markets stable and so on).

The Thermodynamics of Counter-Terrorism

In that way, by stressing the goal of normality in a resilient society, the UK strategy tries to avoid the trap that terrorists set of “the propaganda of the deed,” seeking to radicalize supporters through exposing supposed fragility in Western societies and provoking over-reaction from the security authorities. That is one of the eternal security lessons we

should have absorbed (and learned the hard way over the years) about what could be described as the “thermodynamics” of counter-terrorism.

For there is an important relationship between the necessary vigor of security measures imposed to stop terrorists and the intrusiveness of measures taken to obtain intelligence to prevent attacks, and the level of confidence among different sections of the community in the government’s commitment to protect the liberties and rights of the citizen. The right to life of the ordinary person in the face of murderous terrorism on the one hand is in tension with the right to privacy of personal and family life on the other. As with the thermodynamic relationship between the volume, pressure and temperature of a gas, too sudden an application of force to compress it and the temperature may rise dangerously to explosive levels; too little pressure applied and the gas is uncontained and will expand out of control. The best approach may well be to cool things down as you gradually build up the pressure, and certainly not to do things unnecessarily that heat it up: the impact of the occupation of Iraq on domestic radicalization in the UK and elsewhere comes to mind; the impact of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities were one to occur would be another.

Such an analogy to thermodynamics cannot be pushed too far—the point to be registered is the inter-relationship between a nation’s security effort in the face of domestic threat, the direct effect on the risks faced by the public, and the indirect effects on the rule of law, civil liberties, human rights and thus civic harmony or *Civitas* – the public value of harmony in the community based on a shared sense of place, of belonging, regardless of ethnic roots or religious difference. The choice of security strategy is of course crucial to getting that thermodynamic judgment right.

This is not just a contemporary issue. It is a recurring dilemma experienced by governments over the centuries. I titled my book *Securing the State*,² and illustrated it with details from a remarkable attempt almost 700 years ago to describe the balance needed for good government. Ambrogio

Lorenzetti’s great 14th century fresco cycle in Siena in Italy, entitled Good and Bad Government, illustrates that some of the most pressing dilemmas we face over public security are ancient ones, such as the balance between security and the rule of law, albeit today disguised by the effects of modern technology.

Good government today as in that 14th century vision brings peace, stability and security, prosperity, and culture. The painting shows cheerful townspeople and country folk working in harmony and going freely about their affairs transporting their goods on well-kept roads or sowing in the weed-free fields. Builders are hard at work developing the city-state. The watchtowers are well kept and manned.

Hovering overhead in the fresco is a winged figure, labeled *Securitas*, or security. The winged figure also holds up a scroll on which is written the promise that under her protection all can live in safety, and without fear: the words eerily pre-empt the aim of CONTEST, the UK government’s 21st century counter-terrorist strategy, “so that people can go about their normal business, freely and with confidence.”

On the other hand, in the fresco representing bad government, the figure of Tyranny dominates. The prevalent emotion is insecurity and fear. Not only are the city walls crumbling, leaving the city vulnerable to its enemies, but the very internal fabric of the town is decaying. The message directed at 14th century Siena’s rising merchant class (and now to our own global markets) is that insecurity makes investment and thus innovation hazardous.

In a nutshell, the argument is that good government will always place the task of “securing the state” at the top of its priorities. With security come confidence, economic and social progress and investment in the future. But good government also recognizes, as the 14th century frescoes show, that security needs the active support of all sections of the public and thus the right relationship between justice, civic harmony, wise administration, fortitude, prudence and the other virtues to which the wise ruler and government should aspire.

New Strategic Imperatives

It is tempting to be deflected from such a train of thought by the obvious features of modernity with which we have to grapple. There are new security lessons we have to learn from recent experience, such as the impact (for good and ill) we must now expect from the ease of international travel (of capital as well as people), and the openness of our society to global influences not least through the Internet and social media. Rightly it has been said that abroad has come home, and threats originating overseas can quickly affect domestic security spaces. And the reverse is also true: an offensive cartoon gets published or an insult perceived to sacred scriptures, and an embassy burns overseas.

The strategic narrative governments choose to tell about today's terrorism has to provide a satisfying explanation to the public of why they are at risk, of the historical developments and ideologies that have sustained this threat (recalling that to understand is not to excuse or condone). The explanation has not just to highlight the characteristics of specific emerging threats to warn the public of them. The narrative must generate support for the measures being taken – and in some cases, not being taken – to counter the threat and public acceptance of the residual risk that will remain. It has to incorporate, to use the term being popularized by King's College Professor Sir Lawrence Freeman, "the strategic narrative" government chooses to believe about what is going on in the world, including about the character of the enemies of the state.³

As an illustration consider the way that the surprise attack on the U.S. of 9/11/01 created new narratives. On the one hand, 9/11/01 reinforced a growing view in both the U.S. and the UK that not only should states obviously be prepared to use force to defend themselves against external attack by other states, but in the face of this kind of extreme suicidal terrorism governments have a responsibility to their citizens to anticipate trouble brewing and to act before it is too late. It is in the nature of many of these threats – mass murder and suicide bombings, or terrorists armed with a dirty

bomb, for example – that we cannot afford to wait until the enemy is at the gates, or even inside the city, before taking action to safeguard the public. This thinking has led to policies intended to deal with potential trouble upstream and far from our shores. Interventions have extended to direct military as well as diplomatic intervention to help the governments of countries not able to protect their citizens and whose instability threatens our own security, with the rediscovery along the way of counter-insurgency doctrine and its development for modern times.

On the other hand, however, the strategic narratives told after 9/11/01 by the U.S. and the UK about the ends of counter-terrorism have been subtly different. For the U.S. America had been the subject, as at Pearl Harbor, of a savage surprise attack from overseas. As President Bush's national security strategy subsequently stated, America is at war, thus reflecting al Qaeda's own characterization of the external aggression against the U.S. as war. This metaphor has legitimized abnormal "wartime" measures, first embodied in the Bush "War on Terror," aimed at identifying and destroying the external enemy, al Qaeda.

For the UK, the jihadist threat, although inspired and directed from outside, had early on a domestic dimension, with jihadist extremism gaining pockets of support in some domestic communities within the UK with strong connections both to Pakistan and to North Africa. In the course of gathering funds and recruits to support jihadist activity overseas, quite apart from the few extremists actually engaging in terrorist planning and conducting attacks within the UK, the criminal law was being broken. The first signs of this jihadist terrorism inside the UK also coincided with the final throes of the Provisional IRA's bombing campaign in London. A domestic law enforcement model therefore dominated the government narrative, stressing the need to bring terrorist suspects before the Courts, and to prosecute them for a range of terrorist and related offences. Unlike a war metaphor seeking defeat of the external enemy, the

UK CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy had the formal aim of reducing the risk from international terrorism with the objective of maintaining domestic normality – so that people could go about their everyday business, freely and with confidence. For the UK, the legal framework has therefore been international human rights law (the European Convention on Human Rights was incorporated into UK domestic legislation in 1998); for the U.S. it has been the international humanitarian laws of war that have governed the attack on senior al Qaeda members and associates regarded as enemy combatants wherever they are.

These strategic differences across the Atlantic may seem abstract, but they have had practical consequences (for example in differing rules of engagement for the handling of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan) that have had to be managed within the very closeness of our deep relationship with the U.S. Our invaluable transatlantic intelligence cooperation grows closer than ever and our joint military operations overseas continue, but there will inevitably continue to be occasional difficulties when the actions and methods justified by these different narratives collide.

Strategic Logic of UK Counter-Terrorist Strategy

The UK CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy has remained in force now ten years after its initiation and is on its third major iteration under its third Prime Minister.⁴ One of the reasons the strategy has lasted is that it incorporates the logic of risk management. To achieve the state of normality that is its goal there are campaigns to influence each factor in the risk management equation that provides the measure of total risk: likelihood, vulnerability, initial impact, and duration of disruption.

Thus, the strategy aims to make attacks less likely by improving the intelligence and law enforcement capability to uncover terrorist networks and frustrate attacks and bring terrorists to justice (what in CONTEST was termed the Pursue campaign); it aims to reduce the incidence of radicalization in

the community and overseas to stem the flow of terrorist recruits (the Prevent Campaign); to reduce the vulnerability of the critical civil infrastructure on which society depends including aviation (the Protect Campaign); and to equip and exercise the emergency services to reduce the impact should terrorists succeed in mounting an attack (the Prepare Campaign). The value of such continuity of basic strategy in terms of maintaining effective counter-terrorist effort, not least during the run-up to the recent Olympics, should not be underestimated. I judge it a success in its own terms: as the 2012 Olympics showed the UK is a nation living in peace, despite the continuing substantial level of threat from militant jihadist extremists.

This risk management approach has now been extended in the UK beyond countering terrorism. When the current British coalition government published its overall National Security Strategy,⁵ it spelled out those major modern threats and hazards that have to be managed, from terrorism to cyber piracy, and from instability in key regions overseas to natural disasters, as well as the continuing task of preserving the territorial independence of the United Kingdom, not least through our membership in NATO.

The National Security Strategy identifies four “top tier” risks:

- international terrorism affecting the UK and its interests overseas;
- hostile attacks upon UK cyber-space;
- a major accident or natural hazard;
- an international military crisis drawing in the UK.

Since these priorities were identified two years ago, examples of all four risks have occurred. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen for example almost brought down airliners with bombs hidden in printer cartridges discovered at

Luton airport in the UK; Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) murdered British workers when they attacked the major gas facility operated in part by BP in Algeria. Severe persistent advanced cyber-attacks from China and elsewhere are a daily occurrence. The Libyan crisis saw British Armed Forces in action in a new theater. And although the major environmental disaster happened in Fukushima, Japan, the repercussions in the global industrial supply chain were quickly felt.

A characteristic of many such risks is of course that they are as the economists say, exogenous: their origins cannot be controlled by any one country such as the UK, and they are hard to predict; but in many cases their impact can be moderated by prior preparation. What the hard and dedicated work of the security and intelligence authorities can therefore do is shift the odds in the public's favor.

A Modern Approach to National Security

This modern approach to national security therefore rests on three sets of propositions.

The first step in the argument is recognition of the implications of regarding national security as a collective psychological state as well as an objective reality such as freedom from foreign invasion. People need to feel sufficiently safe to justify investment, to be prepared to travel, indeed to leave the house in the morning to get on with ordinary life and to live it to the full – even in the face of threats such as terrorism and hazards such as pandemics. Our adversaries – and the international markets – must know we have the confidence to help each other and to do what is necessary to defend ourselves.

Looking at the type of malign threats that impact on our increasingly technologically dependent society, we have to be prepared to invest in advance to prevent attacks, to reduce our vulnerabilities and to invest in higher levels of resilience. In a comparable way, we could tomorrow face the consequences of major natural hazards, such as the effects of “space weather” resulting from coronal

ejections from the sun, or animal diseases jumping the species barrier, or those that are likely to flow from resource stress as the global climate changes. Governments need to anticipate and act now – preferably in international concert – to mitigate the consequences of such hazards.

A national UK risk register and matrix to help plan such anticipatory work was developed when I was the UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator, and is now published and regularly updated.⁶ The matrix shows the most significant hazards ranked by likelihood (and in the case of malign threats, ranked by plausibility) and a relative impact score, taking into account vulnerability to this specific risk. Of course, such an approach, if it is to be useful, cannot include every very low probability/high impact possibility that might be imagined – the first such matrix did not include either irresponsible bankers precipitating the economic crash or Icelandic volcanic ash clouds disrupting aviation (now added to the register), and there will always be previously unknown unknowns that arise to surprise us. So humility is needed about our ability to predict future disruptive challenges. But it should be possible to give government and the private sector what I term “strategic notice” of possible futures that were they to arise would cause us problems. Such strategic notice can then guide conceptual thinking, research and development into counter-measures, investment in resilience and protection, and not least intelligence gathering and horizon scanning to spot early signs of emergence and crystallization of the risk.

The second step in modern national security strategy builds on that recognition of the citizen-centric view of threats and hazards. We have to accept that we should be aiming for the sensible management of risk, not on attempting to eliminate risks altogether. Efforts to avoid all risk can do more harm than good since the law of unintended consequences often applies to the measures we take. If unreal expectations are generated then failure will breed public cynicism and an accusatory blame culture when things do not turn out



Photo by Jan Visits on Flickr

London Olympics Security Trial

as planned. In particular, as already noted, governments in their pursuit of security can risk compromising freedom of movement and of speech, and the rule of law, thus disturbing the civic harmony that lies at the heart of successful societies. Indeed, an important ingredient in public security in a democracy is confidence in the government's ability to manage risk in ways that respect human rights and the values of society.

The third step in the argument then follows. It is to see that the key to good risk management, maintaining that delicate balance, is to have better informed decision-making by government, and thus place greater weight on the work of the intelligence community.

The overall purpose of an intelligence community can be said to be to improve the quality of decision making by reducing ignorance. Today there is more information available than ever before to help us do that. So-called secret intelligence is simply the achievement of that purpose in respect of information that other people, such as terrorists or rogue states, do not want us to have, and we normally do not want them to know we have.

Obviously decisions should be based on adequate knowledge of the situation – situational awareness – plus a deep understanding of the roots of what is going on. With situational awareness plus good explanation of why the situation is as it is, there is some hope that what is liable to happen next can be predicted and risks anticipated, and successfully managed, within the limits of the knowable.

With pre-emptive intelligence, criminal networks can be identified and individuals brought to justice without having to resort to cruder measures – the bludgeon of state power – to try to protect the public as was seen in the early 1970s in Northern Ireland, with mass arrests and internment without trial, house to house searches, roadblocks, and large scale stop and search. An advantage of having adequate pre-emptive intelligence is that by making it possible to reduce the level of threat, political pressures are relieved that otherwise would build up on government to take more draconian measures so as to reassure the majority, but that may alienate the community among which the terrorist seeks sanctuary and support, feeding in to the narrative of the extremist.

Thus intelligence – broadly defined – can be used to improve the odds of achieving our goals beyond what we would have managed had we simply tossed a coin to decide between courses of action, acted on hunch, or allowed events in the absence of decision to decide the outcome. But it is always a matter of odds, not certainties. Since the London bombings of 2005 there have been around a dozen jihadist terrorist plots directly affecting the UK. A few, such as the Haymarket car bombs, the plot that ended violently with the terrorists on the run attempting to crash a car loaded with gas cylinders into Glasgow Airport, failed only because of slip-ups by the terrorists. Most failed because the intelligence services and the police got onto their trail first. We had a trouble-free Olympics in 2012 in London, in large part because of a great deal of pre-emptive work by the security authorities.

Anticipation as a component of national security strategy places a great responsibility on the intelligence officers and analysts who are to provide the strategic and tactical intelligence. Anticipation also places a huge responsibility on the shoulders of those who have to decide whether and how to act upon intelligence, or not. As Machiavelli said, “a Prince who is himself not wise cannot be well advised.”

An Effective Intelligence Community

From this line of argument flows a strong case for the increased importance for modern national security of an effective national intelligence community working with its counterparts in like-minded nations. By the term effective is meant an intelligence community that flexibly spans domestic and overseas interests in order to generate actionable intelligence, that works harmoniously with law enforcement and partners overseas to help disrupt threats and bring suspects to justice and that has a well developed analytic capability and the capacity to manage the mass of information and “big data” that modern digital technology makes available.

It is rare that raw intelligence reporting speaks for itself as an unambiguous empirical finding might. Questions of interpretation always arise, and patterns of observed evidence can have widely differing interpretations. Consider how the intelligence analyst might approach a typical question that a policymaker or military commander might pose. To take one example from the arena of current international politics, given the more hawkish rhetoric from the most recent People’s Congress about building powerful armed forces commensurate with China’s international standing, would the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) be likely to use direct military force in seeking to reverse the Japanese intention to nationalize the disputed territory that Japan calls the Senkaku (and China, the Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea?

To answer such a question the analysts can assemble a great deal of information. These days a good situational awareness of the current position can probably be obtained from open sources, possibly confirmed by more sensitive diplomatic or other reporting. But to make sense of the way the situation might develop, the analyst must apply – often unconsciously – some explanatory mental model.

Capabilities and Intentions

Traditionally, many defense intelligence analysts would first try to establish the military capability, and economic and other levers, at the disposal of the parties. In the case of this dispute between China and Japan, this would involve assessing what each side could bring to bear, for example if warning shots were to be fired and the dispute escalate. Then the bolder analysts might try to judge the intentions of the parties towards the dispute and possible escalation. This distinction, between capabilities and intentions, is often colored by an emphasis on capabilities as a guide to policymaking given the recognition that capabilities can take a long time to build up, but intentions can change in the twinkling of an eye or with the arrival of new leadership.

For some purposes, governments do need to assess what might be the worst case they could face – even without detailed intelligence as to intentions – so as to be able to consider how best to protect their national interest in specific ways. This is common in domestic security planning. Thus, stockpiling smallpox vaccine effectively removes the incentive for terrorists to try to obtain and spread that disease; having heavily armed guards at nuclear sites similarly makes what could be a catastrophic attack very unlikely. But a nation cannot afford to act on every possible worst case or always assume the worst of its neighbors. Nor is the worst case usually what intelligence analysts would forecast as the most likely outcome on which diplomats and policymakers should act. This poses an obvious problem of how to respond to a build-up of capability, and in public communication of an assessed threat, in balancing reassurance of the relatively low likelihood of the worst case with warning of the adverse consequences to society were the unlikely to happen. A comparable dilemma often faces government over communication of a domestic terrorist threat: very low risk to any individual; but high risk in terms of the adverse consequences to society as a whole if an attack were to take place.

Distinction Between Secrets and Mysteries

Another model influencing analysts might be the distinction (introduced during the Second World War by Professor R.V. Jones, the founder of scientific intelligence) between secrets and mysteries. Secrets are in principle knowable, since the events in question have happened and decisions have been taken and are in principle discoverable, although no intelligence agency will succeed in uncovering all of them.

But no intelligence source, however well placed, will be able to provide the sure answer to mysteries, since these concern events that have not yet happened and may not happen – the leader has perhaps not decided on his next step,

or may not have confided his decision to anyone. Yet, policymakers and military commanders will still demand the intelligence analyst's best estimate of what will happen next. Those customers need to be very aware to distinguish when they are being told a secret – such as the order of battle and states of readiness of the naval and air power the Chinese could mobilize in the East China Sea – from when they are being given the best divination of a mystery – such as whether and in what circumstances the Chinese might fire warning shots at any Japanese Self-Defense Force units approaching the disputed islands.

And the example illustrates the problem with that model of analysis since our best guess at the mystery of whether in certain circumstances Chinese and Japanese leaderships would escalate the dispute depends in part on our judgment of how they would assess the possible wider responses, including from the U.S., UN, EU and regional powers, and how they would affect Chinese and Japanese national interests respectively. So intelligence judgment in such circumstances is a complex exercise in game theory, not just about the interactions of potential adversaries facing each other in a conflict or dispute, or even their capability for action, but about how they view each other and the rest of the world. A complete intelligence assessment of the situation thus also contains an assumption about the likely effectiveness of our own declaratory policies towards the potential conflict. Such interaction of strategic narratives introduces complexity to the old distinction between secrets and mysteries.

Situational Awareness, Explanation, Prediction and Strategic Notice: a Useful Model of Intelligence Analysis

In teaching intelligence studies in London, I offer another related way of organizing intelligence assessment. I suggest three “phenotypes” of intelligence judgment that, together with the concept of strategic notice, form a useful model of modern intelligence analysis.

The three phenotypes are:

- the use of the best validated evidence that can be accessed to provide situational awareness, to answer questions of the “who, what, where and when?” type;
- the best explanation of the causes of events (and the motivations of those involved) that can be devised having examined which hypotheses are most consistent with the evidence and our historical understanding, to answer questions of the “why? and what for?” type, leading in turn to the third phenotype;
- careful prediction of how events might unfold in different circumstances including how all those involved might respond to the measures we and our allies might take, to answer questions of the “what next and where next?” type.

But prediction beyond a short time ahead is inherently problematic, and should be complemented by using the technique of strategic notice: the identification of possible future developments of interest to answer questions of the “whatever next?” type. On this research and development can be commissioned and intelligence gathering requirements set, and policies developed, without necessarily assuming that we can know whether and when such developments will actually occur. We cannot eliminate surprise, but we can learn to live better with it by being less surprised when it happens.

That brief example of the East China Sea is in many ways an old fashioned one for which precedents can be studied; a longstanding territorial dispute between two powerful states that have a history of antagonism. The subjects of intelligence analysis over the last decade have, however, increasingly involved the activities of so-called non-state actors; terrorists, proliferators, narco-traffickers, organized criminals, and

cyber hackers. Intelligence agencies seeking to uncover covert networks have had to develop new capabilities to track the movements and reveal the communications, air travel, financial transactions, immigration records, and so on of their suspects. The tracking down of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 was a remarkable example of what I would describe as the emphasis now on, “intelligence for action,” against hostile non-state actors – and a pointer to the increasing importance in warfare of having flexible forces able to use tactical intelligence to achieve a strategic impact.

Managing Moral Hazard

PROTINT is my term (by analogy with HUMINT and SIGINT) for the gathering of intelligence from the data-protected personal information about individuals to be found in digital data-bases either in public or private sector hands and located both on the domestic territory and overseas. What some in the CIA call the “electronic exhaust” that we all leave behind as we live our normal lives in a high-tech society becomes the spoor to be followed. It is in the nature of such databases that they will contain mostly information on the law-abiding citizen, thus information on the innocent as well as the suspect. Very recently the explosive growth in the use of social media – Twitter, Facebook, etc. – provides another channel of access to individuals and their preferences, associations and activities and the sentiment of the crowd. Gathering and analyzing social media to assist the authorities in providing public security, what I call SOCMINT⁷, is rapidly becoming a mainstream intelligence activity around the world.

These intrusive methods are powerful and they get results. My conclusion is that we must accept both that the modern “protecting State”⁸ needs pre-emptive intelligence in order to manage sensibly the major threats to everyday life and that gathering such secret intelligence will involve accepting the moral hazard of risking on occasions harm to others for a greater good. There is, for example, a price to be paid for obtaining intelligence on

suspects moving amongst the general population, and that is some invasion of privacy, just as recruiting agents active in terrorist networks will run the risk of being accused of colluding in wrongdoing.

There is a danger of public misunderstanding of this line of argument as a call for the secret world of intelligence to be empowered to do “whatever it takes” to keep us safe. It does not, however, follow that we have to accept those propositions as a justification for treating intelligence activity as an ethics-free zone. We do not need to accept an assumption that intelligence agencies by their hidden nature are outside the pale of moral consideration. In the end, there needs to be public trust that the intelligence and security apparatus will only be used when necessary for public protection against major dangers. The common sense position that the citizen has a right to expect that the security authorities will use all lawful means to manage the risks from such dangers also supports the contention that public security requires the authorities to balance rights, such as the right to life – not to be blown up by a terrorist bomb – and the right to privacy and family life of the community at large, as well as the rights of those the authorities have to keep under deep surveillance. The balancing act required is within the framework of human rights not between security on the one hand and liberty, privacy and the rule of law on the other.

The extreme example of a balancing exercise is to be found in armed conflict, where the enemy’s right to life (and on occasion that of civilians caught up in the inevitable collateral damage of warfare) has to be hazarded for the greater good of the security of the nation. Most of us would recognize the ultimate use of lethal armed force as morally justified in self defense or to prevent worse outcomes in terms of human suffering. The “Just War” tradition deriving from such thinkers as Cicero, Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas has given us tests to apply such as just cause, right authority, necessity, minimum force and proportionality. As the late Sir Michael Quinlan pointed out⁹ by analogy, we can have *Jus ad Intelligentiam*

and *Jus in Intelligentia* to govern when the recourse to the moral hazards of secret intelligence is justified and to limit the methods employed. This approach can indeed be applied usefully to the oversight of intelligence work,¹⁰ when it comes to justifying the moral hazard involved, by applying a check-list of six principles;¹¹

1. *There must be sufficient sustainable cause.*

We need a check on any tendency for the secret world to expand into areas unjustified by the scale of potential harm to national interests

2. *There must be integrity of motive.*

We need integrity throughout the whole system, from collection through to the analysis, assessment and presentation of the resulting intelligence to policymakers.

3. *The methods to be used must be proportionate.*

The likely impact and intrusion of the proposed intelligence gathering operation, taking account of the methods to be used, must be in proportion to the harm that it is sought to prevent.

4. *There must be right authority, including upholding of the universal ban on torture.*¹²

We need sufficiently senior sign off on sensitive operations and accountability up a recognized chain of command to permit effective oversight. Right authority too has to be lawful.

5. *There must be reasonable prospect of success.*

Even if the purpose is valid (guideline 1) and the methods to be used are proportionate to the issue (guideline 3), there needs to be a hard-headed assessment of risk to those involved and of collateral damage to others, and not least the risk to future operations and to institutional reputations if the operation were to go wrong.

6. *Recourse to the methods of secret intelligence must be a last resort if there are open or other sources that can be used that do not run the same risk of moral hazard.*

A Grand Security Bargain

To conclude, drawing on the British experience of the last decade, we can sketch out a series of propositions that can serve as the basis for an ethically defensible security strategy, representing a balance of the competing principles and interests involved.

- All concerned, the executive, its agencies, legislators and the public, have to accept that maintaining security today remains the primary duty of government and will have the necessary call on resources.
- The strategic security narrative government chooses to tell about what is going on in the world should be based not just on the assessment of the threat, but also the likely effects of the response, direct and indirect.
- The public should be invited to accept that there is no absolute security and chasing after it does more harm than good. There is a continuing need to learn to prosper in a world of risk (opportunities as well as threats), and thus to understand – and to apply correctly – the principles of risk management. Providing security today is an exercise in risk management.
- There will always be intelligence gaps and ambiguities, but overall the public must be encouraged to recognize that the work of the intelligence and security services shift the odds in the public’s favor, sometimes very significantly.
- Effective management of threats thus involves having pre-emptive intelligence to guide the work of the authorities in protecting the public. They have a duty to seek and use secret information to help manage threats to national security.
- The ability to catch terrorists and mount successful criminal prosecutions is essential, but

will not by itself sufficiently protect the public, especially when the terrorist is prepared to be a suicide bomber. Using pre-emptive secret intelligence to help disrupt terrorist networks at home and abroad is thus essential to reducing the risk.

- Secret intelligence, because it involves overcoming the efforts of others to prevent us acquiring it, inevitably involves running moral hazard.
- The effectiveness of such secret intelligence rests on sources and methods that must remain hidden. The public must accept that there is no general “right to know” about security and intelligence sources and methods. Freedom of Information legislation has brought greater transparency into the work of government generally, and enabled government to be better held to account, but it cannot be at the expense of public safety.
- We can nevertheless constrain our intelligence activity by an ethical approach that is based on well understood and tested “just war” principles, and that respects human rights including the prohibition of torture. The law enforcement, defense, security and intelligence communities have to accept in turn that ethics do matter; there are “red lines” that must not be crossed.
- If the secrets of terrorists and serious criminals are to be uncovered and their plots disrupted, there will be inevitable intrusions into privacy. These intrusive methods are powerful and they get results. In careless or malign hands they could be abused. So it is essential that the public have confidence that the security and intelligence apparatus of the state is under democratic control, being properly regulated and is being used lawfully for public protection against major dangers.
- Democratic oversight of intelligence activity has to be by proxy. The public right to oversight

of security and intelligence work has to be exercised at one remove, by a trusted group of democratically elected representatives – together with judicial oversight of intrusive investigative powers with the right of redress in cases of abuse of these powers – who can on our behalf be trusted to enter the “ring of secrecy” and to give us confidence that legal and ethical standards are being maintained.

- Some risks will, despite all our efforts, crystallize and thus there is value in pursuing as part of security strategy a long-term national policy of working with the private sector to build up national resilience against a range of threats and hazards, including in cyber-space.
- And of course, government must never forget the importance of having an informed and supportive public that has confidence in the authorities and their methods.

The ancient Greek term *phronesis* describes the application of practical wisdom to the anticipation of risks. *Phronesis* was defined by the historian Edgar Wind as the application of good judgment to human conduct – consisting in a sound practical instinct for the course of events, and an almost indefinable hunch that anticipates the future by remembering the past and thus judges the present correctly; an appropriate description for effective national security and counter-terrorism strategy. **PRISM**

NOTES

¹ HM Government, *CONTEST: The UK's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* (London: HMSO Cm 8123, July 2011), available at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism>

² David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: Hurst and New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

³ Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (London: IISS Adelphi Paper 379, 2006).

⁴ Earlier versions of the UK counter-terrorism strategy can be found in: HM Government, *CONTEST: The UK's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* (London: HMSO Cm 8123, July 2011), available at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism> HM Government, *The UK's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* (London: HMSO Cm 7547, March 2009) available at <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm75/7547/7547.pdf> HM Government, *Countering International Terrorism: The UK's Strategy*, (London: HMSO Cm 6888, July 2006) available at <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm68/6888/6888.pdf>

⁵ HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The UK National Security Strategy* (London: HMSO Cm 7953, October 2010), available at <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/national-security-strategy/>

⁶ The January 2012 version of the UK national risk assessment can be found at: <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/risk-assessment>.

⁷ See David Omand, Jamie Bartlett, and Carl Miller, *#Intelligence* (London: Demos, 2012) and the same authors' "Introduction to Social Media Intelligence" *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 27, no. 6 (December 2012).

⁸ See Peter Hennessy (Ed.), *The New Protective State* (London: Continuum Books, 2007).

⁹ Michael Quinlan, "The Just War Tradition and the Use of Armed Force in the Twenty-First Century", annual lecture of the War Studies Department, King's College London, 25 January 2006.

¹⁰ Omand, *Op. Cit.*

¹¹ Alan Rusbridger, the Editor of the *Guardian* newspaper has also suggested in his blog that these principles could also be applied to govern the use of intrusive investigative methods by newspapers and other media in the wake of the current allegations of phone hacking by News Corporation papers. See <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/07/phone-hacking-alan-rusbridger>

¹² Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 85. This position is reflected in the offence in the UK Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 134 which is committed by any public official or person acting in an official capacity in the UK or elsewhere who "intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported performance of his official duties."

Photo by Nathan Gibbs on Flickr



Alexander the Great

Military Leaders and Global Leaders: Contrasts, Contradictions, and Opportunities

By Anthony J. DiBella

Leadership has long been a focal point of human curiosity but has recently gathered even more attention. As globalization becomes increasingly the dominant force in political, social, and economic affairs, leaders far and wide are being called upon to take on new roles and address emergent challenges. This trend may be most prominent in the arena of national security. In particular, military leaders must now interact with a broader range of social communities as engagements span national and cultural boundaries.¹ While in the past, national militaries or their forces or branches acted alone, most of today's engagements involve coalitions, "partners", or joint forces. How do the traditional traits and characteristics of military leaders align with this new environment? This paper will examine several traits or characteristics of military leaders, compare them to those of other global leaders, and suggest ways to prepare military leaders for global leadership roles that go beyond parochial interests.

Military Leaders: Character and Skills

Over the years, there has been a greater focus on what makes for good leadership as research results converge on the key traits, attributes, and prerequisites of effective leaders. At the same time, there has been a shared recognition that effective leadership combines elements of both art and science. The science derives from a process of identifying required leadership skills and building educational

programs to promote those skills. The art of leadership derives from certain apparently innate attributes or traits such as perseverance or conviction. For leaders to be truly effective, they must have not just skills (competencies) or traits (characteristics), but both.²

The study of military leadership has itself a lengthy history. Among its recurring themes is, "big man theory," according to which there are

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certain individuals just born to be military leaders, from Alexander the Great to Napoleon to George Patton. When it comes to the nature of military leadership in today's national security environment, there are several traits that appear to be universally essential. Among them are the propensity to make good decisions quickly, the capacity to act with conviction, and the ability to take a position, be it of policy or strategy, and compel it on others.³ Each of these characteristics is distinctive, but in the conduct of leading others they are not simply complementary but synergistic as well.

Making Decisions Quickly

Battles may be won or lost at a moment's notice. When the circumstances arrive to attack (or retreat), an effective military leader must not delay but decide on a course of action and begin to implement it. If there is one trait that can undermine one's regard for a military leader, it is the inability to make a timely decision and then act quickly on the basis of that decision. Some of the explanations for why the U.S. Civil War lasted so long point to the indecisiveness of General George McClellan and his hesitation to take action against the Army of Northern Virginia despite the disproportionate power of the Union Army.

Acting with Conviction

Decisions facing military leaders at the strategic, operational, or tactical level often have clear and direct implications for the health and well being of those under their command. One of the simple definitions of a leader is someone who has followers. Followers engage with leaders who are able to communicate the correctness of their decisions, and thus evoke within followers the strong sense or faith that the right course of action is being taken.⁴ A commander who is unable to demonstrate or show conviction is less apt to have followers who implement their orders with zeal, especially if their lives depend on the outcome. When General Robert E. Lee ordered the charge of Pickett's brigade up Cemetery Ridge at the battle

of Gettysburg in 1863, he demonstrated conviction that the direct attack would break the Union line.⁵ The greater the sense of conviction a military commander projects, the greater will be the sense of confidence the commander instills. At the same time, that orientation may lead to a lower capacity for self-correction.

Advocating and Imposing a Clear Position

Effective leadership in battle can be defined as the ability to impose one's will on the enemy. This capacity derives from knowing what one wants to do or having a definitive opinion on a topic, strategy, or course of action. This trait carries over from the battlefield to the war rooms of the Pentagon. Officers who hold, advocate for, or are able to impose their views on others usually command greater respect and hold more power than those who exhibit uncertainty or ambivalence. This orientation tends to lead to binary thinking – right or wrong, my way or the highway. However, it is regarded as a virtue as it provides a leader with the “steadfastness and resolve” needed to pursue a course of action that may have serious consequences to life and limb.⁶ This trait reinforces one's capacity to act with conviction. It is much easier to have conviction when you see the world in only one way; and when you see the world in only one way, it is much easier to advocate for the way you see it!

One of the major criticisms that may be directed to anyone in a position of leadership, or who aspires to leadership, is being ambivalent or, as we say in the United States “wishy-washy” or a “flip-flop.” Better to hold a position and stand by it than to change one's position and risk the impression that one cannot be counted on to hold one's ground against the opinions or influences of others. According to Chris Argyris, this trait explains why it is difficult to teach smart people new things.⁷ Smart people often tend to focus on, and argue for, the correctness of their position and are closed to the opinions and perspectives of others. To do otherwise would be taken as a sign of weakness.

These three leadership traits – timely decision-making, having conviction, and advocating a clear point-of-view – are valued in military culture in general and in American military culture in particular. While these traits are all admirable and constructive in certain contexts, today’s national security environment presents a different and more challenging set of circumstances than those of the past. Effective leadership therein necessitates the application of a different skill set.

Essential Attributes of Global Leaders

As the international economy expands and globalization becomes a dominant force in many industries, the latest focal point in leadership research has been the need for “global leaders.” Such individuals are able to function across cultural or national divides to lead partnerships or coalitions of diverse actors. Here too one can see a great deal of convergence.⁸ While there are many theories, frameworks, or models of and for global leadership, three attributes that are characteristic of most if not all of them: the ability to tolerate ambiguity; inquisitiveness or curiosity; and the ability to manage paradox or embrace duality.⁹

Tolerance of Ambiguity

The French scientist and theologian Blaise Pascal once claimed that, “a truth on one side of the Pyrenees is a falsehood on the other.” Anyone who has ever worked or traveled cross-cultural divides can understand the meaning and relevance of Pascal’s insight. People from different cultures view the world from differing sets of assumptions. At a minimum, global leaders must be able to acknowledge different views of reality, and better yet to incorporate them into their leadership and decision-making processes.

Ambiguity stems from the recognition that there are multiple ways to look at or understand a problem or situation. While the principles of mathematics and science may be universal, the truth regarding assumptions or values comes in many sizes and shapes. Accepting this premise means that

when it comes to problems or situations involving people, there is more than one possible answer.

Mitigating ambiguity means suspending judgment and decision-making until more facts are known, or more interpretations or perspectives are articulated. It means waiting until there is greater clarity in the decision-making environment or a greater number of options or choices are available. In effect, the leader must keep from making a decision until the best decision or at least a better decision is found. Tolerating ambiguity requires patience and being comfortable with the anxiety and uncertainty of not knowing what is to be done. Lack of this skill often leads to what is known as, “rush to judgment;” on the other hand, too much leads to, “paralysis from analysis.”

However, in positions of senior leadership, the most challenging problems and difficult questions are the ambiguous ones. Effective global leaders are able to accept and grapple with uncertainty for as long as it takes to fully understand the problem and its solution. Global leaders are able to fend off social or political pressures to act hastily, an orientation that can propel a leader to solve the problem of ambiguity but to make a decision prematurely.

Inquisitiveness or Curiosity

An inquisitive person is continually trying to better understand the world and all the things in it. By definition, an inquisitive person makes a habit of being in inquiry mode; perennially open to the environment while searching and looking for new, more, or better information. That may mean being pro-active and asking a lot of questions or simply being receptive to what is going on around them. Perhaps the person is simply curious about how something works or what it would be like to have an experience that differs from the normal routine or repertoire.

Being inquisitive means more than asking questions or seeking answers; it means having a mind that is open to new and different ideas. It means suspending judgment to first understand differences or new ways of thinking or doing. Yet

more critically, to be inquisitive or to practice curiosity requires a person to refrain from being in action. That is, the more involved a person is in doing something, whether it is making a decision or implementing it, the less they are able to acquire and process information that comes from being curious. This distinction highlights the balance between action versus inquiry and the cultural balance between the two. In the U.S., we are far more action than inquiry oriented as reflected in the proverbial saying, “don’t just stand there, do something.” There is also something in the dynamic relationship that exists between follower and leader. Followers look to their leaders for answers not questions.

Embracing Duality and Difference

When acting in a global context a leader is sure to face situations involving differences in culture, perspectives, and points of view. A key attribute of effective global leaders is the capacity to recognize that no individual, or culture has a monopoly on the truth. Indeed, there is usually some truth and validity to every point of view. To lead in that context requires an individual to acknowledge, accept, and embrace different perspectives.

Acknowledgment and recognition, however, represent just the first step. To truly lead, an individual must bring people together; one fundamental way of doing so is to embrace duality and integrate differences.¹⁰ The dilemma comes from the contrasting points of view reflected between different cultures. The effective global leader can recognize some truthfulness in every point of view and come up with a more robust understanding of the problem or solution than what can be offered from a singular perspective. By integrating differences, a leader can demonstrate respect for different points of view and promote solutions or courses of action that have greater acceptance. Leaders must, to quote Thad Allen, former Commandant of U.S. Coast Guard, “[...] learn how to unite those who have a consequential role in the outcomes we seek regardless of their role or affiliation [...] we

must be effective within a political process without becoming political.”¹¹

While each of these three traits, tolerance of ambiguity, inquisitiveness, and the ability to embrace duality, is distinctive, there is a synergy between them. To be inquisitive suggests that a person is not zealous or righteous or arrogant about some act, attitude, or belief. It means that a person acts or lives with some degree of uncertainty and can tolerate the discomfort that comes from not knowing the answer to some question or how some experience “feels.” To acknowledge and integrate differences requires not only the capacity to be uncertain about the truth, but also an appreciation of the fact that two heads (or perspectives) may be better than one.

Global Leaders Versus Military Leaders

When you compare the three traits of military leaders previously described with the three typical traits of global leaders, some intriguing and perhaps disturbing contrasts can be made. Table 1 highlights these distinctions. While the two sets could be seen as contradictory, they could also be viewed as complementary.

While a military leader must be decisive, the global leader must be inquisitive. In a military situation, too much inquisitiveness or inquiry can delay deciding on a course of action beyond its period of usefulness. For a global leader to understand and integrate different points of view, he must take time to inquire about what those perspectives actually are.

Given the risks and consequences of their decisions, military leaders are understandably intolerant of ambiguity. While a military leader must demonstrate conviction in his decisions and actions, the global leader must acknowledge the uncertainty and ambiguity reflected in any culturally complex situation. A military leader must simplify circumstances and project confidence in what the situation demands. A global leader must recognize multiple and possibly conflicting ways of framing a situation each of which suggest a range

Table 1: Contrasting Set of Leadership Traits & Skills

“A”	“B”
Military Leaders	Global Leaders
Decisive	Inquisitive
Act with Conviction	Act with Uncertainty
Advocate	Integrate

of responses. As the supreme commander of allied forces during WWII, General Dwight Eisenhower exhibited both competencies by tolerating the uncertainty of when to commence D-Day and projecting confidence that the attack would succeed once he authorized its start.¹²

What is expected of the military leader is the ability to control, dictate, or advocate a particular position, while the global leader is looking to integrate multiple positions or points of view into one that can be universally shared. In the command and control environment of military culture, which rewards those who follow orders without questioning, multiple points of view need not be a major concern to a person in command. For the military leader, differences of opinion can be ignored or worse seen as a threat, whereas for a global leader they are an opportunity. In acting with conviction, military leaders are apt to foster a climate that constrains the sense of openness required for the sharing of alternative perspectives. Military leaders are also expected to advocate positions that are consistent with or advantageous to their primary loyalty which is often to their own country rather than to some global coalition.

While the three characteristics of military leaders would seem to be in conflict with the three skills of global leaders, effective leadership really requires a balance of both. Research supports the view that some traits of military leaders taken to an extreme can be destructive. In a study on leadership and subordinate satisfaction, survey respondents identified as the most common negative behaviors the tendency for leaders to, “impose his or her solution,” “insist on one solution,” “force acceptance of his or her point of view,” “would not

take no for an answer,” and “demand to get his or her way.”¹³ In effect, when military leaders use their formal authority or position to bully subordinates and impose a decision or position, their effectiveness and credibility are compromised.

Even Clausewitz seems to recognize that while it is good for military leaders to stick to a specific position that should not lead to overconfidence and resisting input from others.¹⁴ For example, Dwight Eisenhower was an effective leader for Operation Overlord precisely because of his capacity to hear, tolerate, and integrate the multiple points of view articulated by the diverse set of generals (e.g. Charles de Gaulle, Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Bernard Montgomery, George Patton) who commanded Allied forces.¹⁵ On the other hand, some American generals, such as Douglas MacArthur and Stanley McChrystal, were relieved of their commands due to their strong advocacy of certain policy positions.¹⁶

Another way to characterize this issue would be to say that from a military perspective alternative points of view distract, whereas for a global leader they contribute. In effect, a military leader must have a frame of vision that is like a spotlight; the global leader needs a frame like a floodlight. This distinction suggests that leaders need to be more like “pentathletes than single event competitors.” The latter phrase was penned by John Donnelly in pointing out that, new criteria for promoting U.S. Army generals places greater emphasis on breadth of experience than was the case previously.¹⁷

An intriguing comparison, or perhaps dilemma, is that the military’s reward systems traditionally reinforce one set of characteristics at

the expense of the other. The more pronounced, extreme or archetypical the characteristics of a leader, the more apt they are to be admired and rewarded. At the same time however, it is more difficult for such an individual to exhibit the contrasting set of characteristics. For example, the more conviction a military leader projects, the greater the level of confidence passed on to subordinates, but the less he is apt to appear open to divergent points of view. Similarly, the more a global leader tries to integrate diverse perspectives and get buy-in from diverse stakeholders, the less clear he will appear to be in advocating a particular position.

Developing Military Leaders into Global Leaders

Contrasting the traits of military leaders with those of global leaders begets a series of questions. Should we expect military leaders, especially those at the flag level, to function as global leaders? If so, what are the implications for professional military education (PME) and is it fair or reasonable to expect that military officers will be competent in such a diverse range of capabilities? Certainly by promoting military officers whose skill sets include those required of global leaders, we can ensure that our military and national security apparatus will be more effective in the global environment.¹⁸ Where will these leaders come from if the criteria for promoting military leaders is based on the set of elements “A” rather than those in “B” which taken to extremes can work in opposition to one another? How can leaders keep these skills and traits in balance?

Whether operating at the tactical, operational, or strategic level, today’s military leaders are more apt to work in joint operations or the interagency environment than was the case previously. These circumstances require a different set of skills.¹⁹ Yet, the uncertainty and volatility of today’s security environment make it impossible to specify a-priori what skills our leaders must have. In effect, today’s environment calls for adaptive leadership and for leaders who can cope with the discomfort

of uncertainty in recognizing today’s complexity and who can respond to security threats “along the entire spectrum of conflict.”²⁰

The need for adaptive, balanced leadership is required by the growing interaction of military and civilian personnel in joint operations, especially during crises.²¹ Even the domain of military transformation requires greater civil-military coordination and an increased capacity of military leaders to adapt their styles to the cultures of different stakeholder groups.²² Rapprochement between these constituencies may be enhanced by overlapping the ways in which civilian and military leaders are developed.

How well the military is doing in educating military officers for positions of global leadership is difficult to determine, although the 2010 Congressional review of PME offers a broad and general assessment.²³ During the past 15 years, especially following the attacks on the United States in 2001, there has been a growing recognition of the need to prepare our military leaders for a more complex environment.²⁴ Among the evidence are statements and testimony presented in the 2009-2010 hearings of the House Armed Services Committee to examine progress that has been made in PME since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. More specifically, the hearings were intended to be a follow-up to the committee’s last review of military education in 1989, which became known as the Skelton report. A focal point of the review was less the content of PME programs and more the overall educational experience.

The main conclusion of the Congressional review was that military education is “still basically sound.”²⁵ Such a phrase is self-assuring but says nothing about content and whether the skills and competencies focused on in PME are suited to our current era of globalization. The Committee’s report includes clear admonitions that officers need to get better at developing strategy, but there is no mention of the challenge of implementing those strategies or leading global organizations. Another focal

point of the Committee's review was academic rigor, a major concern expressed in the Skelton report. The more recent review is more favorably inclined with respect to rigor, although evidence of such is based primarily on the presence of tests and the effort by some war colleges to seek accreditation from civilian boards of higher education.²⁶

To use the presence of tests as an indicator of academic rigor reflects a limited view of education. Tests are only one of many grading mechanisms and what is vital in ensuring academic rigor is not grading per se, but standards of achievement. One anecdotal piece of data reflecting the latter is student perception in war colleges that it is more difficult to get a grade of "C" than an "A." Another is the view that attending PME programs is more about getting one's ticket punched for promotion than about developing competencies that contribute to job performance. If Congress and the Department of Defense are seriously interested in academic rigor, war college administrators would be encouraged to sponsor an academic decathlon instead of Jim Thorpe Day, the military's annual sports competition between war colleges.²⁷

Most PME advocates call for greater numbers of military officers to participate and more time in the classroom for those who do.²⁸ This perspective seems to reflect more of a learning-harder rather than learning-smarter attitude. If military officers are to spend more time in the classroom learning skills that are not suited to today's national security environment, then we are misusing that time. PME programs need to be more than way stations to senior level positions; they need to be opportunities to reflect on and learn about the skills required of more strategic and global leaders. One troublesome observation from the most recent congressional review is that there appears to be less rigor than in the past in the PME "Capstone" course for flag officers.²⁹

One of the proposed solutions for shortcomings in PME is to send more military officers to civilian institutions. The presumption is that those types of institutions are more apt to expose military

personnel to new perspectives and new forms of critical thinking. Another option is to make war colleges more like civilian institutions. This approach would require cultural changes in our war colleges, especially in regards to how faculties are valued.

The foundation of any academic experience lies in core faculty. To use an industrial metaphor, they are the tools or machines of production and students the raw material. Discussions about academic freedom at our war colleges often focus on the ability of faculty to publish on policy issues regardless of their political implications. In civilian institutions, academic freedom incorporates another dimension; it pertains to the freedom of a faculty member to teach students the way they wish. When a professor in a civilian institution is assigned to teach a course, he is usually given no more than the course number and title and the room in which classes are to be held. It is up to the faculty member to develop the syllabus and teach the course in the manner that he or she sees fit.

In an earlier part of my career, I was recruited to teach as a core faculty member at one of our nation's war colleges. On my first day on the job, I was assigned to teach several courses. For one of them, I was given a 46-page syllabus that specified all course readings and assignments and discussion questions for each and every class session. I was also informed that I would meet on a regular basis with other faculty to discuss teaching objectives for each class and the way in which course materials could be taught. At a civilian academic institution, such dictates and attention to a professor's teaching responsibility would be the basis for faculty revolt. Another indicator of how faculty is perceived is that war college students referred to my role as a "moderator" not a professor. The former suggests a lower status and reflects the diminished role of faculty compared to the prestige they hold in civilian institutions.

As the saying goes, the medium is the message. If we are to expose military officers to the skills of global leadership, then we have to tolerate more ambiguity in the classroom. Rather than

administrators dictating course requirements and content from above, faculty need the discretion to align how courses are taught with what we expect students to learn. In effect, the more certain Congress or war college administrators want to be about what takes place in the classroom, the less PME students will learn about coping with ambiguity.

A Way Ahead

At the strategic level, a military leader must have the same capabilities and orientation as a global leader.³⁰ What will it take for military leaders to work effectively across cultures and amidst a diversity of national and international armed forces, diplomats, and political leaders? It will require individuals who can balance the need to show conviction in their decisions with the need for intellectual humility and the openness to alternative points of view.

If the culture of the military remains static, then the same type of values will be promulgated and military leaders with the values reflected in set “A” will be promoted. The design and content of PME can be changed, but if the organizational context of PME graduates does not, our military officers will be learning skills that are neither valued nor used as a basis for promotion. This challenge parallels the findings from a report on officer management conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That report indicated that even as the operational environment and demands on our military personnel have shifted, military promotional systems remain the same. This situation has led to what is referred to as an “ingenuity gap.”³¹ In effect, military officers with the ingenuity, flexibility, and adaptability to respond to ambiguous times are less apt to be promoted. For global leaders to emerge from the military, the military’s career management system will need to change.

It would be comforting and assuring if military personnel never faced the demands or expectations of global leadership, but unfortunately

given the nature of contemporary conflicts, that is no longer an option. It would also be folly to think that the culture of our armed services will change either fundamentally or incrementally over time. The best we can hope for is that some accommodation will be made for officers who truly think outside the box and to give faculty at our war colleges more discretion in preparing our military officers for increasingly more uncertain times. That should not mean increasing the number of faculty slots for civilians at our war colleges, but recruiting for faculty (with or without military experience) who are open to inquiry, think comfortably with uncertainty, and are able to deal in the classroom with the challenges that come from not orchestrating every class much as our military cannot orchestrate every battle. The battlefield and our classrooms are or need to be fluid environments where success requires the capacity to respond to that fluidity with creativity and ingenuity.

Professionals who aspire to senior leadership whether in the military, business, or politics need to be in environments where difficult questions are asked and discussed rather than avoided. PME students should not be let off the hook so to speak by discounting or evading ambiguous questions by claiming that they are matters of philosophy.³² The most fundamental parts of being a leader demand deep thinking and resolute reflection. Practitioners who feel discomfort in exercising the cognitive and intellectual parts of their being and who will not or cannot work past that feeling would be wise to remain tacticians. Effective strategic military and global leadership is a balance of leadership traits.

Military culture is an excellent context for supporting and promoting leaders who are decisive, act with conviction, and can advocate clear points of view. If military officers who have risen to be flag officers can balance those traits with those of global leaders, as Dwight Eisenhower was capable of doing, then the military will be more successful in taking on new roles and responsibilities of international security as they emerge. **PRISM**

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Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Emmanuel Rios



A U.S. Special Operations Forces Soldier leads a group of soldiers from Iraqi Special Operations Force's 8th Regional Commando Battalion while practicing movement techniques during Foreign Internal Defense training in Baqubah, Iraq.

Redefining the Indirect Approach, Defining Special Operations Forces (SOF) Power, and the Global Networking of SOF

By Scott Morrison

Most military professionals and historians are familiar with the theories and concepts of air, maritime, and land power, but there has been little in the way of theory or concept as to what Special Operations power means and its strategic utility alongside those of the air, maritime, and land domains. Yet Special Operations Forces (SOF) must play a central role in several of the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces as projected in the Defense Strategy entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, such as countering terrorism, irregular warfare, and countering weapons of mass destruction. The importance of Special Operations to this new strategy was underscored in the accompanying remarks made by former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta during the January 5, 2012, unveiling of the new defense strategy where he mentioned specifically, “as we reduce the overall defense budget, we will protect, and in some cases increase, our investments in special operations forces.” Therefore, understanding the role of SOF power and how it fits within strategy is an essential prerequisite to successfully implementing the U.S. Defense Strategy.

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Recalibrating the Current SOF Interpretation of the Direct and Indirect Approaches

Within the U.S. Special Operations community there has been a considerable amount of theoretical discussion, attempting to more clearly characterize the “indirect approach” as it relates to the “direct approach” in a Special Operations context. The familiar understanding in U.S. SOF circles generally associates the direct approach with direct action (DA), and the indirect approach with foreign internal defense (FID) or security force assistance (SFA). In some quarters current interpretations of these two approaches represent what is nearly a cultural schism within Special Operations due to the very different focus and skill sets associated with them. In order to understand SOF power, one first needs a recalibrated view of the direct and indirect approach frames of reference from a broader strategic vantage point.

An informative start point for exploring these topics to better define and understand the strategic utility and value of SOF power is to revert back to first principles and reconsider the roots and origins of the indirect approach. Former British soldier, historian, and military theorist Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart is historically credited with defining the indirect approach in his work, the “Strategy of Indirect Approach,” where he asserted: “...throughout the ages decisive results in war have only been reached when the approach has been indirect. In strategy the longest way round is apt to be the shortest way home.”¹ This indirect approach of Hart focused on targeting the balance or equilibrium of an adversary noting, “while the strength of an enemy country lies outwardly in its numbers and resources, these are fundamentally dependent upon stability or equilibrium of control, morale, and supply.”² The central premise of the indirect approach is to orient upon, target, and upset an adversary’s equilibrium or balance to set up and enable follow-on decisive blows to be landed. Hart goes on to explain with an athletic metaphor that a direct approach without the preparatory shaping

of an indirect lead is often a blunt and raw methodology that typically results in an adverse outcome; “In war as in wrestling the attempt to throw the opponent without loosening his foothold and balance can only result in self-exhaustion increasing in disproportionate ration to the effective strain put upon him. Victory by such a method can only be possible through an immense margin of superior strength in some form, and, even so, tends to lose decisiveness.”³ From his historical analysis of the indirect approach vice the direct approach, Hart became convinced that, “More and more clearly the fact emerged that a direct approach to one’s mental object, or physical objective, along the ‘line of natural expectation’ for the opponent, has ever tended to, and usually produced negative results.”⁴ While the context of Hart’s theory stemmed from observations of state on state conflict, the indirect approach is arguably more applicable in the complex operating environment of the 21st century where non-state threats and internal conflicts dominate the security landscape.

The Indirect Approach and SOF Power

In some circles a degree of cynicism is expressed when Special Operations are explained as small unit tactical actions performed by specially organized, trained, and equipped forces aimed at achieving strategic and operational effects. SOF alone are not a panacea or substitute, but they provide significant complementary capabilities to those of the air, land, and maritime domains. In fact, a great deal of what allows SOF to perform in a special manner are the enabling capabilities, in many cases leveraged from outside of SOF, such as “mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote logistics, engineering planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, interpreters/translators, communications, dog teams, close air support specialists, security forces, and others that permit SOF operators to focus more directly on their missions.”⁵ What SOF do however, is bring together a potent and unique mix of capabilities to the defense portfolio that enables pursuit of

this indirect approach with an effect or outcome that is grossly disproportionate to the investment in resources. The SOF core activities identified by the U.S. Special Operations Command are: Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs Operations, Counterterrorism, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Security Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency Operations, and Activities Specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).⁶ Collectively, these core activities provide a toolbox for pursuing the strategic indirect approach. SOF power is the ability to apply the precise effects of these collective capabilities at carefully calibrated points of the adversary's balance or equilibrium described by Hart, whether that opponent is a state, non-state, or irregular actor in the form of an insurgent challenging an incumbent allied government. These capabilities might include the surgical application of force through offensive action, more methodical long-term efforts that support and influence others through training, advice, and assistance, or as in most instances a combination of both. A strategy of support and influence seeks to achieve a positional advantage, exercised primarily via local indigenous forces to undermine the foundation and environment that enables the equilibrium or balance of an adversary. These local forces empowered with indigenous knowledge and information, enabled with advice and assistance, are capable of eroding an adversary's balance over time. These longer term support and influence efforts, complemented by carefully calibrated, high tempo offensive action driven by high fidelity intelligence, combine to achieve, through a strategic indirect approach, what John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt described as "swarming" to disrupt command and control, deny sanctuary, interdict lines of communication, gather information and provide strategic anticipation to inform follow-on actions and decisions.⁷ The tools of the current interpretation of the direct approach as it

is known today, primarily offensive operations in the form of high tempo precision raids, are in fact integral components of a broader application of the strategic indirect approach. Obtaining clarity on this topic is critically important, as the value and utility of SOF power operating in this strategic indirect manner are particularly relevant to the threats and challenges faced in the 21st century security environment.

Facing Nefarious Networked Actors and Today's Paradigm for Conflict

It is no secret that the technological impact on telecommunications and modern transportation has made the world more interconnected. It has revolutionized how we look at commerce and business through a global lens of interdependence. As a result, the global international security landscape is inherently more complicated due to the same interconnected nature found in today's world of interdependent financial markets and commerce. The nature of today's threats and challenges is characterized by a complex network of nefarious state and non-state actors ranging from insurgents and terrorists to traffickers, financial institutions, and drug cartels who collaborate wittingly and unwittingly through relationships of opportunity, convenience, dependence, shared ideology, like causes, common enemies, financial gain and brotherhood. Iran for example, by many accounts has become extremely adept at leveraging a diverse global network of nefarious entities. The balance or equilibrium, referred to by Hart, of this loosely affiliated network is similarly complex, amorphous, and dynamic. We have seen this in over more than a decade of conflict against the network of Al Qaeda.

Arquilla and Ronfeldt are not frequently credited for their concept articulated as early as 1996, "It takes a network to fight networks." Today this phrase is unfortunately bantered about and attributed to others with little of the contextual substance and detailed understanding that made their observation so profound and prophetic. In

the aftermath of September 2001 in a follow-on piece entitled “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)”, the authors brought the issue into sharper focus:

“It takes networks to fight networks. Governments that want to defend against netwar may have to adopt organizational designs and strategies like those of their adversaries. This does not mean mirroring the adversary, but rather learning to draw on the same design principles that he has already learned about the rise of network forms in the information age. These principles depend to some extent on technological innovation, but mainly on a willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally, perhaps especially by building new mechanisms for interagency and multijurisdictional cooperation.”⁸

This concept of requiring more dynamic configurations to enable combating networked nefarious actors bears relation to another key work by the same authors written for RAND in 1997 entitled, “A New Epoch and Spectrum of Conflict,” that metaphorically describes the paradigm shift required to fight these “netwars” of the future. In this work, the traditional western game of chess is juxtaposed as the frame of reference representing the past against the Chinese game of Go to describe the nature of the strategic paradigm shift to the future.

“Thus Go, in contrast to chess, is more about distributing one’s pieces than about massing them. It is more about proactive insertion and presence than about maneuver. It is more about deciding where to stand than whether to advance or retreat. It is more about developing web-like links among nearby stationary pieces than about moving specialized pieces in combined operations. It is more about creating networks of pieces than about protecting hierarchies

of pieces. It is more about fighting to create secure territories than about fighting to the death of one’s pieces. Further, there is often a blurring of offense and defense—a single move may both attack and defend simultaneously. Finally, the use of massed concentrations is to be avoided, especially in the early phases of a game, as they may represent a misuse of time and later be susceptible to implosive attacks. This is quite different from chess, which is generally linear, and in which offense and defense are usually easily distinguished, and massing is a virtue. Future conflicts will likely resemble the game of Go more than the game of chess.”⁹

The work of these two authors will prove over time to be as consequential to understanding warfare in the 21st century as the thoughts of Clausewitz were to the 20th century martial art.

The centrally important role of networks to counter nefarious networks of the 21st century has not been lost upon the United States Government after a decade plus of war against the Al Qaeda network. Across innumerable U.S. national security policy documents the inexorable fact of life that the United States cannot go it alone and must work with other international actors in a comprehensive whole of government manner to achieve common security interests resonates with unmistakable clarity. Former Secretary of Defense Panetta emphasized the importance of this in a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace in June of 2012 where he said, “In the 21st century, we must build partnerships that enable us to better meet a wider range of challenges. To that end, I see us building networks that leverage our unique capabilities – and the unique strengths of our allies and partners that share common interests – to confront the critical challenges of the future.” He again reiterated this theme further in a briefing at the Pentagon in October while speaking about the ongoing implementation of the new U.S. Defense Strategy against the backdrop of



(DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Joseph Swafford, U.S. Air Force/Released) U.S. Department of Defense

Afghan National Police Crisis Response Unit members climb over a wall to enter a compound during training in Surobi, Afghanistan, Dec. 9, 2010. The training was conducted by International Security Assistance Force special operations forces.

fiscal challenges, “But one important way that we are going to do this is to strengthen our network of defense Alliances around the globe.”

The Networking of SOF Power

With the formidable array of SOF fielded by the United States, some might question the utility and need for closer networking of U.S. SOF with allied and partner SOF around the world. As former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ms. Michelle Flournoy once insightfully remarked, allies and partners of the United States are more than “nice to have” or “window dressing,” but are instead essential for achieving our security interests in today’s world. The ultimate strategic utility of SOF power is applying a classic reinterpretation of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach to leverage SOF as a force multiplier and economy of force instrument to upset an adversary’s equilibrium and balance through proactive and

preventative insertion, presence, and action in coordination with a multinational collaborative network of SOF networks.

A robust and focused effort to build a global SOF network of networks supports the U.S. defense strategy in three major ways. The first is that this global networking of SOF builds relationships that engender trust and confidence among different national SOF elements enabling more effective, efficient, and coherent multinational employment and collaboration among SOF. The central importance of relationships cannot be over-emphasized; in fact this is the center of gravity relative to a multinational SOF network. This is especially important to SOF as they are in most nations a close-knit insular community stemming from their sensitive strategic and operational work that is inherently classified; often of a low visibility, clandestine, or covert nature; and quite often depends on a high degree of operational security

for success and force protection. As a result, collaboration among multinational SOF depends first and foremost upon trust and confidence that underpins relationships between commanders, staffs, and SOF operators. However, without undergirding and codifying these relationships in a habitual, enduring, and substantive manner, working collaboratively alongside allies' and partners' SOF will never rise above a baseline threshold of effectiveness. What is required to build these relationships is more than transactional episodic interactions. Transactional relationships, or those forged under the duress of hurried timelines are less effective, as they lack the critical foundation that leads to trust and confidence. The quality of these relationships is proportional to the value and output of the relationships. Substantive and enduring relationships that yield results require an investment of time, energy, and resources. These relationships entail understanding the culture and ethos of the different SOF elements, as well as organizational and individual capabilities, limitations, idiosyncrasies, and terminology. Concepts that engender and foster these enduring relationships among the global network of multinational SOF support the "system of defense Alliances and security partnerships" described by the Secretary of Defense as "one of America's greatest national security assets." Secretary Panetta went on to point out that "No other nation in the world really has this asset," and that "These relationships are sound investments in an era of fiscal challenges and they really do pay dividends."¹⁰ His assertion on the efficacy of these networks in response to the associated investment reaffirms the findings of seminal studies of network effectiveness by Professors Keith Provan, Brinton Milward,¹¹ and Alex Turrini and others¹² over the last decade that indicate network leadership and associated resource munificence are some of the key characteristics required to build effective networks.¹³

The second way this SOF network of networks is supportive of the U.S. Defense Strategy is by building allied and partner SOF national

capabilities for both self-defense and their contribution to future coalition operations. Without the appropriate capability, capacity, and interoperability, allied and partner SOF will not be postured to work effectively alongside U.S. SOF, and therefore will have diminished utility in burden sharing. Secretary of Defense Panetta highlighted the importance of this in remarks at the Pentagon stating, "Indeed, I think it is fair to say that a vital pillar of the new defense strategy that we released this year is the important work of developing and deepening ties to other nations; developing their capabilities and building new Alliances and partnerships to build stability and security. This is one of the keys to the Defense force we are trying to build for the 21st Century."

The third and no less critical way in which U.S. leadership of a SOF network of networks supports the U.S. Defense Strategy is by providing U.S. SOF with peacetime and contingency access. Access not only in a classic sense in terms of infrastructure such as airfields, ports and training opportunities, but more importantly access to information, knowledge, understanding, perspective and legitimacy that are essential ingredients to operating successfully in the complex operational environment of the 21st century. As the 2008 U.S. Defense Strategy described, "Allies often possess capabilities, skills, and knowledge we cannot duplicate."¹⁴ It is for that reason that the global SOF network of networks enables a shared comprehensive understanding of today's challenges, threats, and issues that provides a broad and in depth appreciation for the nature of the problem as a point of departure for designing and implementing collaborative solutions.

Conclusion

We recognize that the nature of the nefarious networked adversary is dynamic and complex, requiring an adaptive, agile, and collaborative response. Arquilla and Ronfeldt postulated that applying the networks to fight networks paradigm would require "a willingness to innovate organizationally

and doctrinally, perhaps especially by building new mechanisms for interagency and multijurisdictional cooperation.” The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader “global war on terror” stimulated more collaborative “out of the box” interagency networked collaboration to include that of a multinational nature in some cases, but there is a need to evolve and push the innovation further to enable the application of appropriate lethal and nonlethal authorities, capacities, and capabilities against adversary networks in the most effective, efficient and coherent manner. This innovative principle is well understood by the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral William H. McRaven, who is pursuing multiple efforts along these lines to stimulate and implement precepts originally put forward by Arquilla and Ronfeldt on how to counter the phenomenon of “netwar.” The first of these initiatives is to engender and invigorate a multinational collaborative SOF network of networks around the world, and the other is to focus on and enhance a networked U.S. SOF relationship across the U.S. interagency community.

The modern version of the indirect approach is where networks of like-minded actors on today’s game board of international security achieve strategic presence through proactive and preventative insertion and activity to undermine the balance and equilibrium of the adversarial networked actors. While networking as described by the Secretary of Defense is not uniquely applicable to SOF, in some cases U.S. SOF alongside allied and partner SOF, are already serving as the vanguard for precisely the type of organizational, doctrinal, and mechanistic innovation and cooperation described by Arquilla and Ronfeldt over a decade and a half ago. SOF is ideally suited to lead these innovative efforts and serve as an enabler and catalyst to engender greater multinational and interagency collaboration through a comprehensive approach. This global networking of SOF through a SOF network of networks will exponentially increase the utility of SOF power and position it

appropriately to complement air, maritime, and land power in the 21st century. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Liddell Hart, *Strategy of the Indirect Approach*, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1941), 4.

² Hart, *Op. Cit.*, 5.

³ Hart, *Op. Cit.*, 5.

⁴ Hart, *Op. Cit.*, 4.

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⁶ “About United States Special Operations Command Webpage,” *US SOCOM*, accessed on March 8, 2013, at <http://www.socom.mil/Pages/AboutUSSOCOM.aspx>.

⁷ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 57.

⁸ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 15.

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¹⁰ Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, Department of Defense News Briefing from the Pentagon, October 25, 2012, accessed March 8, 2013, at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5143>.

¹¹ Keith G. Provan and H. Brinton Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public-Sector Organized Networks,” *Public Administration Review* 56, no. 4 (July/August 2001), 68.

¹² Alex Turrini et al, “Networking Literature about Determinants of Network Effectiveness,” *Public Administration* 88, no. 2 (2010), 540-545.

¹³ Joerg Raab, “Heading towards a Network Theory of Effectiveness: Combining Structure and Governance” (presentation at the University of Southern California Sol Price School of Public Policy Bedrosian Center, Los Angeles, California, March 28, 2011), accessed March 8, 2013, at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksriE7B3eIM>.

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Anti-Piracy Mission Atalanta

The Military in a Wicked World: A European Union Military Point of View

By Bruce Williams

We live in an increasingly wicked world, both in the common understanding of the word (given the growing number of serious security bushfires around the world threatening to join into a larger forest conflagration) and from a systems engineering perspective;¹ where interrelationships between concurrent and coincident actors and events necessitate increasingly complex solutions, to even the most seemingly simple crisis, if unintended consequences are not to dominate outcomes.

The European Union (EU) has responded to such increasing complexity in its approach to delivering Comprehensive action and effects – it now assumes modern crises require all instruments of power to be woven together from the outset to address them – a full span of such levers are, of course, the constituent parts of the EU. Some organizations might say they already deliver comprehensive effect. However the EU’s uniqueness lies in that it does not presume a starting point where any one lever of power is dominant—as is found in a defense dominated organization such as NATO. The EU’s model roughly equates to the U.S. inter-agency, but working in this case not under just one administration but 28!


Novel, and beginning to show real promise of delivering more enduring outcomes, this approach requires an attitude of mind in the military in the

EU that has to learn to cope with ambiguity and compromise. They must also cope with the fact that defense isn’t the dominant partner in an environment that, from its outset, has always been orientated more towards the norms of society and nation building than crisis management. Albeit, of late with the advent of the 2009 EU Lisbon Treaty, Member States (MS) have indicated their intent to grow the ability to deliver more coherent external action in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management through the formation of the European External Action Service on 1 January 2011, which has incorporated, inter alia, the European Union Military Staff.

The Issue

All too frequently military interlocutors outside the European Union (EU) get frustrated that “we”

Rear Admiral (UKRN) Bruce Williams is Deputy Director General of the European Union Military Staff.

Figure 1: Variation in Comprehensive Approach

don't act or feel like NATO. What follows attempts to address that frustration and suggest that the unique complexities of the EU are both desirable and increasingly proving to be an advantage in some circumstances. Such a discourse will also examine how the EU integrates military effect into its external action and show why the EU does not duplicate NATO, why it has a different philosophy of working, why (at times) it has entirely different roles and why such difference may eventually be seen as more complementary, and not in competition, with the efforts of other defense dominated organizations, such as NATO.

The Comparator

For a start the context is substantially different. The genesis of NATO, and its authority today, rests largely on the application of a single instrument of power—defense and security. Defense is the senior stakeholder with, by and large, the civil dimension being spread sparsely throughout the structure. Obvious advantages flow from this more discrete and focused lever, in terms of its ability to respond to crises at short notice. Such agility requires high readiness capabilities to support such advantage—hence, in part, the justification for permanent


command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) infrastructure and response forces designed to operate quickly and up to the highest reaches of the spectrum of crisis.

Of course utility across the spectrum of crisis must not be confused with, or detract from, NATO's ultimate purpose of assured collective defense and thus the drive to sustain the capabilities necessary to fulfill that remit. Such high-end capability necessarily proffers the capacity to address issues lower in spectrum and to pursue its "Comprehensive Action" ambitions. The difference between "Comprehensive Action" and the "Comprehensive Approach" might be, in the latter case, making a difference between using all possible means and valorizing them and others, in the former case, who can only coordinate. So such ambitions will always be constrained by the organization's design; where, in essence, although "Comprehensive" expertise might be integrated (see figure 1) into the organization, "Comprehensive" partners will still have to be contracted-in on a case-by-case basis.

The European Union in the World

The EU on the other hand, with access to almost all levers of power, from its birth, has been

Figure 2: EU Comprehensive Approach



Note: In rough terms, to address emergent crises or potential crises the EEAS draws together the three points of this triangle into a Crisis Platform. This Crisis Platform is not just EEAS but a range of stakeholders including, and crucially, the European Commission. Drawing from Framework Policy for the Region the Crisis Platform initiates development of the Crisis Management Concept document (the Comprehensive Estimate) for Member State's agreement on the need for, and span of, EU involvement in a Crisis.


predominantly concerned with the norms of human existence and nation building, rather than crises requiring military response – as an aside, one might argue this has had the effect of promoting a more impartial EU military persona in the settlement of international disputes. That said, EU Member States reinforced the possibilities of collective security and defense interests² in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.³ In doing so, their aim was to remove legal and other institutional impediments in order to promote more coherent comprehensive EU external action. In other words it looked to a future with real opportunity, inter alia, for intelligent and more subtle application of the military instrument. Such ambition manifests itself most obviously through the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS)⁴ on 1 January, 2011.⁵

The EEAS is functionally autonomous from other EU bodies but has a legal responsibility

to ensure its policies are consistent with those of other EU institutions. Accordingly the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also a Vice President of the European Commission and President of the European Foreign Affairs Council with a mandate to:

- conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy;
- contribute proposals to the development of that policy and execute it under the mandate of the European Council;⁶
- preside over the Foreign Affairs Council of Ministers;⁷
- ensure the Vice-Presidents of the Commission⁸ the consistency of the Union's external action;

Figure 3: CSDP Oversight



- represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy, conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and express the Union’s position in international fora;
- exercise authority over the European External Action Service and over EU delegations in third countries and at international organizations.

In practice this means the EEAS (which includes EU Delegations spread world wide) has a mandate that ranges from peace building and conflict prevention to the promotion of democracy, human rights and cooperation to provision of development aid⁹ to building of security through the Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP)¹⁰ – all collectively summarized at figure 2 and with arrangements for executive oversight shown at figure 3.


EU Mechanisms

This security and defense component, as a junior partner in a civil dominated convoluted nexus of

instruments, brings with it unique advantage when it comes to crisis management—the potential to deliver effect from a truly intrinsic Comprehensive Approach.¹¹ Of course remembering also the very real advantage of this approach is its capacity to deliver effect well before issues become a crisis through concerted effort on conflict prevention. Much of this prevention effort is the daily “bread and butter” work of the EEAS, dominated as it is by diplomatic and development capacities, that fits into what might be considered a crisis management cycle that aims to promote prevention rather than cure as the best course toward peace and prosperity.

The down-side of such diversity of stakeholders, with at times conflicting mandates or motivations,¹² results in an environment in which problems appear difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory or changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Indeed the effort to solve one aspect of such problems may reveal or create others.¹³ In this context one might consider the military in the EU being considered akin to NATO’s Political Advisers

Figure 4: EU Military Operational Chain of Command



Note: The EUMS is the source of collective multidisciplinary military expertise within the EEAS; working under the direction of the EUMC and under the direct authority of the HRVP. As an integral component of the EEAS's Comprehensive Approach, the EUMS coordinates the military instrument, with particular foci on operations/missions (both military and those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability. Enabling activity in support of this output includes: provision of early warning (through the SIAC), situation assessment, strategic planning, CIS, concept development and support of partnerships through mil-mil relationships. Concurrently the EUMS is charged with sustaining the dormant KO OPSCEN and providing its core staff when activated.

(POLADs) in relative numerical terms—in effect the Military Advisers (MILADs) to the EU. However, this is where this simile breaks down, as the EU military's remit and expected span of influence, including creating the space in which Operation/Mission Commanders can do their work, is substantially greater.

So given the diverse and convoluted environment in which the EU military exists, it should not be a surprise that military absolutism (more prevalent in defense dominated organizations such as NATO) has to give way to greater levels of compromise, collaboration and, critically, levels of ambiguity that most Service personnel will not have experienced before. And it doesn't stop there, as the military has also to adapt to the language of the civilian majority in order to thrive in this somewhat alien environment.

Perhaps adapting to this context would be more straightforward if one was part of just one

institution. However, the EU is an alliance of institutions with all the natural tensions that that context promotes. For instance one might view the relations between the EEAS and the individual Commissioners in the European Commission as one would between ministries in a government—all have their own opinion on external actions within their respective domains. But one should remember that such cultures and behaviors may, in part, be the legacy of pre-Lisbon treaty structures that show signs of fading in the face of promising Comprehensive successes such as in the Horn of Africa (HoA).

That said it is important to realize that, unlike many other aspects of EU business, common security and defense policy is entirely owned by Member States. The European Commission has no formal role to play in CSDP and the European Parliament has opinions but no immediate influence on this policy¹⁴ (as discussed later in this

article however, in seeking a truly Comprehensive Approach the opinion of the EU Commissioners and European Parliament remains of great import). Member States' ownership of CSDP routinely manifests itself through the Member States' Ambassadors in the Political Security Committee (PSC), supported by CSDP advisory committees and working groups (amongst which Member States' Military Representatives (MILREPs) convene as the EU Military Committee (EUMC)).¹⁵ This is, in some ways, analogous to the North Atlantic Council and Military Committee in NATO (indeed many of the MILREPs are dual-hatted to the EU and NATO) but, again, the simile breaks down as the command process differs significantly. For instance, the first level of executive power rests with the PSC, to whom all EU Operational Commanders (civil and military) report directly—an extremely short chain of command (figure 4). The EUMC, with staff support provided largely by the EU Military Staff (EUMS), exists to provide military advice to the PSC on behalf of Member States' Chiefs of Defense (in most instances).¹⁶


It is necessary at this point to pause for a moment and reflect on the mandate of the EUMS that itself adds to the complex (“wicked”) problem. Even though EU structures and institutions have changed substantially over the last two years, as things stand today, the EUMS hasn't formally modified its role since its creation just over ten years ago. It still identifies and assesses crisis situations, plans, and enables and supports operations, whilst conducting long-term concept and capability development. However, within the new paradigm, as an integral part of the EEAS, the scope and complexity of the EUMS role has dramatically increased. So today, as well as providing the source of military expertise within the EU into the Comprehensive Approach, substantial EUMS effort is also spent being the essential interface between the EEAS and EUMC, and with other military partners, such as NATO,¹⁷ UN and AU.

The Approach to Comprehensiveness

For quite some time the phrase, “Comprehensive Approach to crisis management,” has been much used but less well understood. For the military, perhaps one can summarize the approach by simply recognizing that there are limits to what the military can achieve in crisis management—while there may be an important role for the military, it has been demonstrated repeatedly, in recent years, that the military component cannot alone normally deliver a lasting end-state. Perhaps, by way of example, the Libyan conflict ably demonstrates this point. Although a military culminating point was reached 18 months ago, it is obvious, that in January 2013 there is some way to go in helping the Libyans secure the peace. Indeed, some argue today that the apparent use of the military instrument alone has resulted in the unintended consequence of exacerbation of regional instability in the Sahel, and in Mali in particular, in addition to ongoing security concerns in Libya.

This is where the EU's unique selling point, of having most levers of power available to realize Comprehensive Action, comes into its own. Naturally it is more difficult, and time consuming, to consolidate the plethora of interests vested in the different levers. Nevertheless, the EU has that inherent depth and breadth necessary to provide coherent multidisciplinary solutions to crisis, albeit more tailored towards the lower end of the spectrum of crisis than NATO (figure 5). That said, from this greater utility at the lower end of the crisis continuum,¹⁸ one should not infer lack of capability higher up the spectrum—the EU's formal ambition, assuming an issue directly impacts on EU political goals and interests, goes up as far as peace enforcement in regional crises. This suggests that developing NATO-EU collaboration must be a central concern of each organization's future when it comes to defense and security (in NATO) /security and defense (in the EU). In short, the EU and NATO are naturally separated by ambition and processes, and, to Member States' direct benefit, it would appear increasingly desirable to build

Figure 5: EU Military Operational Chain of Command



Notes:

1. Upper level determined by NATO's Level of Ambition.
2. Upper level determined by EU's Headline Goals.
3. Line represents conflation of the military instrument into the civil.
4. Point at which EU's relative utility (in general terms) might be considered to outweigh NATO's as one moves towards peace where a wider variety of instruments of power naturally reside.
5. Military utility extends further down the spectrum by dint of integration with other instruments in the EU.

on those discrete, but essentially complementary, drivers—indeed noting that any one strength might actually live in both NATO and EU simultaneously.

Building the Future

Part of that complementarity necessarily resides in the area of concept and capability development – clearly essential to enable the Comprehensive Approach. Thus, unsurprisingly, the EU military must also have responsibilities in developing the future—especially where such efforts assist Member States' Defense budgets by promoting common capabilities to protect our interests. Additionally, it should also come as no surprise that, with 22 Member States common to both organizations, the EU's "Pooling and Sharing"

capabilities development initiative is entirely complementary and coherent with NATO's equivalent "Smart Defense" initiative.

Within the EU, this work requires a symbiotic relationship between the EUMS and European Defense Agency (EDA) to both deliver such output and, especially in the case of EDA, to promote the preservation of the European defense industrial and technological base.¹⁹ And in doing so progress in such a way that complements, not duplicates or competes with, the efforts of NATO and other Member States' national considerations. Accordingly EDA and EUMS facilitate Member States in improving their respective capabilities for use by NATO or EU, and not exclusively by one or the other.



European Training Mission in Mali

Limits to Military Reach

But it must be recognized that, in Brussels, such military influence on the Comprehensive Approach is largely achieved through the efforts of just over 200 military personnel operating within an environment of 25,000 EU civilian staff (including 1,600 in the EEAS HQ). For any crisis the EEAS routinely brings together the key actors for the region in question: the EEAS Corporate Board, the regional/geographic Managing Director, the Managing Director Crisis Response, the representatives of the in-country EU Delegation, the three crisis management organizations (EUMS, Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) and Civilian Planning & Conduct Capability-CPCC), the EEAS's civil and military intelligence directorates, cross cutting issue departments for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention or Global and Multilateral Issues (such as human rights and democracy or counter terrorism) and, as importantly, the European Commission experts

(predominantly from the areas of development and cooperation,²⁰ and humanitarian aid and civil protection).²¹ One could also add to this mix other actors such as the 150 plus EU delegations around the world, who like the stakeholders in the Crisis Platform above, are also more and more welcoming of the military instrument in their midst – and not just in crisis but also in acknowledging that the military has a role to play in peace as well.

Inevitably some will raise the concern about high bureaucratic density in having so many stakeholders engaged. And they would be right – it is difficult to work with so many actors to drive real output. No doubt over time natural selection might streamline this more. However, the essential nature of the “Comprehensive Approach” in the EU (as indicated right at the beginning of this article and at figure1) means benefit will only accrue from embracing such complexity if lasting solutions, using all the instruments of power, not temporary fixes are to be found. Empirically, as highlighted

earlier in this article, an increasing body of evidence (from Iraq and Afghanistan to name but two sources) points to the probability that an overly simplistic initial approach to emergent crises only results in long-term chronic problems.

That said, given the newness and uniqueness of this truly joined up approach in the EU (to establish key areas of concern, methods to address them and then conduct strategic planning to articulate to Member States how the EU might respond) one must accept this is still, albeit encouraging, work in progress. But progress nevertheless and an approach that is providing tangible results – for instance, as alluded to earlier, in the Horn of Africa.

Demonstrating Potential for Success

The Horn of Africa is a region that suffers from natural disasters such as drought, is struggling with a largely failed state in Somalia and has to cope with the endemic problems that these cause. We see uncontrolled migration, repressive religious fundamentalism and rampant organized crime from, broadly, an absence of the rule of law. This is clearly a complex region with severe man-made, and natural, causes of instability. So how does the EU, since the formation of the EEAS, begin to address this?

Towards the end of 2011 the EEAS crafted a framework strategy for the Horn of Africa describing the EU's interests and objectives. This strategy, owned by a new EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, is designed to act as an umbrella under which lie various lines of development and associated action plans, with the express aim of ensuring coherent collaboration of all instruments to deliver comprehensive progress towards enduring stability for the region. Lines of actions associated with the military, within that construct, are:

- Enhancing the Somali National Security Forces by the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM), which trains Somali soldiers in the safe training environment of Uganda. This EU

training is conducted with strategic partners including Uganda, African Union (AU) and the United States. This is directly contributing to establishing stability and security in Somalia. EUTM at the beginning of 2013 is stepping up a gear with a new and expanded mandate that will see such training develop more in Somalia itself and include the mentoring of Somali ministries and headquarters to improve their effectiveness and accountability;

- Countering piracy—the EU launched its first maritime Operation (ATALANTA) in late 2008 to guarantee the security of the World Food Program ships providing food aid to Somalia, escorting shipping from the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and re-supplying their force by sea and countering the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia. This has directly led (in concert with efforts from partners such as NATO, Coalition Maritime Forces and other nations' unilateral activities) to increased safety for merchant shipping transiting the Horn of Africa—the crucial artery of trade to and from Europe and the east. It is worth noting that the relative robustness and reach of this operation's mandate, in particular, is now setting a benchmark for such operations;

- Supporting capacity building—the military has a supporting role in a project for Regional Maritime Capacity Building (EUCAP NESTOR), launched to develop and train regional states in maritime security, thereby developing an enduring and locally-owned capacity to tackle illicit exploitation of their maritime resources.

This fits into a much broader picture with many civilian lines of action that include:

- Development funding utilized for creating security, building peace, and improving democratic governance in Somalia. Over €215 million had been set aside for the period



Bundeswehr/Marc Tessemohn

European Training Mission in Somalia

2008-2013—it has recently been increased by a further €175 million.

- Development funding also assists the wider Horn, with projects in Kenya (€98 million), Ethiopia (€130million), Eritrea (€70 million), and Djibouti (€1.5 million) in the same period. These are targeted at food security and rural development to ensure sustainable solutions for the population;

- Humanitarian aid of €158 million over the last year to assist in feeding up to 12 million people affected by the drought—the worst drought in 60 years according to the UN. This will provide food aid, healthcare, access to clean water, and sanitation;

- The support to the Rule of Law and Security, implemented by the UN Development Program, is developing the Somali judiciary

system including civil police, improving access to justice, and training of custodial services;

- Security sector support—the EU has contributed over €200 million in direct support of AMISOM since 2007.

With the Transitional Government of Somalia transformed into a fully legitimate Government following elections last year, with developments in the instruments of state bolstered by EU (€1.6 billion expended by the EU on the Horn of Africa between 2008 and 2013) and other partners' funding, clear successes of AMISOM (augmented by credible Somali troops emerging out of the EUTM pipeline) against Al Shabab, with impressive reductions in rates of piracy offshore²² all supported by a more joined up approach at sea and on land, it is not unreasonable consider there is a growing body of evidence that the EU's new approach

to Comprehensiveness is beginning to deliver.²³ Albeit one must recognize that such success cannot be delivered through EU action alone. Real and lasting success is ultimately dependent on alignment of EU work strands with those of strategic and, most importantly, regional partners.

Conclusion

Winston Churchill once said, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity, the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.” Demonstrable advances highlighted above are grounds for real optimism. But optimism tinged with reality that there is no simple way forward. This article began with a simple hypothesis—as apples differ from pears, the military residing in different parts of Brussels are different fruit. One can’t simply equate military modus vivendi in the EU (apples) with other military dominated organizations, such as NATO (pears). The military within the EU is a junior partner but, nevertheless, is a key actor in the Comprehensive pursuit of truly enduring end-states. But in applying the EU’s hugely multi-faceted and uniquely integral Comprehensiveness, the military has to accept a strategic environment perpetually dominated by convoluted nexus of inter-related issues (both visible and invisible) that often result in unavoidable or unintended consequences. Accordingly the military must learn to operate in a context where dealing with ambivalence is an ever-present challenge to the military mind.

Given the challenges of ambiguity and complexity, such realities necessitate persistent and wide-ranging engagement by the military in the EU to ensure, by close collaboration and deft compromise, the input of a clear security and defense perspective into EU business. Unsurprisingly this can, at times, be frustratingly slow! One should not forget, however, that even earlier conflict prevention initiatives benefit from the new EU Comprehensiveness in stemming the march of an increasing number of issues towards crisis; a substantial dividend of the complexity, diversity and

reach of the EU’s many instruments that is often too easily overlooked.

Rightly, protracted responses do not always sit easily with Member States who demand more immediate cost efficient outcomes. But here again there are grounds for optimism as such drive naturally resides in the genes of the military staff due to their frequent rotation.²⁴ Consequently, if one focuses purely on the military in this complex (“wicked”) world of the EU, that component’s clearly understood end is to deliver such timely effect but through ways that have to fit the unique peculiarities of the EU. And do so, when compared with other security and defense related organizations, with military means that are lean by any standard. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Systems engineers often refer to convoluted and complex interrelated problems as “Wicked Problems” – a term not referring to such problems being evil but more to situations which are manifestly hugely resistant to resolution. It is an environment in which unintended consequences flourish if one is not careful.

² Contemporary and potential threats have been identified in the 2003 European Union Security Strategy—much has happened since.

³ External ambition is the context of this article but it should not be forgotten the Lisbon Treaty raised two clauses that will impact in ways yet to be decided by Member States: the Solidarity Clause (that focuses more on support for resolution of internal natural disasters) and the Mutual Assistance Clause (referring to internal manmade security issues—a legacy of the Western European Union (WEU) Treaty which is especially valid for European Member States who don’t belong to NATO).

⁴ The EEAS (that includes a network of EU Delegations around the world) assists the High Representative to deliver external action. Key policy goals are: a secure stable and prosperous European neighbourhood; closer relationships with strategic partners; universal respect for human rights; the spread of democracy and the rule of law; a sustainable development policy; crisis management and conflict prevention. Some examples action in pursuit of those goals are: Peace building: through political, practical and economic support the EU has played a crucial role in peace building in

the Western Balkans after the Yugoslav wars. From Bosnia-Herzegovina to Montenegro, the EU has used its power to promote peace and reconciliation. The latest example of this is the dialogue being facilitated by the European Union between Serbia and Kosovo – the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. A responsible neighbour: to the East and South of the European Union lie many countries that have in recent years undergone tumultuous political change. The Arab Awakening is just the latest example of this. Which is why the European Neighbourhood Policy aims to maintain solid and friendly relations with countries that are at the European Union's borders. Promoting democracy, human rights and opening trade and cooperation on visa issues are just some examples of this. Development Aid: which is making a huge difference to millions of people's livelihoods around the world. The EU is member of the Quartet, alongside the United Nations, the United States and Russia, which is working for peace in the Middle East. Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. The EU's objective is a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state side-by-side with Israel in peace and security. The Union is committed to human rights and works to ensure they are respected universally. The EU has made human rights a central aspect of its external relations: in the political dialogues it holds with third countries; through its development policy and assistance; or through its action in multilateral fora, such as the United Nations. The Union works closely with the United Nations on a host of issues. The Union's belief in multilateralism reflects an attachment to negotiated, binding rules in international relations, and is explicitly spelled out in the Treaty of Lisbon. Building security around the world: Under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU operates civilian and military missions worldwide. These missions carry out a variety of tasks from border management to local police training. For example the Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia tackles piracy and protects humanitarian shipments of the World Food Program bound for drought hit areas. Crisis Response & Humanitarian Aid: Almost half of all international humanitarian relief comes from the European Union and its members. This provides life saving aid in places like the Horn of Africa where famine stalks whole populations. In addition the European Union stands ready to respond in a coordinated way to any international emergency—be it the earthquake in Haiti, tsunami in Japan or flooding in Pakistan. This brings together all the tools the European Union has at its disposal. The Union was instrumental in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and, with a domestic low-carbon agenda that is probably the most advanced and sophisticated in the world remains a crucial player on this issue, indispensable for pushing an ambitious

agenda of change. The Union is focusing on building a coalition for a legally binding agreement on climate change. Trade: The European Union is the world's largest trading bloc. Trade is a common policy so the EU speaks with a single voice in trade negotiations with international partners in promoting a free and fairer international trading system.

⁵The EU Military Staff (EUMS) was transferred from the General Secretariat of the Council to the EEAS on 1 January 2011. The EUMS is the source of collective multidisciplinary military expertise within the EEAS; working under the direction of the EUMC and under the direct authority of the High Representative Vice President. As an integral component of the EEAS's Comprehensive Approach, the EUMS coordinates the military instrument, with particular foci on operations/missions (both military and those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability. Enabling activity in support of this output includes: provision of early warning (through the Single Intelligence Assessment Capability (SIAC)—a virtual organisation of military and civil intelligence), situation assessment, strategic planning, Communications and Information Systems (CIS), concept development and support of partnerships through mil-mil relationships. Concurrently the EUMS is charged with sustaining the dormant Ops Centre in Brussels and providing its core staff when activated.

⁶The European Council was created in 1974 with the intention of establishing an informal forum for discussion between Heads of State or Government. It rapidly developed into the body that fixed goals for the Union and set the course for achieving them, in all fields of EU activity. It acquired a formal status in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which defined its function as providing the impetus and general political guidelines for the Union's development. On 1 December 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it became one of the seven institutions of the Union. President of the European Council is currently Herman Van Rompuy.

⁷The Foreign Affairs Council is made up of European Union Member State Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development. These Ministers attend monthly meetings to discuss foreign policy, trade, security, defence and development matters.

⁸The European Commission (EC) is the executive body of the European Union responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the Union's treaties and day-to-day running of the EU. The Commission operates as a cabinet government, with 27 members of the Commission (informally known as commissioners). There is one member per member state, though members are bound to represent the interests of the EU as a whole rather than their home state. One of the 27 is the Commission President (currently José Manuel Barroso) proposed by the European Council and elected by the European Parliament.

⁹The EU is the largest single donor of development aid—in 2010, the combined total of donations from the EU and member states was €53.8 billion

¹⁰The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), is a major element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (EU) and is the domain of EU policy covering defence and military aspects. Formally, the Common Security and Defence Policy is the domain of the European Council. CSDP structures and instruments are summarized at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/cpsc?lang=en>

¹¹Note earlier distinction between Comprehensive Action and Comprehensive Approach. Whereas NATO, to a great extent, has to contract-in capacities to deliver a comprehensive approach—and even then the construct will remain defence dominated.

¹²For instance, within the Commission the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in pursuit of its humanitarian aid mandate needs to sustain its impartiality, whilst the EEAS, by dint of its Member States' oversight and mandate, will be obligated to be partial in most crises.

¹³Or in other words the archetypical “Wicked Problem”.

¹⁴Principal levers of Parliament could be considered to be its influence over annual budget votes and political pressure on HRVP when she reports to Parliament.

¹⁵CSDP Committees: EUMC (supported by the EUMC Working Group), Political Military Group (PMG) and Civil Committee (CIVCOM).

¹⁶In a few cases MILREPS represent Ministers of Defence not CHODS; for instance Cyprus, Malta, Sweden.

¹⁷With respect to NATO this interface is currently politically authorised to be at the staff to staff level only.

¹⁸As an aside, with regard to the argument of the term lower versus softer end of the spectrum, empirical evidence points to ever increasing complexity and problem ‘Wickedness’ as one secures the peace. Softer often implies easier. In many cases, however, that implication could not be further from the truth of what is routinely experienced at the lower end of the spectrum.

¹⁹Further reading at: <http://www.eda.europa.eu>

²⁰Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation- Europe Aid: Europe Aid Development and Cooperation is responsible for designing European development policy and delivering aid throughout the world. Europe Aid delivers aid through a set of financial instruments with a focus on ensuring the quality of EU aid and its effectiveness. An active and proactive player in the development field, it promotes good governance, human and economic development and tackle universal issues, such

as fighting hunger and preserving natural resources. DG DEVCO, through the Europe Aid cooperation office, implements the funding instruments for external assistance.

²¹The EU Commission's European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was created in 1992 as an expression of the European solidarity with people in need all around the world. In its 20 year existence it has provided €14 billion of humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict and disasters in 140 countries around the globe. Over the last five years ECHO's annual budget has averaged €1 billion. In 2011 alone these funds reached nearly 150 million of the world's most vulnerable people in over 80 countries.

²²No ship has been pirated since May 2012. 5 Ships and 745 hostages held currently in January 2013 compares with 32 ships and 745 hostages in January 2011. That said there is no room for complacency with pirate disruptions by friendly forces (Op ATALANTA (EU), Op OCEAN SHIELD (NATO) and Coalition Maritime Forces) still continuing and noting increasing sophistication of the pirates that included on 15 December 2012 attacks by Somali pirates off Muscat in Oman (some 1200 nautical miles from Somalia).

²³Those first holistic steps have encouraged development of overarching strategies for other regions—the ‘Strategy for the Sahel’ is one such example with EUCAP Sahel (Niger)—delivering Security Sector Reform assistance in Niger—being the first practical CSDP output from that strategy.

²⁴All EUMS personnel are Seconded National Experts (SNE) on loan to the EEAS for 3-4 years, with basic pay provided by national resources and all subsistence, and all other job related expenses, provided by the EU.

USAF PHOTO BY TSGT MIKE BUYTAS 051019-F-9085B-154 on Flickr



US Army (USA) Sergeant (SGT) Kornelia Rachwal gives a young Pakistani girl a drink of water as they are airlifted from Muzaffarabad to Islamabad, Pakistan, aboard a USA CH-47 Chinook helicopter.

A Recurrent, Variable and Complex Challenge: The Uncertain Trajectory of Stabilization and Reconstruction in U.S. Security Strategy

By Kari Möttölä

Despite the apparent strength of their case, the community of planners, veterans, think-tankers and civic activists working in external security and humanitarian missions are puzzled and frustrated with the past and present performance of the United States in such missions, and anguished about the future.² It is not that the United States has not taken action in foreign conflicts, regional instabilities or humanitarian catastrophes. It is not that the response to fragile or failed states has not been a key agenda item in U.S. foreign and security policy throughout the post-Cold War era. Where America as a polity has come short is in failing to recognize, as a permanent national security interest, the need to design and pursue a *strategic policy* on stabilization and reconstruction. While the concept may be debatable and the capability may be constrained by developments, what those devoted to the cause call for is a policy with a sustainable balance between ends and means and commensurate to the responsibility of U.S. global leadership.

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The Reality Check: Obstacles and Challenges

A number of paradoxes seem to be blocking progress. On the civilian side, the Department of State (DOS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are combining diplomacy and development to pursue and lead an innovative policy of soft or smart power. Although there is a will, critical shortcomings endanger a stronger policy in conflict response and humanitarian assistance.

Entrenched bureaucratic rivalries within the DOS and USAID weaken the governance of external relations. Embedded divisions of competence and authorities complicate effective DOS leadership in the whole-of-government mode. Reservations about nation-building among the political elites and a lagging narrative for the general public dilute reforms. In Congress, the reluctance to favor the DOS hinders funding increases while even among the more sympathetic members an effective ownership of the cause is missing.

On the defense side, having taken over complex stability operations without sufficient preparation in the midst of wars of the 1990s and 2000s, and frustrated over the burden of what should have been a civilian responsibility, the U.S. military is ready to swear “never again.” The Pentagon has even made some of its own funds available for civilian operations. Joint national security funding, which would give leeway for civilian needs, is a no-go among the interest-driven congressional budget committees.

Moreover, under fiscal austerity, even with the drawdown of wars, no peace dividend is forthcoming to redistribute money from military to civilian branches. The Department of Defense (DOD) is diverting planning and resourcing away from stability operations to traditional defense tasks and combating societal threats such as cyber-vulnerability and terrorism. Where there is a resource, there may not be a will.

In the context of grand strategy, stronger U.S. attention to conflict management will be

contingent on the priorities of the second Obama administration. At stake will be the goals of democracy promotion and transformative development assistance and the tools of low-intensity operations, primarily civilian, and demanding high-intensity interventions with a major military component.

Finding a Way Forward: Concept, Capability and Policy

What is the way forward to an effective and adaptive U.S. policy of conflict, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and comprehensive crisis management? If the contingent reasons are political and transient, should the focus be on waiting for better times in realignments among players? If the critical factors are structural and permanent, would the solution be institutional reforms or lowering objectives to match the resources available?

It has been observed that a “third generation” of U.S. operations is emerging, after the post-Cold War decade of humanitarianism and multilateralism, and the post-9/11 decade of counterinsurgency and unilateralism. As the challenge is recurring in variable forms, lessons learned should be a major factor in correcting malfunctions and directing future action. An analysis must cover three aspects of stabilization and reconstruction: the concept, the capability and the policy.

The Evolution of the Concept: Process- and End State-Driven

While the operations envisaged are complex by nature, combining military and civilian aspects, the U.S. pattern of action has evolved in an *ad hoc* manner through responses to emergent situations. Consequently, an analytically-defined and politically-adopted common concept is yet to emerge in the U.S. discourse and usage for what is widely called *stabilization and reconstruction*. Hence, for a policy of response to events, the concept of *contingency operations* is applicable and pertinent to the challenge of shaping a consistent policy.

Primarily in civilian usage, stabilization and reconstruction denotes expeditionary missions in fragile or conflict-affected societies. The concept may depict a certain phase in the sequence of actions, such as initial crisis management or post-conflict reconstruction. The analytical framework is the *conflict cycle* and, accordingly, the definition of the concept here is *process-driven*.³

In U.S. military parlance stressing the primacy of security, the concept of *stability operations* containing civilian assets integrated with counterinsurgency and irregular warfare was introduced as a type of *complex operation* pursued in recent wars.⁴

Another way of defining the concept is to call for a *holistic* approach to promote the transformation of the targeted state or society. In a prominent manual for the practice of stabilization and reconstruction, such *end states* are listed as the rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable economy, stable governance and social well being.⁵

In the social science perspective, the holistic approach calls for fixing the security, political/governance, social and economic components of the society. All the sectorial missions are critical for success in stabilization and reconstruction. While being dynamic, sequenced, and interconnected, they cannot compensate for each other in the totality of the operation. Reconciliation support provides an additional driver towards social change.⁶

Within the comprehensive approach, the order of priority among the various components is a matter of choice. In an ideal model for practical policy, security would be introduced first, followed by economic, political and social transitions.⁷ In the area of international relations research, theories exist for each alternative: liberalization first, security first, institutionalization first or civil society first.⁸

Humanitarian emergency assistance or disaster relief should be included in the toolkit, as they concern social conditions and may affect conflict resolution. To the extent sustainable development is the ultimate goal, and most targets are fragile or

developing countries, tailored development assistance is included in the capability as well.⁹

Both conflict cycle and holistic approaches call for a broad involvement. Any single operation may not cover all components, but a sequence of actions or segments could complement each other in the long run.

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The idea of transferring Western-style governance to emerging or developing states is complicated by the elusive nature of contemporary state sovereignty. Areas of limited statehood within the borders of states abound and hybrid or *de facto* states challenge the traditional depiction of sovereign states as actors. Multi-level governance, while differing from the Western norm of good governance, may be a right way to go. Another factor to be taken into account in designing interventions, whether for social engineering or development purposes, is the absorption capacity of recipient societies.¹⁰

A holistic and end state approach would justify the use of state building, nation-building and peace-building as generic concepts, although for political and cultural reasons they do not sit well in the American discourse, which is more attuned to the conflict cycle approach driven by risk assessment. Consequently, defining and naming the concept – thus implying the pattern of action – remains a challenge for the analysis of U.S. policy in the cycle of crisis management, transition support, stabilization, reconstruction and state-building.

Constructing the Capability: In Search of the Whole of Government

The analysis of the capability of the United States for stabilization and reconstruction missions begins with reforms undertaken by the State

Department/USAID, and the Department of Defense as well as, in an integrated fashion, other main U.S. governmental agencies. Capability is determined by institutional and material enablers: the effectiveness of inter-agency leadership and governance and the fiscal, material and personnel resources allocated to the task; as well as by the added value produced by think tanks and non-governmental organizations.¹¹

The complex nature of changes in targeted states and societies underlines the need for tools and mechanisms that are adaptive, as well as the need to hedge against changes and provide options in the course of the undertaking. A key question is how the balance between military and civilian tools in the U.S. arsenal of national power will be shaped by the evolution and recalibration of foreign, security and defense policies in the transforming global order.

Will a “civilian surge,” which seems to be preferred by both civilian and military planners, take place? A stronger civilian-military capability is driven by an agenda that includes improved strategy and planning, implementation infrastructure, and training and education as well as increased funding. In the current discourse, it seems the civilian sector is being built up towards an open-ended objective, whereas the military sector is being built down to find a closure or limit to its role in stability operations.

Civilian Capability

A civilian surge with a strong investment in institutional resources is promised in the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), produced by the State Department in 2010. It aims to elevate civilian power alongside military power as an equal pillar of foreign policy, taking a qualitative step in the area of conflict prevention and crisis response.¹²

As for stabilization and reconstruction as forms of soft power, the QDDR did not begin from scratch. Pioneering executive, legislative and institutional steps were taken by the Clinton and

George W. Bush administrations on both the civilian and military fronts.¹³ While recognized as a well-argued and structured document but not a path-breaking guideline, the QDDR was received with disappointment and disbelief among the think tank and NGO community.

Firstly, the report was not in tune with fiscal or political reality. The Department of State and USAID face a mismatch between available resources and a growing demand for contingency operations. The QDDR identifies two types of civilian contingency operations: (i) conflict response with conflict management, mitigation and resolution; conflict prevention; security and justice sector assistance; and stabilization, reconstruction and recovery; and (ii) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The civilian agencies will encounter declining funding and continuing requirements for missions, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, even after – and as a consequence of – the military withdrawals.¹⁴

No plan for the additional funding required for the reforms was attached, and the report seemed to have no impact on budget cuts affecting State and USAID. In addition, targeted extra funding for State-led operations from two sources (Congressional funds, mostly for the generation of the Civilian Response Corps, and the Section 1207 authority DOD funds channeled for DOS field missions and projects) had peaked. They were reduced or winding down by the time the follow-on institutional reforms suggested in the QDDR took effect.

Secondly, the QDDR model of two parallel lead-agencies (State for operations responding to political and security crises and USAID for response to humanitarian crises and natural disasters) did not go far enough towards creating a machine which would draw on, and bring together, all the relevant instruments of U.S. civilian power for stabilization and reconstruction.

Both high expectations and nagging doubts were centered on the launching of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), a

singular product mandated by the QDDR, established in the human security pillar of bureaus and offices under the new Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. Even with the Assistant Secretary acting as the principal advisor to the Secretary of State on the related issues, the CSO was not to become a tool in executing State Department leadership over the whole administration on conflict engagements, if the drafters of the QDDR ever had such a vision for inter-agency power concentration. Neither would the CSO have at its disposal a dedicated civilian surge capability that could be sent to a conflict spot early to make a difference on the ground. Rather than being in control of the government policy in crisis, the CSO will be at best a repository of expertise.

Established in 2011, the CSO will “focus” on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities (reconstruction being dropped from the title). It succeeds and absorbs the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), established in 2004 with a broader mandate to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize” U.S. civilian capacity. The CSO has taken a pragmatic and incremental approach to its role, by looking for, and acting where, it can make a strategic difference in the complex of institutional actors, as reflected in the definition of how it intends to perform its mandate: “by driving integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states, setting conditions for long-term peace.”

Instead of acting as a coordinating hub, the CSO is carving for itself an expert role in providing situation awareness for conflict prevention, and contributing to analysis and planning conducted in regional bureaus and embassies, cooperating also with regional military commands, at their request or on its own initiative. In addition, the CSO runs a small number of small-scale civilian operations (in 2012 in Kenya, Burma/Myanmar, Northern Central America and Syria), inherently aimed to be short-range and turned over to other agencies such as USAID.

It is indicative of the tentative nature of the CSO that its head declared that the new unit had to find its place and prove its added value within its first 12 months; and that its operations, contributing particular expertise in a flexible manner, would be a legitimate measure in such stock-taking, in addition to what the CSO might bring in its planning role.¹⁵ As a facilitator of innovative and proactive action, the CSO is matched against the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) mandated to bringing similar added value to the stabilization and reconstruction operations of USAID, which have a long history and easily overlap with those of the State Department.¹⁶

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As for absorbing the Civilian Response Corps, which was to be the main instrument of the S/CRS and at one time was envisaged to have 2,500 reserve and active staff¹⁷, the CSO is working with a small active core of federal employees and has put the future of the instrument as a whole on hold.¹⁸

The stormy if aborted term of S/CRS contradicts the approach adopted by the CSO. Established in 2004, the S/CRS entered the scene during the pioneering decade when both civilian and military components of the U.S. policy were placed on a legal, institutional and practical footing in the midst of two major expeditionary missions, which the United States entered unprepared for a comprehensive approach combining military with civilian components.

Despite voices of doubt and opposition, the military was put in charge of relief and reconstruction operations in Iraq (with most civilian operatives being contracted), duties typically within the scope of State and USAID. In Afghanistan,

the Pentagon hastily set up a civilian operation.¹⁹ Pressed by events into adopting a sustainable basis for contingency operations, the DOD issued Defense Directive 3000.05 (2005, reissued as DOD Instruction 3000-05 in 2009), which made conducting (“with proficiency equivalent to combat operations”), supporting and leading stability operations “a core U.S. military mission.”²⁰

In parallel, Presidential Directive NSDP44 (2005) moved to place the planning and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization operations under the leadership of the State Department and integrate them with military contingencies when relevant and appropriate. Created to perform the ambitious mandate, codified, together with a civilian corps, in law (FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act), S/CRS struggled from the beginning. With its funding for operations peaking and ebbing within a couple of years, S/CRS was never deployed in Iraq or Haiti, and was marginalized within State’s turf-conscious bureaucracy.²¹

Further uncertainty is caused by the location of the CSO within the group of functional units dealing with human security. The new bureau is not hierarchically above the influential regional bureaus or the powerhouse bureaus dealing with political-military affairs, with the former directing policies on the ground in conflict areas and the latter dealing with the DOD and sharing control over funds used in cooperation with the military.²²

In favorable circumstances, the complex of human security bureaus and offices would be a formidable presentation and instrument of U.S. soft power.²³ The long-term vision of the QDDR makers was to have an integrated source for funding expeditionary missions with human security as a mainstream component.

Unconsolidated, the QDDR design for State Department leadership will have to hedge against visions and proposals where high-level inter-agency management and coordination is transferred to the NSC. In other alternative models operational responsibility for foreign assistance and deploying civilian experts would reside at USAID, with State

confined to diplomacy and policy planning, or a single new inter-agency structure would be established to command and carry out contingency operations.²⁴

Military Capability

By the time of the adoption of stability operations as a new core function, the U.S. military had produced a mixed legacy from missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where civilian components were integrated to support the surge of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare.²⁵ The military-led complex operations had created and enhanced new types of expertise and experience.²⁶

The imbalance between military and civilian capabilities led DOD to call for increased resources for civilian partner agencies. A major NDU study recommended to the Obama administration the acceleration of efforts to build the capacity of civilian agencies by providing additional resources, creating new authorities and reforming interagency structures.²⁷

While the military would gain in prestige and power from its role in complex operations, voices were raised warning of the risk of an expeditionary military with one-sided focus in stability operations, resulting in fewer ground forces available for early high-intensity combat, and a leadership cadre intellectually unprepared for a large-scale conventional conflict.²⁸

With an institutional conflict of interest emerging between major combat and stability missions in defense policy, new strategic decisions adapted the open-ended approach reflected in Directive 3000.05 to the change underway in domestic and external priorities. Driven by war fatigue and fiscal austerity, and pressure to implement geopolitical reassessment, the Pentagon strategic guideline of 2012 seemed to lock in a new direction by stating unequivocally that, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”²⁹ Although the U.S. military will be ready to conduct “limited” counterinsurgency and other stability operations

“if required,” the rise and fall of the dominance of military-driven complex operations took barely five years.³⁰

As the rebalancing to the Pacific will be focused on strengthening and deploying naval and air forces, which are comparatively spared from budget cuts, the army will suffer most. There will be fewer ground forces, except for special operations forces, available for stability operations in such a high-technology military. Consequently, proponents of peace operations are ready to conclude that the new strategic policy will inevitably lead to a decreased U.S. investment in, and contribution to, crisis management, in particular regarding more demanding or high-intensity operations.

The 2012 strategic guideline promotes a degree of flexibility. Emphasizing non-military means as a way to reduce the demand for major force commitments, the military will work with partners in the federal government and coalition and other international partners. The lessons learned and capabilities developed in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be wasted; neither will the DOD refuse to provide deployable military capabilities for humanitarian and other relief operations.

Directive 3000.05, though re-issued as an “Instruction” (2009) will continue to guide the U.S. military in keeping up its inherent capability, which will be vital for most future civilian-military contingencies. The fiscal predicament, together with the political reorientation, may drive the civilian and military agencies to a closer, innovative partnership to ensure that government resources are used to the best effect.

Correcting Asymmetries of U.S. Power

The sharing of responsibilities and burdens in the practice of expeditionary missions among the State Department, USAID and DOD as well as other federal agencies remains open and variable. No single leading agency is in sight, unless the National Security Staff (NSS) would be put in charge, which would not likely work as its small staff lacks sufficient resources to run a major operation.

The asymmetry between State and DOD in resources and political clout is a perennial issue in American security policy.³¹ One argument claims that the reason is not civilian under-resourcing but an underperformance by the State Department, in particular in running major projects or implementing policy. The vacuum left by inadequate civilian power is filled by the military. The cause is cultural: the inability of State to create change and pursue reforms.³²

A larger share of civilian power would have to include additional resources and new authori-

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ties as well as effective inter-agency governance. In view of a shared responsibility, looming fiscal constraints have brought forth the idea of a national security budget combining DOS and DOD appropriations, including funding for contingency operations, although its acceptance is unlikely.

The civilian and military components of U.S. power are at a crossroads and taking separate routes in the area of contingency operations. The civilian side is growing its muscles and searching for an effective leadership role, whereas the military side is trimming its capability for stability missions and searching for better integration with civilian tools. The two routes may meet after a period of development, reform and innovation.

In Search of Policy: Domestic and External Drivers in a State of Flux

The trajectory of stabilization and reconstruction, contingent on domestic and external drivers, is framed by the strategic orientation of the United States. The scope and pattern of international engagement will characterize the U.S. leadership and measure the sustainability of its position of primacy in a global environment where conflict, instability and fragility call for response and crisis



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USAID/IOM relief distribution in Ghotki, Pakistan

management. The mixed legacy of the post-Cold War era highlights the widely-shared assumption that the military withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan will constitute a turning point in U.S. policy on military and civilian contingency operations. The choice is between a limited, prioritized policy or one that is open-ended and generically global.

While the military establishment is re-arranging its priorities and reshaping its preparedness, the civilian agencies are struggling to reform and sustain their capability for leading, conducting and integrating conflict response and humanitarian missions.

With drivers in a state of flux, it is challenging to distinguish and define an American template for crisis management. Whenever the United States intervenes in a crisis, the level of impact and risk is high. Moreover, the fractured nature of policy making in the U.S. political system makes predicting the future course all but impossible.

Several factors would have an adverse effect on ideational and material investments in contingency engagements. Fiscal constraints will impact both the State Department and the Department

of Defense. Domestic political gridlock continues to loom even after the re-election of Barack Obama. The lack of ownership or leadership in the Congress on nation building would need to be overcome. Lackluster public support is not helping and needs to be roused.

Of particular relevance is the overall war and engagement fatigue within the political class and the public after a decade of wars and associated stability and reconstruction efforts. In addition, the implications of the strategic reassessment underway – a rebalancing to the Pacific and an emphasis on emerging powers – may make military assets for contingency operations in zones of conflict look diversionary.

Among factors favoring engagement is the commitment of the United States to sustaining the liberal principles of the world order as a leading power.³³ The experience and readiness gained during the past decade guarantees a leading position for the U.S. While there is wide reluctance or apprehension towards repeating anything close to the Iraq or Afghanistan adventures, there is an increased interest in conflict prevention and crisis management as well as development assistance as

means of avoiding future large-scale military interventions and lowering human and material costs.

To what extent an active and reinforced U.S. engagement in democracy promotion and liberal internationalism at large will be a fundamental feature of the policy of the second Obama administration is a key question to which there is no straightforward answer.³⁴

Although state fragility remains a global structural issue, it can be debated whether threats emanating from fragile societies are sufficiently serious to call for costly intervention.³⁵ The question of rebalancing responsibilities between liberal Western and emerging powers is being raised as a matter of burden sharing justified by global power shift.³⁶

The consequences of a diminished prioritized or selective U.S. pattern of interventions would be an order – by default or by design – where multilateral institutions or emerging powers may fill the void. In any case, the United States would need to rely more on like-minded partners – foremost among them the European Union and NATO – and improve its interoperable civilian capability.³⁷

There will be ongoing pressures from civilian government agencies and NGOs to continue an open-ended commitment (by design) to stabilization and reconstruction with comprehensive nation building as an end state. Within the military, however, there are growing pressures to reallocate resources, which may (by default) reduce, redirect or restructure any comprehensive civilian-military activity. Moreover, disappointments and frustrations in the areas of resources and funding, as well as the complexity of nation-building and democratic transition, highlighted by the Arab Awakening, have brought forth a discussion of lowering expectations to “more for less” from the conditionality doctrine of “more for more.”

As a result, a shift in the use of U.S. national power from military to civilian in the area of stabilization and reconstruction would be a policy change with structural preconditions and strategic consequences.

Features in the American political culture pertaining to external engagements of choice make it difficult to envisage an established doctrine of stabilization and reconstruction. Since the Vietnam experience, U.S. interventions have witnessed scant continuity in institutional readiness and a rare use of lessons learned, leading to a pattern of starting anew instead of building on a permanent concept and capability. In the American system of governance, with administrations entering office with a bias against nation building, the policy remains contingent on external events and their presentation in the domestic media and in public. Ultimately, the foreign policy philosophy of each president may be crucial in the line of action chosen.

Conclusion

While remaining true to the ideological framework of liberal internationalism, President Barack Obama’s pragmatic, cost-conscious foreign policy is expected to reflect an inclination to limit foreign engagements. An operative doctrine of “the light footprint” contains ingredients, which can produce a workable innovation out of the patchwork of civilian and military contributions for conflict prevention and crisis management.

As military-driven interventions are treated with caution to prevent mission creep and costly escalation, a broader space opens for civilian missions, rebalancing the relative share of responsibility between the two pillars of government. Moreover, humanitarian catastrophes or other high-impact events may lead the country into action with all the capabilities at its disposal.

To be credible, the new model would have to be accompanied with a strict control of commitments and consequences.

Even while following a holistic philosophy, civilian operations would be rigorously prioritized in the complexity and uncertainty of the global environment. Likewise, even if not excluded, the contribution of military assets would be strongly limited to avoid high-intensity options and rely on partners and coalitions.

In the unlikelihood of a civilian surge, and in light of the contraction of the military commitment to large-scale complex operations, the probable U.S. response to future stabilization and reconstruction challenges, and commitment to U.S. leadership in this area, will be modest. **PRISM**

Notes

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²Reflecting sentiments in the workshop held in Washington, DC on May 15, 2012, where the author participated, to assess the case for reconstruction and stabilization 10 years after the landmark report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Play to Win*, Final Report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), January 2003); and the launch of the report based on the workshop, July 9, 2012: Johanna Mendelson, *Inevitable Conflicts, Avoidable Failures: Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012).

³Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), II.

⁴Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, Eds., *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009), 1-10; Christel Fonzo-Eberhard and Richard L. Kruger, "Sizing the Civilian Response Capacity for Complex Operations," in: Binnendijk and Cronin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*, 11-32.

⁵*Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, United States Institute of Peace, United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 2-8. While prepared primarily for civilian actors by the U.S. Institute of Peace, which uses the concept of peace operations, and works to mitigate conflicts and reduce costs of interventions, the manual is more widely used by the U.S. Army than the State Department, which is driven by practical knowledge rather than by formal models.

⁶Paul K. Davis, Ed., *Dilemmas of Intervention: Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011). The broad study was commissioned from RAND by the Department of Defense, indicating that the military is in tune with the holistic approach.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Bernd Ladwig and Beate Rudolf, "International Legal and Moral Standards of Good Governance in Fragile States," in Thomas Risse, Ed., *Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 199-231; Ulrich Schneekener, "State Building or New Modes of Governance? The Effects of International Involvement in Areas of Limited Statehood," in Risse, Ed., *Op. Cit.*, 232-261.

⁹Noam Unger and Margaret L. Taylor with Frederick Barton, *Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2010).

¹⁰Thomas Risse, "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview," in Risse, Ed., *Op. Cit.*, 1-35; Lars Brozus, "Applying the Governance Concept to Areas of Limited Statehood: Implications for International Foreign and Security policy," in Risse, Ed., *Op. Cit.*, 262-280; Robert D. Lamb, *Political Governance and Strategy in Afghanistan*, A report of the CSIS program on crisis, conflict, and cooperation (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2012); see also the project plan on, *Global Statelets Initiative*, Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), arguing that instead of state-building the incremental use of hybridity of states may be less costly and more effective.

¹¹The United States Institute of Peace, an agency of the public sector financed by the Congress but not part of the executive branch might be placed in a grey area between government and civic society.

¹²United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, *Leading Through Civilian Power*, The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Washington, DC, 2010).

¹³Richard G. Lugar, "Stabilization and Reconstruction. A Long Beginning", *PRISM* 1, no. 1 (2009), 3-8.

¹⁴Nora Bensahel and Patrick M. Cronin, *America's Civilian Operations Abroad: Understanding Past and Future Requirements* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2012) on the plethora of civilian missions of various kinds, mainly small-scale.

¹⁵"Conflict and Stabilization Operations: A Conversation with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rick Barton," (Brookings Institution, April 17, 2012), available

at <<http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/04/17-conflict-stabilization>>.

¹⁶ Ambassador Rick Barton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization since 2012, was earlier in his career the founding director of the OTI.

¹⁷ As high as 5,000, in Binnendijk and Cronin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸ Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

¹⁹ For a critical testimony, see Dov S. Zakheim, *A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

²⁰ Department of Defense Instruction, Number 3000.05, September 16, 2009.

²¹ Caroline R. Earle, "Taking Stock: Interagency Integration in Stability Operations," *PRISM* 3, no. 2 (2012), 37-50; Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., "No More Adhocracies: Reform in the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," *PRISM* 3, no. 2 (2012), 3-18; for an especially critical account, see John Herbst, "Failed States and the International Community 10 Years After 9/11: A Shifting Paradigm?," in: Eva Gross et al., Eds., *Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), 9-13. Carlos Pascual, the first director of S/CRS, and John Herbst, the last director, both left the office expressing disappointment and frustration.

²² Earle, *Op. Cit.*

²³ On the concept of human security, which is widely used in European scholarship, see Mary Kaldor, "Human Security in Complex Operations," *PRISM* 2, no. 2 (2011), 3-14. In addition to conflict and stabilization, the human security pillar in the DOS structure includes: counterterrorism; democracy, human rights and labor; international narcotics and law enforcement; population, refugees and migration; trafficking in persons; and global criminal justice.

²⁴ James A. Schear and Leslie B. Curtin, "Complex Operations: Recalibrating the State Department's Role," in: Binnendijk and Cronin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*, 93-114; Unger, et al., *Op. Cit.*; Bowen, *Op. Cit.*

²⁵ Bowen; Earle; Christopher J. Lamb, and Martin Cinnamond, "Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan," *Strategic Forum*, no. 248 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2009); Lamb, Robert D.; Zakheim, *Op. Cit.*

²⁶ Christopher J. Lamb, et al., "MRAPS, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform," Institute for National Strategy Studies, *Occasional Paper* 6 (Washington, D.C.: National University Press, 2009); Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, "Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation," Institute for National

Strategy Studies, *Strategic Perspectives*, no. 4 (Washington, D.C.: National University Press, 2011), about successes based on practical innovation and civilian-military integration.

²⁷ Binnendijk and Curtin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*

²⁸ Terry J. Pudas and Catherine Theohary, "Reconsidering the Defense Department Mission," in: Binnendijk and Cronin, Eds., *Op. Cit.*, 65-92.

²⁹ *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012). The reference to stability and counterinsurgency operations is placed as the second last of the list of primary missions of U.S. Armed Forces.

³⁰ Fred Kaplan, "The End of the Age of Petraeus," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no.1 (2013), 75-90.

³¹ Stephen Glain, *State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America's Empire* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011).

³² Kori N. Schake, *State of Disrepair: Fixing the Culture and Practices of the State Department* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2012).

³³ G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Robert Kagan, *The World America Made* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).

³⁴ Martin S. Indyk, et al. *Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012). For the debate between proponents of strategies of "pull back", "lean forward", and "lean back", see John Arquilla, "America in Recline," *Foreign Policy*, January 28, 2013, available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/28/america_in_recline>; and President Obama's reasoning about interventions in an interview in *New Republic*, January 27, 2013, available at <<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112190/obama-interview-2013-sit-down-president#>>.

³⁵ Stewart M. Patrick, *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³⁶ *The Use of Force, Crisis Diplomacy and the Responsibilities of States*, Center on International Cooperation (New York: New York University, May 2012); Stephen D. Krasner, "International Support for State-building: Flawed Consensus," *PRISM* 2 no. 3 (2011), 65-74.

³⁷ The United States is the initiator of an informal network of governments and international organizations aimed at enhancing civilian capacity globally and increasing interoperability among international actors (International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative, ISPI).



USAID Firms Project's Agriculture Marketing Reforms

From Multilateral Champion to Handicapped Donor—And Back Again?

By Nancy Birdsall and Alexis Sowa¹

The global financial crisis triggered by the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and its aftermath in the subsequent five years has made visible and telling two new realities of the 21st century. First, the United States and its western allies no longer represent the single canonical example of the economic and political model of a free market democracy that other countries ought to strive to imitate. The crisis was triggered in the United States in part by a failure of monetary and financial regulatory policy; many emerging market economies, including China, India and Brazil, recovered relatively quickly from the global crisis in part due to so-called heterodox policies inconsistent with the U.S. model. Second, the global economy is no longer dependent on growth in the traditional western democracies; it is growth in China and other emerging market economies that has fueled the global recovery. For the first time in over 100 years, there is convergence between the per capita incomes of the richest and at least some large developing countries.

One key outcome of these new 21st century realities is that global development can no longer be thought of solely as a matter of financial transfers from rich to poor countries to reduce poverty. The world's poor are no longer concentrated in

“poor” countries, nor are the world's rich solely in rich countries. For many countries, rich and poor, reducing poverty is a matter of reducing the concentration of wealth and income at home.² For most of the last century, credit and capital flowed

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from the transatlantic powers to poorer countries; today capital flows “uphill” from developing to advanced economies. That it is the rich and not the developing world that is struggling with looming public debt and the burdens of aging populations only drives home further the shared nature of the challenge. Rather than a matter of transfers from rich to poor countries, global development is now as much a matter of meeting a set of challenges shared by all countries, both at home and through cooperation in managing a globally integrated and interdependent global market.

The cross-border challenges range widely – from financial crises, volatile food prices, disease pandemics, policing of drug and sex trafficking, microbial resistance to drugs, to climate change. All of these in one way or another constitute challenges to progress against poverty and inequality in the developing world. At the same time, without development in the form of state building in low-income and front-line states, they constitute challenges to global stability and the long-term security of Americans. Put simply, economic globalization has created dependence of citizens everywhere on decisions elsewhere, and individual well being, material prosperity and security itself, depend increasingly on successful international cooperation.

In this paper we argue that the United States cannot afford *not* to revisit and re-emphasize cooperation with other countries, or multilateralism, in its development programs and policies. The approach the United States takes to development needs to adjust more quickly to its diminished comparative advantage as a provider of foreign assistance, and the growing premium on cooperation with other countries, including China, India, Brazil and other large and rapidly growing emerging markets, in shaping climate, immigration, financial and trade policies at the global level that are more development-friendly than current regimes.

We begin by describing briefly the history of U.S. leadership in multilateral cooperation for


development, beginning with the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions and the creation in 1960 of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, and the more recent reluctant multilateralism, at least in the approach to foreign assistance. We then explain the structural difficulties the United States faces in providing effective aid to a major recipient of U.S. bilateral aid, Pakistan, and the constraints that one of the largest and most prominent U.S. agencies, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), faces in exploiting new models for delivering aid effectively. Further, we summarize evidence using economic data that with the rise of China and other major emerging markets, the United States is less dominant than it has been for many decades, and refer to recent signs that the United States is shifting from energetic leader to reluctant follower in support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and in its approach to international cooperation not only on aid, but on financial, climate and trade issues. Finally, we conclude that if the U.S. is to contribute to development at the level its place in the world and its interests and values as a nation suggest it should, it needs to become again a leader in multilateral cooperation, not a reluctant follower.

The United States’ Role in Fostering Economic Cooperation in the Immediate Postwar Period


In the aftermath of World War II, the United States took a leading role in establishing a new open and liberal economic order. In his 1996 essay in *Foreign Affairs*, John Ikenberry identifies four principles underlying this post-war order. The first principle was economic openness, in the form of a system of nondiscriminatory trade and investment. Second was joint management of the Western political-economic order, reflecting the increasingly prevalent recognition (to quote President Franklin D. Roosevelt) that “the economic health of every country is a proper matter of concern to all its neighbors, near and far.” A third principle

Figure 1: Share of Total Official Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) from Each Donor

1960: Total ODA \$36.4 Billion (2010 USD)



2010: Total ODA \$148.4 Billion (2010 USD)



- United States
- United Kingdom
- Germany
- France
- Multilaterals
- Japan
- Netherlands
- Spain
- Canada
- Norway
- Sweden
- Australia
- Belgium
- Italy
- Denmark
- Switzerland
- Finland
- Austria
- Korea
- Ireland

Source: OECD Statistics Expert. ODA Includes Aid of Types I.A (Bilateral Official Development Assistance) and I.B (Multilateral Official Development Assistance). Data in constant 2010 prices.

reflected the importance of domestic economic stability and social security, holding that the new rules and institutions of the Western world economy must support these domestic priorities (and, notably, creating new institutions to secure economic openness while providing safeguards for domestic stability). Ikenberry termed the final element “constitutionalism,” referring to the need for Western nations to systematically anchor their commitments in long-term and binding mechanisms – in effect, tying their own hands to minimize obstruction from domestic constituents.

These principles were manifested and made more permanent through the creation of three major new global institutions: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)–and its successor the World Trade Organization, or WTO–to shape and implement trade rules in support of increased growth and development; the IMF, to assist countries in adjusting to balance of payments difficulties imposed by the gold standard and to provide safeguards for domestic economic stability; and the World Bank, to provide low-cost loans to developing countries for productive, growth-enhancing investments. In helping to

create these institutions, the U.S. ushered in a new era of coordinated action to broaden and sustain economic prosperity.

While this economic integration and joint management was motivated initially by the impulse to rebuild in a new way after World War II, and by the threat posed by the Soviets during the Cold War, the fight to end poverty also assumed an ethical character. As President Kennedy famously said in his 1961 inaugural address, “To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required – not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.” Later that year the U.S. Congress signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act, reorganizing the structure of US foreign assistance programs and creating USAID to administer non-military economic assistance programs. President Kennedy also launched the Alliance for Progress, a ten-year plan to stimulate growth and establish democratic institutions in Latin America.

Other advanced economies followed suit and increased their official development assistance, resulting in a more than quadrupling in official overseas development assistance (ODA) between 1960 and 2010. In 1960 the United States dominated as a funder, providing almost half of all development aid. But as other countries became donors and the size and influence of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks grew, the prominent role of the United States declined – in money terms and eventually in terms of thought leadership as well. By the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, U.S. aid had fallen to just 15 percent of total aid; it rose somewhat in the 2000s to 20 percent in large part due the Bush Administration’s emergency program to combat the AIDS pandemic in Africa.

the U.S. began providing economic assistance along with military aid to Pakistan shortly after the country’s creation in 1947

In the last five to ten years, China and other emerging market economies have instituted aid and investment programs in Africa and the poorer countries of Asia and Latin America, particularly for infrastructure; the regional development banks founded in the late 1950s and 1960s have become larger and more influential; sub-regional banks like the Andean Development Corporation in Latin America have become major financiers in their borrowing member countries; and the BRICS countries³ are proposing to capitalize their own development bank. While contributions from these new so-called *non-DAC* donors⁴ are not included in official aid flow estimates they constitute an increasingly significant share of financial flows, with estimates ranging from 8 to 31 percent of global gross ODA.⁵

Thus while still a large donor in absolute terms, the U.S. is no longer as dominant in


relative terms. Moreover USAID, its major aid agency, struggles with bureaucratic and political constraints that have accumulated over many decades. Some of these arise from the U.S.’s role in the world as a military and economic power, and some of which reflect the legislative scrutiny that foreign aid faces in all donor countries, but especially so in the U.S. system.⁶

Structural Difficulties in the United States’ Ability to Provide Effective Aid

Of the total U.S. foreign operations budget of nearly \$34 billion in FY 2012, more than 18 percent went to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq where U.S. aid programs were motivated in part by military and security interests, and another 13 percent to Egypt and Israel, motivated as much or more by diplomatic as development objectives.⁷ In this section we describe the difficulty the U.S. has faced in providing effective assistance to Pakistan, as an example of the handicap the United States faces in countries where it has multiple objectives (no matter how reasonable). We then describe some of the bureaucratic and political constraints specific to the United States that circumscribe the ability of USAID and other U.S. aid agencies to shift to new ways of providing assistance to developing countries in general – adding to the sense that the United States is handicapped compared to other donors in its ability to “do aid well.”⁸

The U.S. began providing economic assistance along with military aid to Pakistan shortly after the country’s creation in 1947, and for more than three decades, was seen by Pakistanis as a steadfast partner in support of growth and development objectives. But in 1979 the CIA confirmed the existence of Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment program; President Jimmy Carter responded by terminating all U.S. military and economic assistance. Less than a year later, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (a harsh reminder of Pakistan’s geostrategic importance) the United States reinstated its development aid program, and at a higher level. Then in 1985, the U.S. Congress

Figure 2: History of US Assistance to Pakistan (Annual Obligations, Millions USD, constant 2011 \$)



Data Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2011 (aka the Greenbook) and "Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan", prepared for the Congressional Research Service by K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs.

passed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (the Pressler Amendment), which conditioned U.S. assistance on an annual presidential certification that Pakistan did not possess nuclear explosive devices. Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998 again brought U.S. assistance to a halt — until the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. soil provided yet another reminder of Pakistan's importance to the interests of the United States.

In short, for the last 30 years, U.S. support has fluctuated massively, largely as a function of U.S. political, strategic, and diplomatic concerns. The United States is no longer seen or trusted, by the civilian government or a large majority of the people, as a development partner – and that was the case even before the fallout of the drones and Abbotabad.

However as a now nuclear-capable state with a population nearing 200 million people, almost

half of whom are between the ages of 15-29 with few job prospects, Pakistan's development is clearly in the long-term interests of Americans. In 2009, in recognition of this fact (and no doubt because of the United States' military engagement in Afghanistan), the U.S. Congress passed a landmark piece of legislation seeking to insulate the U.S. development agenda in Pakistan from the unpredictable geopolitical and military events that had undermined the development (as well as diplomatic) benefits of past aid funding. In addition to providing political cover, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (commonly referred to as the Kerry, Lugar, Berman or KLB legislation in recognition of the bill's sponsors) authorized \$7.5 billion in funding over five years, with an emphasis on promoting "sustainable long-term development and infrastructure projects."⁹⁹

But in Pakistan, as in other frontline states, it quickly became apparent that the management of the development program could not escape the multiple and sometimes shifting priorities for its use set by the State and Defense Departments, the White House and even the Congress, and by the office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, led at the time by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke.¹⁰ The least secure regions of Pakistan got priority to counteract the Taliban insurgency.¹¹ To maintain stability the U.S. focused on increasing short-term energy supply, a not unreasonable idea, but the program could not be sustained let alone deepened for lack of political capacity of a weak government to manage adequate price increases. An emphasis on schooling made sense but the USAID program was small and piecemeal compared to impressive sectorial reform programs of the World Bank and the UK, which required longer time horizons and were not compatible with USAID procurement and other standards. These are a few of many examples of the handicaps the U.S. government encountered in trying to administer an effective aid program in the difficult circumstances of Pakistan.

Independent of these obstacles, within two years other events had already undermined the commitment to a renewed partnership on long-term development objectives. There was the diplomatic deadlock arising from the case of Raymond Davis, reportedly a CIA contractor who shot and killed two Pakistanis and was arrested by Pakistani police forces, then subsequently released upon urging from President Obama and then Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry (D-MA). Then came the covert Navy SEAL raid on Abbottabad in May 2011 and the angry reaction of Pakistan, which viewed the raid as a violation of its sovereignty. These raised tensions in Pakistan and in the U.S. Congress that naturally affected the assistance program (the state government of Lahore asked USAID to close its office there for example). Discussion in Congress of reducing or halting aid, or conditioning it on security and

military decisions in Pakistan, added to tension – in an unfortunate echo 25 years later of the Pressler Amendment.

The U.S. development assistance program was in fact never suspended in the wake of these events, but annual disbursements have to date been lower than the KLB authorization of \$1.5 billion per year for the period 2009-2014.¹² The low disbursements reflect a mixture of lower appropriations by the Congress and the attendant uncertainty in planning programs and projects, and the challenges of spending money effectively in priority areas like energy and other infrastructure in the absence of pricing and other reforms by the government.

Spending levels are in any event a poor measure of the success of an aid program. Still the reality is that the size and visibility of the original \$7.5 billion authorization raised expectations in Pakistan and in Washington that in retrospect were unrealistic.¹³ The tensions around the aid program, if anything, took political attention from other ways the United States could have supported the civilian government: special trade measures to increase access to the U.S. market for Pakistani exports; greater flexibility for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in bringing foreign direct private investment to Pakistan and supporting small and medium enterprise development; and greater emphasis on strategic and technical dialogue on water, agriculture, energy and other critical long-term development issues.¹⁴

It is not only that Pakistan is and was a difficult setting for an effective aid program administered by the country embroiled in complicated military and security activities. U.S. aid programs are for many reasons less flexible and more costly to administer than is the case for most other donors. For example, in what was meant to be a “re-set” of its relations with the government of Pakistan, Ambassador Holbrooke proposed a major departure from what had become USAID practice in most aid-recipient countries, namely that in Pakistan at least 50 percent of U.S. development assistance funds should be spent through

the civilian government and other Pakistani institutions rather than through American contractors. This was in part a response to the obvious interest of Pakistan's civilian government in deploying assistance through its own budget for its own priorities, and of the U.S. government in improving its relations with the government. It also reflected the experience of the larger donor community that aid programs are more effective and sustainable if instead of being administered in a parallel system, they are owned and managed by the recipient government and local institutions.

But the creaky U.S. aid system had difficulty in responding quickly. Other donors operating in Pakistan, including the UK aid agency, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have been able to develop systems over the years that combine reasonable controls and auditing practices to allow funding governments and local institutions directly, while minimizing the risks of waste and corruption. In the United States, however, auditing and accounting demands for tracking assistance have mounted over the decades in response to Congressional and other pressures to ensure foreign aid is spent well, and it took several years for USAID to ensure local government agencies and civil society groups could comply with U.S. standards. The target was subsequently adjusted to 30 percent, but even that has not yet been attained.

Another example is the annual appropriations process itself, which limits U.S. aid agencies' ability to commit financial support and subsequent programming over the longer time horizons generally required for development impact. At best, U.S. development officials can pledge to ask Congress to approve additional funding each year – hardly a guarantee of financial commitment.


Furthermore, oversight from a relatively large and active counter-bureaucracy whose “principal mission is to monitor, criticize and improve the performance of other government agencies” has institutionalized a culture of risk aversion and allergy to any sign of waste within the U.S. aid system.¹⁵ The offices of the Inspectors General

(OIG), Management and Budget (OMG), US Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the special Inspector Generals for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) are but a few examples of institutions that have been created to provide this oversight function. This proliferation of the counter-bureaucracy has occurred during a period when the private sector has embraced innovation and risk-seeking behavior, to much reward as evidenced by the success of the Silicon Valley tech giants. While USAID is demonstrating fledgling attempts to move in this direction, for example by creating new units like Development Innovation Ventures (DIV), and the White House has managed new initiatives like the Partnership for Growth, these are small pilot programs in a larger sea of traditional, risk-averse activity. It is difficult to undo the culture of risk-aversion that has built up in the bureaucracy over the past decades.¹⁶

proliferation of the counter-bureaucracy has occurred during a period when the private sector has embraced innovation and risk-seeking behavior

This is unfortunate, because much has been learned in recent years about the importance of experimentation, and the dramatic gains that can be achieved when programs are owned by recipient governments and developed and implemented locally. New approaches such as paying for performance after the fact are being tried by the United Kingdom (in Ethiopia for a schooling program) and Norway (in Brazil, Guyana and Indonesia for forest preservation); donors shift the responsibility for progress (and the risks of lack of progress) to the recipient governments, and pay out only once progress is independently verified.¹⁷ Another aid delivery mechanism getting increased attention by other donors but limited uptake in the U.S. government is direct cash transfers. Rather than investing funds to deliver public services,

Figure 3: Extent of Dominant Country's Economic Dominance



Source: Authors' calculations using Subramanian's index values.

under a cash-transfer scheme those deemed 'in need' according to some measure are directly given cash (sometimes though not always with conditions imposed, such as requirements that children attend school or receive immunizations). Such schemes have proven extremely effective across countries and sectors, but have had limited uptake within the U.S. government. In Pakistan the United States cannot, for example, provide long-term support for the Benazir Income Support Program, a non-conditional cash transfer program that has proven effective at providing assistance to low-income families. While the United States did financially support the program in 2010, largely in response to the terrible floods that devastated many areas in Pakistan and rendered rapid disbursal of cash to the victims particularly important, that support was discontinued soon thereafter.

The United States' Decline in Relative Economic Dominance

For the latter half of the 20th century the United States provided the leadership, generally if not always benign, in managing the liberalization of international trade and finance – in its own interests as for decades the most competitive and dynamic economy, and in the interests of prosperity and growth among its allies as well. It also provided the canonical example of the economic and political direction all countries should take, that is in the direction of more open markets and deep democracies, in which individual freedoms and protection of minority rights in the political sphere, and property rights and contract enforcement in the economic sphere, buttress each other to minimize elite capture and guarantee sustained and widely shared prosperity. The United States used its dominance to manage the system almost



Marc Weinberg

China in Africa; Along the Benguela Railway, Angola


on its own, creating and supporting the global institutions and rules, which have underwritten that model.

However the 20th century geopolitical order is now being disrupted. The U.S. economic model, with its belief in and promotion of markets, has bred success elsewhere in the world; with the model of market capitalism supporting rapid growth in the developing world, China and other emerging markets are catching up. The United States is still in economic and military terms a super-power, but it can no longer manage without collaboration and engagement with not only its traditional allies but with the new emerging market powers. On economic and financial issues and on related growth and development issues, the reality of multi-polarity is reflected in the creation of the G20 club of nations at the level of heads of state at the time of the global financial crisis.

In his 2011 book “Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance,” Arvind Subramanian quantifies sovereigns’ changing economic dominance over time, based on an index incorporating three country-level inputs: overall resources (GDP), share of global trade, and

external financial strength.¹⁸ In Figure 3 we show the difference between the resulting index scores of the most economically dominant country and, a) the second most dominant, b) the second and third most dominant countries, and c) the second through fifth most dominant countries. As the chart below shows, the postwar period marked the peak in the United States’ “lead” over other countries: in 1950 its dominance index score was greater than the next four largest economies’ index scores combined. However by 2010, while still the dominant power the United States had lost its lead over the others and China, the second most dominant country, was very close behind.¹⁹

In many respects the United States remains the western world’s leading nation; no trading nation can afford to ignore the U.S. market, or eschew the U.S. security blanket. But the rise of China suggests the United States will not have an uncontested monopoly on leadership indefinitely. China’s growing engagement in Africa is one example. China last summer pledged \$20 billion in loans to Africa for infrastructure and agricultural investments over the next three years – amounts comparable on an annual basis to U.S. levels of

Figure 4: Multilateral aid as a percent of each country's net aid, 2010

Source: CGD 2012 Commitment to Development Index (using 2010 data).

aid, but far more concentrated on infrastructure in response to African leaders' emphasis on growth.²⁰


Changing geopolitics means, perhaps ironically, that it is more than before in the interests of the U.S. to promote and support multilateral approaches, engaging with China and other rising emerging markets in and through the key economic and financial multilateral institutions on what and how to "do" development in their own countries and in the smaller and poorer low-income countries. That is true for aid programs, but also for cooperation on trade, immigration, climate and other policies that matter for the developing world's people and the countries in which they live.

But despite the premium on multilateral engagement in a global system that is increasingly interdependent and multi-polar, the United States is if anything shifting from energetic leader to reluctant follower in support of the key global economic institutions that matter for developing countries. A worrying example: the doubling of IMF quotas (votes, influence, reserves available for borrowing) and the accompanying modest reallocation of quotas to increase those of China and other emerging markets compared to Belgium

and other small European countries, is held up in the U.S. Congress. Though most other nations have approved the changes agreed in 2010, and indeed the Bush and Obama administrations took the lead in negotiating the reforms at the IMF, the changes cannot be implemented without Congressional blessing, because U.S. voting power gives it an effective veto on such changes, and U.S. approval requires Congressional legislation. Despite strong bi-partisan support including from former Republican and Democratic Treasury and other officials, the administration has had to carefully time its request to Congress, because of concern that a hostile Congress is unfriendly in general to international institutions.

Similarly in recent recapitalizations of the World Bank and the major regional development banks, the United States has been a reluctant follower, not a leader. The recapitalizations require appropriation of new funds to each bank. The amounts are relatively small, come primarily in the form of callable not paid-in capital, and are highly leveraged because of other countries' capital. But the politics of adding to a tight budget in the United States militate against the kind of leadership the United States could exercise in the

Figure 5: Country Rankings on the CGD Commitment to Development Index



¹ The chart reflects the authors' update to the Center for Global Development's "Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers" analysis: <http://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers>.

past. The relatively small recapitalization at the World Bank may have contributed to the ongoing initiative among the BRICS countries to capitalize their own new multilateral bank, primarily to support borrowing for infrastructure.²¹

The lack of robust political support for multilateralism is also reflected in the relatively small proportion of its aid budget (just 13 percent in 2011 compared to an average of 41 percent by other OECD donors) that the U.S. channels through the multilateral institutions as opposed to through USAID and other U.S. agencies (Figure 4). This is

despite the United States' poor performance when it comes to aid quality, as measured by the Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA) Assessment compiled by the Center for Global Development and the Brookings Institution.²² The QuODA assessment ranks 31 countries and multilateral agencies on four dimensions of aid quality, in turn based on 30 measurable indicators. The United States scores below the mean in 21 of the 30 indicators. In contrast the United Kingdom, a strong performer on the QuODA assessment and a large donor in absolute terms and relative to the

size of its economy, still chooses to channel nearly 40 percent of its total aid through multilaterals.

Nor is the United States in a position of leadership on other issues that matter for development. It has been unable to forge a development-friendly climate policy at home, and without its engagement a global agreement remains elusive. On other issues – trade, immigration, investment and tax policies – the United States scores in the bottom of the pack among the advanced democracies in terms of its commitment to development.²³

The Multilateral Narrative: From Reluctant Follower to Leader

Global development in this century is no longer mostly about charitable transfers from rich to poor countries, if it ever was. The United States is still the most powerful nation in the world in economic and military terms. But it no longer dominates as it did, and the trajectory of its relative influence suggests it will soon be overtaken by China. The rise of China and rapid growth in many other countries of the developing world, the increasing salience of such global problems as climate change and the risk of disease pandemics, and the reality of fiscal and demographic challenges in the advanced economies are changing the development landscape. The changes warrant a reconsideration of the United States' strategic approach to fostering development – for its own sake and in its enlightened self-interest in a more stable and prosperous global system.

the United States can be more effective deploying its strength as a global leader and moral force on trade, immigration, climate and other global challenges

First, the focus on foreign assistance in developing countries as the principal tool of “development” for the United States should end. We have suggested above that the United States is particularly handicapped in managing its own

bilateral aid programs in frontline states because of its security responsibilities as a kind of global sheriff, and is handicapped elsewhere because of its history as a large donor in which fear of waste and corruption in aid programs has led to an unwieldy system. The United States can be more effective in other ways, deploying its strength as a global leader and moral force on trade, immigration, climate and other global challenges, where U.S. action or lack of action matters far more than U.S. foreign assistance for growth and prosperity across the world.²⁴ Even its aid programs could be better focused by addressing global challenges; food security, global health and climate (current announced Presidential priorities) as well as humanitarian aid and emergency relief, where the United States does have a comparative advantage on the delivery side; and on a few high-performing low-income countries.²⁵

That approach would not mean that U.S. aid funding would necessarily fall, only that more of it would be channeled to global programs where the United States can be particularly effective, and more of it would flow through the multilateral institutions, where U.S. contributions crowd in other countries' contributions and foreign and local private investment.²⁶

In the case of Pakistan the administration could work with the Congress on two adjustments. The \$7.5 billion KLB authorization could be formally extended from its current five (2010-2014) to 10 years (through fiscal year 2019) to signal a commitment to a long-term partnership with the new civilian government. This would reduce the political pressure to manage the details of a large bilateral aid program on the ground in the two years remaining of the KLB authorization. And more of the funding that is appropriated could be channeled through the multilateral banks and the UK aid agency, particularly in sectors such as education where their programs have had measurable impact, with technical input from U.S. staff. Working with and through the IMF and the multilateral banks, the United States could continue to



(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Capt. Paul Duncan/Released) U.S. Department of Defense

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, helps Pakistani men load food into a Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter Aug. 13, 2010, during a humanitarian mission in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan.

engage on the big issues that matter for long-term development in Pakistan – the challenges of tax and energy and macroeconomic policy, where its technical input and indirect financial clout give it considerable influence.

Second, the United States should reclaim its leadership in fostering the multilateral narrative. Over the last 60 years, the United States took leadership in fostering the open liberal trading system and providing the security umbrella that made possible rapid economic growth and poverty reduction in the developing world; that has been its greatest contribution to development. In doing so, the United States put a premium on multilateral cooperation as a mechanism for collective action and for leveraging its own resources and reinforcing its interests and values

– beginning with its leadership in the founding of the United Nations, the international financial institutions, and what became the WTO. Today continued U.S. engagement is key to assuring the maintenance and strengthening of such clubs as the G20 and such institutions as the multilateral banks and whatever climate institutions can be created, and is critical to ensuring the stability of the global system. As its hegemonic dominance gradually diminishes and the list of development challenges that require global cooperation lengthens – climate, security, sex and drug trafficking, disease pandemics, and more – it is more than ever in the interests of the United States to be the champion of a robust and fair system of multilateralism that will navigate the challenges of the 21st century. **PRISM**

Notes

¹The authors are grateful to Kate Almquist Knopf, Scott Morris, Justin Sandefur, Sarah Jane Stats, Arvind Subramanian, and the many other colleagues at the Center for Global Development who have contributed to and advanced their thinking on this subject. The views expressed are the authors' alone.

²Andy Sumner, "The New Bottom Billion: What If Most of the World's Poor Live in Middle-Income Countries?" *CGD Brief*, Center for Global Development (Washington DC, 2011).

³"BRICS countries" refers to Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa.

⁴The term "non-DAC donors" refers to countries that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

⁵Julie Walz and Vijaya Ramachandran, "Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance." *CGD Working Paper 273*, Center for Global Development (Washington DC, 2011).

⁶One constraint may be the extensive and fragmented oversight of aid programs by various Congressional committees. In 2008, twenty U.S. government agencies disbursed funds for or administered foreign assistance activities, with each agency falling under the jurisdiction of multiple congressional committees. This may be a product of the U.S. bureaucracy operating under an antiquated Foreign Assistance Act (originally passed in 1961), or it could be a product of extensive checks and balances of the U.S. presidential system compared to the ministerial systems of many other donors. But it is difficult to do a systematic comparison. Some evidence of the latter exists in a 2003 analysis of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows to Africa. Markus Goldstein and Todd Moss show that between 1961-2000, when the same party controlled the executive and legislative branches of government, aid to Africa was higher; when different parties controlled each branch aid was lower, both in terms of absolute flows and as a percent of total aid. This feature of the U.S. presidential system, whereby the separation of the executive and legislative branches is meant to institutionalize checks and balances and limit excessive concentration of the government's power, does not exist in a parliamentary system, where the executive is drawn from the legislature and criticism of one branch by another is less likely. Source: Markus Goldstein and Todd Moss, "The Surprise Party: An Analysis of US ODA Flows to Africa," *CGD Working Paper 30*, Center for Global Development (Washington DC, 2003).

⁷U.S. Department of State, "FY 2013 Department of State Operations Congressional Budget Justification," released on February 13, 2012.

⁸Not all U.S. aid goes through USAID. The Millennium Challenge Corporation by design works in countries judged better able to absorb development aid, and the PEPFAR program is focused on dealing with the AIDS pandemic (although over half the funding still goes through USAID). They are both newer, smaller and more focused agencies and programs and are less burdened by multiple objectives, though they do face some of the same bureaucratic constraints as USAID.

⁹S. 1707 (111th Congress): "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009." Text as of August 23, 2010.

¹⁰As former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios wrote in a 2010 CGD essay, State and Defense aid programs worldwide are "political, not development, aid programs... (we should) dispense with the polite pretense that they are development programs at all." While this observation was likely informed by observations in both frontline and non-frontline states, we believe it is particularly relevant in countries where the United States has pressing (and sometimes competing) defense and diplomacy objectives. Source: Andrew Natsios, "The Clash of Counter-Bureaucracy and Development," *CGD Essay*, Center for Global Development, (Washington DC, 2010).

¹¹This has been the experience in Afghanistan as well. A forthcoming paper by Sandefur, Dykstra and Kenny finds that development and security objectives are at odds with each other in that donors overwhelmingly prioritize wealthier, violence-prone districts over poorer, more peaceful districts. Importantly the authors also find a mixed relationship between increased aid flows and changes in political attitudes, casting doubt on the commonly held view that foreign assistance buys hearts and minds and is thus an effective tool for counterinsurgency efforts.

¹²It appears (from conflicting data sources) that of the \$7.5 billion over five years authorized by KLB, after three years perhaps \$3 billion has been spent. The sources are the U.S. Foreign Assistance Dashboard, accessed at www.foreignassistance.gov, on March 15, 2013, whose figures loosely correspond to figures discussed with USAID staff but differ quite substantially from those in the Greenbook, formally known as the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations companion to the annual report of U.S. foreign assistance to Congress, available at <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov>. This highlights another challenge in tracking U.S. development assistance to Pakistan: data availability is limited, data is often reported in aggregate, and figures from different sources are often conflicting, rendering detailed analysis challenging if not impossible.

¹³ Expectations were high despite the fact that \$1.5 billion a year represented less than five percent of the government's annual budget in 2011-2012. On the limits to leverage that aid provided, see Nancy Birdsall, Wren Elhai and Molly Kinder, "Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the U.S. Approach to Development in Pakistan," Center for Global Development (Washington DC, 2011).

¹⁴ Perhaps ironically when major infusions of outside financial support are critical to macroeconomic stability in a country like Pakistan, it is participation in broader macroeconomic dialogue between the civilian government, IMF, and the multilateral banks that matters, not the details of U.S.-administered aid projects.

¹⁵ William T Gormley, "Counter-bureaucracies in Theory and Practice," *Administration and Society*, 28 no.3, 276, cited in Natsios (2010), *Op. Cit.*

¹⁶ As Carol Lancaster discusses in her book "George Bush's Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos?" (Center for Global Development, 2008) the creation of new government agencies (the Millennium Challenge Corporation) and programs (e.g., PEPFAR) was an attempt to overcome these bureaucratic limitations and transform how the U.S. delivers aid. However while effective in some regards, such as embodying an increased focus on measuring results, incorporating elements of performance-based aid, and dramatically increasing funding flows, these changes also introduced elements of chaos into an already heavily fragmented aid system.

¹⁷ The UK program in Ethiopia takes the form of Cash on Delivery. See Nancy Birdsall and William D. Savedoff, *Cash On Delivery: A New Approach to Foreign Aid* (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2010). The World Bank has developed an instrument called Program for Results based on the same idea of ex post payments tied to demonstrated progress.

¹⁸ Arvind Subramanian, *Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance* (Washington, D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011).

¹⁹ Subramanian argues that by 2020 China will dominate overall, as the chart shows.

²⁰ Jane Perlez, "With \$20 Billion Loan Pledge, China Strengthens Its Ties to African Nations," *New York Times*, July 19, 2012, accessed April 2013.

²¹ The Obama Treasury supported the unusual and large recapitalizations of the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank (and the first time general capital increases were done across all the banks), and some observers would assert that a reluctant Congress on the multilateral institutions is nothing new. What may be new is the budget crisis - which is likely to persist in the next decade and go to the heart of the changed role of the United States in the world.


²² Nancy Birdsall and Homi Kharas, "Quality of Official Development Assistance Assessment," Center for Global Development (Washington DC, 2010). See in particular tables four and five for rankings and performance by donor and donor type.

²³ CGD's Commitment to Development Index website, accessed at <http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index>

²⁴ For an agenda that is still relevant, see the chapters in Birdsall (ed). *The White House and the World: A Global Development Agenda for the Next U.S. President*, (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2008).

²⁵ The Millennium Challenge Corporation maintains this focus on a few countries where security and diplomatic objectives are less likely to dominate. Its annual budget in 2011 was \$745 million, compared to the USAID budget of over \$11 billion.

²⁶ The Obama Administration's Presidential Policy Directive includes language committing the United States to strengthen key multilateral capabilities, including: "redoubling efforts to support, reform, and modernize multilateral development organizations; renewing leadership in the multilateral development banks, ensuring that we take advantage of their expertise and coordinate our respective efforts; and creating new multilateral capabilities as and where needed." Source: The White House, *Fact Sheet: US Global Development Policy*, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy>.



A Mara Salvatrucha gang member in prison in El Salvador

Central America's Northern Triangle: A Time for turmoil and Transitions

By Douglas Farah

Over the past decade the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador) has earned the unenviable position as one of the world's most violent and lawless regions.

The growing importance of the region as a multifaceted transshipment corridor for transnational organized crime (TOC) groups—primarily Mexican drug trafficking syndicates—has brought a new and dangerous alignment in the region's power structures. The result has been that the three governments have moved beyond being weak, somewhat corrupt and unresponsive to almost non-functional in much of their national territories.

While none of the issues driving the collapse are new, they now appear to have driven the governments past a tipping point in the correlation of forces between the state and TOC organizations.

Flush with increasing resources, political protection and access to law enforcement entities, the criminal organizations are ascendant.

The states, with shrinking resources and hollowed out structures, are in retreat and positive state presence¹ is ever less accessible to the citizens. The states are currently incapable of solving most of the serious national issues in ways that strengthen the democratic process, rule of law and citizen security. With the benefit of hindsight these tipping points are identifiable.

This shift has significant though little studied consequences for the United States. It heralds the real possibility that a region in close proximity

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to the porous southern border of the United States and abutting Mexico will be increasingly under the sway of hostile TOC groups, some of whom are closely aligned with state actors such as Venezuela and Iran that are overtly antagonistic to U.S. interests and goals. U.S. policy makers have fewer and fewer viable, trusted interlocutors in the law enforcement, intelligence and political communities. Significant funding to these governments in recognition of their importance in counter narcotics, trade and immigration is not achieving the stated goals of strengthening democracy, the rule of law, economic growth and enhanced interdiction.

The U.S. government estimates that approximately 95 percent of the cocaine leaving South America for the United States moves through the Mexico and Central America corridor. Of this, an increasing amount – nearly 80 percent – stops first in a Central American country before onward shipment to Mexico.²

This fact alone is a major contributor to the growing chaos in Central America and the Northern Triangle and is largely blamed for the historically high rates of homicide, kidnapping, extortion and government dysfunctionality. It is also a major reason why the United States, despite resource constraints, continues to spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year in the region.

Yet regional problems are far more complex and dangerous than just the expansion of TOC groups in new and more violent ways, and the U.S. policy response appears to be rooted in unrealistic expectations of what can be accomplished through existing, traditional aid and trade platforms. A profound rethinking of policy priorities and the allocation of resources is required in light of the current power alignment.

The Rise of TOC Power

With each of the relatively small countries playing a specific role as a node for different types of illicit activities,³ the Northern Triangle is emerging as a region where the state is often no longer the main

power center or has become so entwined with a complex and inter-related web of illicit activities and actors that the state itself at times becomes a part of the criminal enterprise.⁴ There are virtually no “ungoverned spaces” in the region. Some power group exercises real political and military control in almost every corner of every country. What has changed is that the authority is less and less often the state.

Cooptation, corruption and intimidation by TOC actors, many controlled by the Mexican drug trafficking organizations establishing expanding beach heads in the region, have left the debilitated governments facing a crisis of authority, legitimacy and democratic governance while undermining the fragile licit economies.

This is not to say that all state actors are corrupt, but that the balance of power across the region has shifted markedly in favor of the TOC groups. While some analysts have written of two states in each nation state – the formal and the informal – the reality is that each of the three countries contains multiple states within their borders. This often manifests itself in physical territory controlled by TOC groups where the state is either entirely absent or serving at the will of the TOC leaders, carrying out errands and providing armed protection and hit men services.

At this critical juncture the countries of the Northern Triangle and the United States, long allies and financial partners, have sharply divergent views of the crisis and its possible solutions. The United States, albeit with tightly restricted resources, continues to focus on the rule of law, the interdiction of illicit commodities and financial flows, dismantling TOC structures and enhancing trade.

Many leaders in the region (as in Mexico) are now focusing on the reduction of violence, with a strong sense that the U.S. policy has largely failed and that accommodation of different sorts with TOC groups is both desirable and politically acceptable. This includes discussions of legalization, decriminalization and a strategy of

significantly less confrontation with non-state actors in the hopes of reducing the violence surrounding trafficking in illicit goods.

It is unclear whether these changing attitudes are driven by the growing power of the TOCs within the governments or whether, conversely, the political process is simply recognizing and adapting to political reality. What is clear is that, while the internal conditions of each country are significantly different and somewhat fluid, all have seen a significant decline in the rule of law and governability in recent years.

Even where statistics such as homicide rates show improvement, the explanation often has less to do with positive government actions than the ebbing and flowing of internal TOC dynamics. As a recent U.N. study on Central America noted, “The key driver of violence is not cocaine, but change: change in the negotiated power relations between and within groups, and with the state.”⁵

Thus, consolidation of the control of *Los Zetas* in certain areas of Guatemala leads to a sharp drop in killings – an indication of TOC power rather than law enforcement success. The same is true in El Salvador, where the homicide rate has plummeted over the past years as transnational criminal gangs have negotiated a truce among themselves and government in exchange for economic and political benefits and power. Thus, the drop in homicides is not a matter of combatting crime, but of the gangs’ success in renegotiating their power relations with the state.

The Transactional Paradigm and New Actors

As the Mexican-based and regional TOCs have gained both territorial control and political power across the region, the rule of law has largely been replaced by transactional relationships built on the exchange of goods and services among state and non-state actors. These exchanges include the right of passage for a cocaine load in exchange for cash; the support for a local political campaign in exchange for political protection of criminal

activities; shifting party loyalties in the legislature on specific issues of TOC concern in exchange for luxury beach properties; court decisions not to prosecute cases or to deliberately let them languish in exchange for economic benefits; access to prisons to assassinate key witnesses in exchange for thousands of dollars; or payments to policemen to carry out executions in exchange for a share of criminal proceeds.⁶


This transactional paradigm explains some of the anomalies in the region: prisons are overcrowded on a massive scale,⁷ yet homicide rates are the highest in the world and the impunity rate for homicides is above 90 percent in the region. Only in Guatemala does the office of the attorney general, who enjoys significant international support, function at all.

This transactional activity is necessary because powerful TOC groups function much like large multinational firms that produce and ship commercial goods along transnational supply chains that must either co-opt or evade the state. Critical social networks within these organizations coordinate to move products from the production zone to market, aiming to do so in as little time, and at as low a cost as possible. Organizational leaders concern themselves with rate and return, just like commercial CEOs, managing the flow of profits that accrue from retail sales, and outsourcing the risk where possible.

However, TOC groups oversee logistical networks that are more complex and sophisticated than their commercial counterparts, because they must move both product and profits undercover, constantly maneuvering to avoid interdiction. The need to maneuver in, through, and around the state and rival organizations has led to each side seeking the maximum benefit from the other, and transacting with each other in order to achieve that maximum benefit.

In addition to the growing power of Mexican organizations such as *Los Zetas* and the *Sinaloa Federation*, the region is facing a wave of violence generated by tens of thousands of transnational

Figure 1: Homicide rates per 100,000 by municipal area. The illicit corridors largely run through the areas of highest violence, indicating an almost total lack of state control of those regions. Source: UNODC, elaborated from data from national police (Guatemala, El Salvador) and Observatorio de la Violencia (Honduras).



gang members, primarily the *Mara Salvatrucha* (*MS-13*) and *Calle 18*. Some 300,000 of these gang members have been deported from the United States to the region over the past two decades, importing a violent army of criminals to countries that were ill prepared to deal with them.⁸

In El Salvador these highly criminalized groups have also entered into the transactional dynamic, negotiating a truce with the government, exchanging a sharp drop in inter-gang violence for better prison conditions, economic benefits and real political power in a series of “peace” villages where they exercise real political power.⁹

New extra-regional actors such as Russian and Ukrainian organized crime groups, Chinese Triads, and drug trafficking and money laundering structures tied to the government of Venezuela are competing for power, influence and resources.¹⁰ These

actors, sensing the faltering ability and/or political will by the states, are negotiating their way into the market and introducing new illicit products into the network of recombinant supply chains or pipelines through the region. These include precursor chemicals for methamphetamines, methamphetamines, smuggled gasoline and more advanced weapons.

Para-state actors such as Hezbollah, the premier hybrid terrorist-TOC organization in the world, have been active in carrying out criminal activities in Central America, as documented by ongoing field research and multiple cases now in U.S. courts. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the separatist Basque ETA organization and multiple other terrorist-TOC groups are also active in the region.

The result of the convergence of the growing Mexican and international TOC presence and

the growing power of local criminal groups is a dramatically changed landscape. Vast swaths of national territory, the legal economy and government infrastructure now fall under the control of non-state actors whose budgets often rival or surpass those of the governments. This has enabled the TOC groups to fulfill state roles in ever growing regions where the state cannot or will not act. This is particularly true in more isolated regions where major drug trafficking leaders have acquired massive land holdings¹¹ and provide employment, occasional medical care, educational services and other economic benefits to those on their land or in adjacent villages. This, in turn, builds a solid social network that protects the traffickers from surprise raids or other state activities.

U.S. TOC Strategy and Changing Attitudes

The United States has recognized the enormous power of TOC groups and the burgeoning threat they represent to U.S. national security interests. In its 2011 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security,” the Obama administration correctly noted that TOC networks “are proliferating, striking new and powerful alliances, and engaging in a range of illicit activities as never before. The result is a convergence of threats that have evolved to become more complex, volatile and destabilizing.”

The Strategy further noted that:

- TOC penetration of states is deepening and leading to co-optation in some states and weakening of governance in many others. TOC networks insinuate themselves into the political process through bribery and in some cases have become alternate providers of governance, security, and livelihoods to win popular support.
- TOC threatens U.S. economic interests and can cause significant damage to world financial system by subverting legitimate markets.

- Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to crime and criminal networks for funding and logistics. In 2010, 29 of the 63 top drug trafficking organizations identified by the Department of Justice had links to terrorist organizations. While many terrorist links to TOC are opportunistic, this nexus is dangerous, especially if it leads a TOC network to facilitate the transfer of weapons of mass destruction material to terrorists.¹²


There are few places in the world that illustrate these trends more clearly than the Northern Triangle of Central America. The dangers outlined in the strategy are intensified by the Northern Triangle’s geographic proximity to the United States. TOC dominance in the region could threaten vital U.S. sea-lanes and transportation routes such as the Panama Canal, as well as significant business interests and vital fuel supply routes.

The Northern Triangle is also in immediate proximity to Mexico, engaged in a significant effort with the United States to halt the flow of cocaine and other illicit products into the homeland. In recognition that progress in Mexico will be difficult if the “back door” of trafficking and violence in Central America isn’t addressed, the United States over the past five years has approved US\$ 466.5 million for the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and has requested an additional US\$ 107.5 million in 2013.¹³

The threat is further exacerbated by the fact that Central American smuggling organizations have for decades successfully moved millions of illegal aliens across the southern border of the United States with a high rate of success. A recent U.N. report called Central America “a global pathway to the United States.”¹⁴

Given the growing activities of Iran – a state sponsor of terrorism – in the region, the demonstrated presence of Hezbollah, the growing power of Venezuelan state investments and money laundering activities there, and the increasing number

Figure 2: Military and Police aid to Northern Triangle



of “irregular” immigrants moving through Central America from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, the region constitutes a significant vulnerability.¹⁵ The growing levels of criminality greatly increased that vulnerability.

The consequence of this series of crises has worsened long-standing governance issues and led to “inadequate public security forces, dysfunctional judicial systems, inadequate jails which become training grounds for criminals and deficiencies in other dimensions of state structure such as the maintenance of infrastructure.”¹⁶

One must add to this list several other key elements such as weak government intelligence systems that are often far less effective than the multiple parallel intelligence structures mounted by TOC organizations, rogue security agents and corrupt and unrepresentative political parties.

The push by criminal organizations to place their illicit funds into the licit economies by buying businesses and huge tracts of land, not only opens new money laundering activities. It allows these entities the opportunity to fulfill social and economic functions such as providing security. Private security companies have more members, are better financed and more mobile than the national law enforcement structures.


Real power, then, increasingly rests with a host of autonomous TOC groups, their allied political

actors, and private armies equipped with their own resource base that makes the re-imposition of state control as a positive influence difficult if not impossible.¹⁷

As Phil Williams correctly notes, “more security challenges will likely fall into the category of wicked problems that are not amenable to easy or readily available solutions.” This leads to the cycle now underway in the Northern Triangle where;

“States face two fundamental and interconnected challenges: they are often unable to meet the economic needs and expectations of their citizens, and they are unable to elicit the loyalty and allegiance of significant portions of these same citizens.”¹⁸

By the middle of the 2000s, the northern tier countries of Central America had three of the five highest homicide rates in the world, far higher than during their civil wars. El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras measure consistently among the highest five murder rates globally, ranging from 50 to 71 homicides per 100,000 citizens. This compares to about five murders per 100,000 in the United States and 1.7 in Canada. The murder rate for people aged 15 to 24 in El Salvador was recently an almost unimaginable 94 per 100,000, the highest in the world.¹⁹

Figure 3: UNODC statistics on private security forces compared to police forces.

Source: Orozco 2012⁸

⁸Orozco, R., *¿Un cambio de actores en el tráfico ilegal de armas en Centroamérica?* Nicaragua: Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y Políticas Públicas (forthcoming).


Searching for a New Model

Faced with growing fragmentation of power, territorial gains by TOC groups and the collapse of state institutions, the governments of the region are searching for a new paradigm outside the U.S.-led “war on drugs,” including some calls for decriminalization. At the same time, there is a growing perception among the population that the violence generated by TOC activity is their primary concern, and that some sort of accommodation with those groups to end the bloodshed is the best and perhaps only way out of the current crisis.

“Are we going to be responsible to put up a war against the cartels if we don’t produce the drugs or consume the drugs? We’re just a corridor of illegality,” said Eduardo Stein, a former Guatemalan vice president who headed President Otto Perez’s presidential transition team. “The issue of drug trafficking and consumption is not on the North American political agenda. The issue of drugs in the U.S. is very marginalized, while for Guatemala and the rest of Central America it’s very central,” he added.²⁰

Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes has moved from publicly identifying combatting TOC groups, particularly Mexican organizations, as a

Figure 4: Homicide rates in the Northern Triangle as tabulated by the United Nations.



national security imperative to dismissing their importance. General David Munguía Payes, his recently resigned minister of public security, has gone so far as to deny drug trafficking is a problem in El Salvador.

As InSight Crime, a respected website monitoring organized crime in Latin America noted;

“Recently, in Washington, D.C, Munguía said that El Salvador did not have a serious drug trafficking problem and insisted that the only issue was micro trafficking, or small-scale drug dealing. The newspapers and police investigations tell another story: that of drug traffickers who move tons of cocaine, and members of Congress who use their constitutional power to launder money

with the protection of authorities who do not investigate them.”²¹

There are other psychological factors that play into the changing perceptions in the region, such as the growing belief that the U.S.-led interdiction efforts are not only part of the problem, but that they cannot succeed. “There are two dynamics at work,” said one regional analyst who monitors polling data and political trends. “One is the feeling that the governments can or will do little or nothing to solve people’s basic needs. The second is the feeling that people want to be on the winning side in any conflict, and the perception now is that the Narcos have won, so they will adapt to that. Crossing that threshold to acceptance of the narco-state is huge, but already underway.”

Understanding Regional Structures

It is indisputable that Central America's geographic location between the world's leading producers of cocaine to the south and the largest consuming nation to the north makes it a major transit hub. But there are multiple other factors that have led to the region's growing role not just in the cocaine trade, but in the illicit movement of money, guns, weapons, people, stolen cars and multiple other products.

The emergence of the Northern Triangle as a major node for TOC activity did not happen overnight, although, given the decade-long U.S. focus on two hot wars in other parts of the world, it is often viewed as a new trend. There are three main stages over the past 25 years that have shaped the current disastrous situation.

Illicit networks often develop in times of conflict or in the absence of a positive state presence, where multiple porous borders and disdain for the often predatory and/or corrupt state have led to smuggling routes that have endured for generations. These historic routes, in turn, engender the accompanying "cultures of contraband"²²—particularly border regions—that often leads to the acceptance of smuggling activities as a legitimate livelihood.

For example, one of the primary routes to move cocaine across Honduras and into El Salvador for onward movement to Mexico is controlled by the *Cartel de Taxis*, named for the town of Taxispeque, where some of its leaders come from. Its operational territory along the Honduran border includes the once famous "*ruta del queso*" or "cheese route" used to smuggle Honduran cheese into El Salvador at the turn of the 20th century, a smuggling route that has endured at least a century.²³

The Early Years

The first stage of the current TOC activity in the Northern Triangle began with the end of the armed conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador and parts of Honduras that lasted from the 1960s through the mid-1990s.

The conflicts, in which U.S. proxy forces battled Soviet and Cuban proxy forces, that cost billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives, laid the foundations for the weapons trafficking, money laundering and contraband traffic today. Peace accords in Guatemala and El Salvador, and police and military reform, only partially resolved deep-seeded socio-economic and security issues. In some cases they may have accelerated a process by which drug traffickers could penetrate relatively new, untested government institutions.

One of the major shortcomings of the peace processes in El Salvador and Guatemala (as well as Nicaragua) was a failure to appreciate the depth of key clandestine networks that supplied all sides of the conflicts with weapons, intelligence and broad international support networks. Despite the general demobilization when the peace accords were implemented, many of these clandestine structures remained largely intact and almost immediately morphed into heavily armed and well-trained criminal organizations.

A major investigation of post-conflict armed groups in El Salvador in 1994—just two years after the peace agreements were signed—found that the "illegal armed groups" operating after the war had "morphed" into more sophisticated, complex organizations than had existed during the war, and that, as self-financing entities they had a strong economic component, as well as political aspect, to their operations.²⁴

The first phase coincided with the dismantling of the *Medellin* and *Cali* cartels in Colombia, opening the way for growing Mexican dominance in all phases of the transporting of cocaine from producing nations to consumers. This shift from the preeminence of Colombian trafficking structures to Mexican organizations had profound impacts on Central America.²⁵

The Next Steps

The second significant phase began around the year 2000, as U.S. drug interdiction pressure in the Caribbean drove the Colombian and Mexican

DTOs to seek to exploit the growing vulnerabilities in Central America. This led to a significant increase in cocaine flows through Central America, particularly Honduras and Guatemala, the gateways to Mexico, where a variety of TOC groups operated with relative impunity.

At this point there were few indications of direct Mexican involvement in what became known as *Transportistas*, or transport networks, those groups specializing in moving illicit products from Point A to Point B. The *Transportista* groups became more specialized, but generally continued to act as independent brokers for whatever organization was willing to pay them. Many of the primary *Transportistas* had been involved in cross border smuggling long before cocaine began to flow, and adding the white powder to their product list, while lucrative, was essentially a continuation of past activities.

The third phase began in 2006, when *Los Zetas*, the most violent Mexican TOC group, began its rapid expansion into Guatemala while the *Sinaloa Federation* and other smaller Mexican groups migrated more visibly to Honduras. Both found El Salvador relatively hospitable territory. This migration was driven largely by the decision of Mexican President Felipe Calderón to begin waging a more aggressive campaign against the drug cartels with strong U.S. support. As Mexican and U.S. pressure on the TOC groups increased inside Mexico the organizations saw increasing opportunities to operate more securely in the relatively accessible Northern Triangle.²⁶

While the *Sinaloa Federation* and other established Mexican groups continued to use the more traditional model of allying with local *Transportista* networks in the region to acquire and move product, *Los Zetas* introduced a new methodology that has significantly altered TOC operations in the region – that of widespread territorial control.²⁷

Rather than focusing on cocaine trafficking nodes and specific points of penetration to move their product, *Los Zetas* sought territorial dominion in which they could then tax all illicit activities that

operated in or moved through that territory. This diversified the revenue stream of the organization because the group taxes prostitution, human smuggling, and all illicit activities in its areas of control.

In some cases in Guatemala, it is estimated that *Los Zetas* derive only about 40 percent of their revenues from taxing cocaine trafficking, while the rest comes from levies on other activities.

In one new innovation, the group has been stealing tanker trucks full of gasoline in Mexico from the state-run Pemex oil company to sell at discounted rates along the major highways heading out from the Mexico-Guatemala border. One recent intelligence analysis in Guatemala estimated that 30 percent of the gasoline sold in Guatemala came from these *Zeta* thefts, yielding the groups millions of dollars a month unrelated to the drug trade.

The new routes carved out by *Los Zetas* put them in direct conflict with both *Transportista* networks and traditional family trafficking structures, particularly in Guatemala. And it was the confrontation among these groups—largely won by *Los Zetas* and their allies because of their superior firepower, ruthlessness and military training—that led to the series of massacres and assassinations in the Guatemalan drug trafficking world. The UNODC’s Antonio Mazzitelli notes;

“The confrontation between two different criminal cultures—the first, business oriented; the second one, territorial oriented—constitutes a serious threat not only to the security of citizens, but also to the very consolidation of balanced democratic rule in the region.”²⁸

The shift also brought a significant “Mexicanization” of the TOC groups in the region, meaning an imitation of the habits and culture of the Mexican drug lords. This includes the significant rise in the importation of expensive horses and horse shows on properties owned by drug traffickers and their allies; the production of “narco corridos” or songs lauding the specific exploits of a

particular drug trafficker or drug trafficking organization; the importation of cars used to race on specially constructed race tracks in isolated areas (Maserati, Ferrari and other luxury vehicles); carrying gold plated weapons; and importing exotic animals from Africa and elsewhere to roam the narco-ranches in Guatemala and Honduras.

But perhaps the most important and least studied shift has been in the massive acquisition of land by TOC organizations, as well as their incursions into the licit economies as a means of laundering their illicit proceeds. The overall effect is to further weaken the legal economies and further undermine state sovereignty. While there are no comprehensive studies available on land acquisition by TOC groups, knowledgeable sources in each of the three countries estimate that these groups now own anywhere from 25 percent to 50 percent of land in each country. A state cannot exercise sovereignty, even if it wants to, when that much of the land mass is beyond its reach.

Breaking Down the Region by Country

The countries in the Northern Triangle face a common set of problems in different ways and to different degrees. One regional analyst explained the differences by outlining what happens to journalists who investigate illicit activities. In El Salvador, the journalist will be harassed, smeared, offered bribes and threatened, but will likely not be injured. In Guatemala, the threats are more explicit and, the journalist could be killed if the political cost is deemed to not be too high. In Honduras, the journalist is killed without discussion and no investigation is even considered.

Honduras

Honduras is the mouth of the illicit pipeline funnel, with most of the cocaine arriving by air from Venezuela and Colombia into remote areas. Some cocaine also arrives by sea from Panama and Nicaragua. While Honduras has a significant gang presence, the groups are less tied to TOC activity (with the exception of the *Calle 18* groups in San


Pedro Sula) than in the other countries. This is primarily because the areas used by the drug traffickers are a significant distance from the territory under gang control.

Yet Honduras has the highest murder rate in the region, and perhaps the world, at about 85 per 100,00 inhabitants. As the map above indicates, the violence is heavily concentrated along the main drug trafficking routes. This shows those areas have homicide rates significantly above the national average and the state is largely absent. Honduras' level of impunity (based on convictions in homicide cases) is close to 95 percent. Across the region and in Honduras itself there is broad consensus that among the three Northern Triangle countries it is the one closest to being a true narco state.

The tipping point came with the 2009 ouster of President Mel Zelaya by the military. The move, described by many as a coup, had immediate and disastrous effects on the already weak governmental institutions. Most virtually ceased to function as the interim government careened toward bankruptcy, the international community cut off most assistance and refused to recognize the new government, and the U.S. cut off its counter-narcotics assistance. The TOC organizations, already well positioned in the region, simply filled the vacuum with money, cocaine and other illicit products, and a growing power to corrupt. The result was a "kind of cocaine gold rush," where "flights from the Venezuelan and Colombian borders to airstrips in Honduras skyrocketed, and a violent struggle began for control of this revived drug artery."²⁹

Even following elections (which were not broadly recognized, but were supported by the United States), the internal chaos has continued. The government, which mortgaged its financial future by taking out high interest loans from banks when cut off from international lenders, has faced numerous strikes by policemen and an atrophying of the already weak state. Knowledgeable sources in Honduras describe different police units, short on resources and leadership, as beholden

Figure 5: Main drug trafficking routes in Honduras.



Source: UNODC, elaborated from interviews in the region and national police data
 *Selected among the municipalities with highest homicide rates (<100 homicides per 100,000 population)

to ever-present TOC groups for everything from extra income to supplementing the meager salaries, to money to buy parts for the ramshackle police vehicle fleet.

The *Sinaloa Federation* is the dominant TOC group operating in Honduras today and has the tightest control over the “Atlantic Route” where product enters over water or via air. However, Honduran authorities acknowledged that *Los Zetas* have also begun to establish a footprint in Honduras, possibly presaging even more violence between the two groups.³⁰

Guatemala

Guatemala is the only country of the three that directly borders Mexico, making it the key

transportation node in the region where the funnel narrows. Almost all illicit commodities entering Mexico overland—cocaine, humans, weapons, cash, stolen cars and other products—have to pass through Guatemala, with a trickle through Belize.

This explains in part not only the violence among the traditional contraband handlers who operate in family units and *Los Zetas* taking over great swaths of national territory, but the number of important sub-groups that operate there and the wide variety of routes.

Guatemala has long had an important role in organized crime in the region. The traditionally weak central government, tumultuous history and geographic location have made it ripe for criminals to use the territory for the storage and transport

Figure 6: Cocaine trafficking routes in Guatemala

Source: UNODC, elaborated from interviews in the region and national police data
 *Selected among the municipalities with highest homicide rates (<100 homicides per 100,000 population)

of illicit drugs moving north, as well as a host of other criminal activities from human smuggling to kidnapping.

The most prominent criminal groups originated in two principal sectors: 1) official circles such as the military or the police; and, 2) along border areas where contraband was a way of life.

Factions of the country's infamous military intelligence branch split from the government in the 1990s during a reconfiguration of the state and became some of the most important criminal groups, trafficking in fake passports, weapons and other illicit goods. As in El Salvador in 1992, the 1996 peace process that ended the nation's long civil war dramatically downsized the military and left thousands of highly skilled military personnel suddenly looking for employment.

Portions of the police have formed their own extortion, kidnapping and theft rackets.

Traditional contraband families have developed trafficking routes and a means to move virtually any product north or south, and have offered their services to larger, multinational criminal organizations from Colombia and Mexico. Some of these *Transportistas* have become powerful drug traffickers in their own right. The result was the emergence of several criminal groups, some of which took on the names of their former military working groups. The most famous of these groups was known as the *Cofradía*, or the "brotherhood," but there were numerous others.

Here the transactional paradigm is clear. The state is effectively split into pieces, each piece serving the highest bidder, or developing regular customers from amongst the myriad organizations that need its services. Local governments and congressional representatives have been equally willing to accommodate these underworld figures,

facilitating the movement of property titles and opening avenues to public works projects in order to facilitate the financial end of these projects. For the most part, the judicial sector has cowered or capitulated to these criminal interests. The prisons have become a respite—a place to regroup, recruit and/or develop new alliances.

the Zetas, largely former Special Forces troops in Mexico, began recruiting ex-military experts from Guatemala

In an unusual recognition of the collapse and corruption of its own judicial structures, the Guatemalan government in 2006 agreed to the formation of the United Nations-mandated International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (*Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala* – CICIG). CICIG is charged with investigating the most serious crimes, and is largely focused on TOC groups that have penetrated state institutions. After several early high profile successes, the CICIG has become less visible over the past two years.

The Arrival of Los Zetas

The *Zetas*' connection to Guatemala stretches back at least to the mid-2000s. The organization was then part of the *Gulf Cartel*. The first push toward expansion came via personnel, not geographic movement. The *Zetas*, largely former Special Forces troops in Mexico, began recruiting ex-military experts from Guatemala. The news reports from that time period focus on the *Kaibiles*, Guatemala's vaunted Special Forces, although they also recruited from other units as well.³¹

Their first target in taking over territory is usually the local drug trafficking industry, normally the most important and lucrative of underworld activities. After discovering the distribution point of one of the main traffickers, they often kidnap and torture the proprietor for further information on the network, repeating

the process until the entire distribution structure of a given geographic location is under their control.³² The *Zetas* began operating more regularly in Guatemala around 2007.³³ Guatemala had become a dangerous bottleneck in the journey north.³⁴

The consolidation of *Los Zetas*, again a significant tipping point, came in March 2008, when they effectively won the war against their main opponent, a drug trafficker named Juancho León. León, operating in the traditional Guatemalan way of using a family based organization in alliance with other family based trafficking groups, had come to dominate the Guatemalan cocaine trade. León, who had married into the Lorenzana family, another powerful trafficking clan, was the key entrée for almost all illicit trafficking activities in the government of Álvaro Colom (2008-2012).

Los Zetas allied with Walther Overdick and other trafficking families to get rid of León and the need to pay him as a middleman. On March 25, 2008, armed men from several organizations, including the *Zetas*, met with León in a restaurant in the state of Zacapa. The meeting was supposed to be a place to settle differences and arrange a price they would pay León to move illicit product through Guatemala. But on the way out León was caught in an ambush by assailants using rocket propelled grenades and automatic weapons. All that was left was a smoldering wreckage of his convoy of armored cars.

With León out of the way, *Los Zetas* and Overdick worked together to tremendous mutual benefit. Overdick provided the political, judicial and military contacts that gave the organization political top-cover, legal protection, and access to weapons, training and recruits. He also gave them the infrastructure to obtain and move cocaine or simply purchase it from him. This boosted the presence of *Los Zetas* in Guatemala and allowed them to take new territory to expand their routes and implant their structures in a more permanent manner.

For their part, the *Zetas* provided the Overdick organization with muscle so he could expand operations as cocaine middleman. Together the two organizations pushed other family organizations out of business. Some, like the senior members of the Lorenzana clan, ended up extradited to the United States, while others were forced to cut deals. The growth of the Overdick-*Los Zetas* alliance continued unabated until April 2012, when Overdick was arrested with the help of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). He was extradited to the United States in December 2012.³⁵

However, by then *Los Zetas* were a consolidated group, recruiting local military and ex-military members and integrating them into a tight operation that works in cells of 8 to 10 men.³⁶ These “soldiers” move in smaller teams of 4 or 5, a function of how many men they could put in the SUVs and *Suburbans*, the vehicles the organization favors.

The *Zetas* concentrated their efforts on Cobán, Alta Verapaz. Cobán is strategically located in the heart of Guatemala. It gives relatively easy access to the northern, more remote province of Petén, the capital and country’s banking center, Guatemala City, and the eastern and western border provinces.

The move north into Petén was the most violent and revealing of the way the *Zetas* have chosen to operate in Guatemala. This included the widely reported massacre of 27 farm workers, as a way of sending a message to a rival who had reportedly stolen cocaine from them. But the incursion into northern Petén actually began several months earlier with a violent spree during which they killed a rival from a large transportation network and attacked a farm owned by the *Mendoza* clan.³⁷

El Salvador

El Salvador remains a key player in the TOC structures in the region, despite its small size and dense population, and despite government protestations to the contrary. Its criminal structures are largely local and regional rather than transnational and cocaine flows are significantly less than those of Guatemala and Honduras.³⁸ However, the local

Transportista structures are deeply tied to local and national political structures, the judiciary, and the police, while Mexican TOC groups are gaining in influence.

in El Salvador organized crime grew by using structures created by the far right paramilitary and leftist guerrillas during the war

One respected analyst at the Jesuit-run University of Central America recently explained the strength of these networks as follows;

“In El Salvador organized crime has ties to all aspects of politics, both on the left and on the right . . . While these types of ties exist in many places, in El Salvador the ties are structural, as organized crime grew by using structures created by the far right paramilitary and military groups and leftist guerrillas during the war. In both camps after the peace agreement there were those who knew how put to use the skills they learned in war and put them at the service of organized crime. They took all they had learned of corrupt structures and clandestine networks and turned them to criminal enterprises.”³⁹

Among the most notable of the corrupt structures these groups continue to operate are a series of parallel intelligence structures that are more powerful and efficient than the government’s intelligence services. These are maintained by remnants of the far right, recalcitrant groups of the Communist Party and wealthy businessmen.

Using their political clout local drug trafficking organizations such as *El Cartel de Taxis* and *Los Perrones* are increasingly pushing into legitimate business enterprises such as the importation of basic grains, hotel construction, transportation, professional soccer teams and gasoline station

ownership – all cash intensive business well suited to money laundering while undercutting and eliminating legitimate business.

The deep ties of the *Transportista* networks to the local and national governments are seen in the recent reports that a vehicle of Herbert Saca, a senior Presidential adviser, has been used for cocaine trafficking by a major drug trafficker;⁴⁰ the ties of multiple mayors and elected representatives to the *Perrones* and *Texis* groups;⁴¹ and the profiteering of another close adviser of President Funes, Miguel Menéndez, through a private security business that has won more than \$14 million in no bid government contracts while creating an armed unit outside of normal chains of command.⁴²

the negotiations that led to the gang truce are again a significant tipping point, where the government chose to negotiate directly with criminal elements

Because neither the *Sinaloa Federation* nor *Los Zetas* have established a significant permanent presence in the country, all sides of different TOC organizations can meet there to resolve differences. The northern coast of the country near the Guatemalan border is dotted with luxury homes where regional TOC leaders can meet with impunity to discuss their operations, grievances and plans.

A second anomaly is that transnational gangs have a significant presence in virtually every corner of the country, meaning that the regional *Transportista* networks must cut deals with the local gang leaders to move their product. In recent years this has led to some of the *MS-13* and *Calle 18* groups becoming much more directly tied to drug trafficking and weapons trafficking activities in ways their counterparts in other countries are not.⁴³ This is true even as the gang truce moves forward despite a lack of transparency and multiple contradictions in the Salvadoran government statements on the nature and commitments in the pact.

MS-13 cliques such as *Fulton Locos Salvatruchas* (*FLS*) and *Hollywood Locos Salvatruchos* (*HLS*), the most violent of the identified gang cliques, operate in close conjunction with *Transportista* networks. The reported leader of the *FLS*, José Misael Cisneros Rodríguez, aka “*Medio Millon*” (Half Million), was arrested in May, but has been arrested in the past and subsequently freed under mysterious circumstances. Salvadoran police officials say he and his gangs are among the most closely linked to the cocaine trade.⁴⁴

Another *MS-13* leader linked more directly to the cocaine trade is Moris Alexander Bercián Manchón, aka *El Barney*, one of the few gang leaders to control multi-kilo cocaine loads. The son of a Guatemalan colonel who was a commander in the border zone, *El Barney* controls the *Normandie Locos Salvatruchos* clique and is linked by police to more than 50 homicides.⁴⁵

The *FLS* and *HLS* work directly with and for the *Cartel de Texis*, which in turn constitutes a major transport network of the *Sinaloa* cartel operatives running their Central American operations from Honduras. *Texis*, and by proxy the *FLS* and *HLS* wield tremendous local political power along the routes where *Texis* operates.⁴⁶ The negotiations that led to the gang truce are again a significant tipping point, where the government chose to negotiate directly with criminal elements under opaque circumstances that have greatly strengthened the power of TOC groups in El Salvador.

The *Texis* group controls the northwest corridor of the border with Honduras through Metapán to the Guatemalan border.⁴⁷ Another major *Transportista* network known as *Los Perrones Orientales*, (Big Dogs of the East) operates in and around the eastern cities of San Miguel, Usulután and La Unión.

These groups take custody of the cocaine that arrives on El Salvador’s Pacific coast from Colombia and Ecuador, or overland from Honduras. The sea transfers of illicit products often take place in the Bajo Lempa region, long a smuggling center, and particularly used by the

former guerrillas as a weapons transshipment point during El Salvador's civil war. The area is still a center of black market for weapons movements.⁴⁸ Many of the leaders of both groups have been involved in running contraband and stolen goods through the region for many years, and in some cases, for generations, showing how the "culture of contraband" has taken root.

A third unique trait of El Salvador is the nation's dollarized economy and lax to non-existent anti-money laundering efforts. This enables TOCs, with a minimum of presence and expenditure, to move money through El Salvador from the United States and Europe into the international banking system without ever having to convert the wealth to another currency.

Conclusions

The real power structures (as opposed to the formal power structures) in the Northern Triangle of Central America are increasingly tied to regional TOC structures in which the Mexican drug cartels predominate. This provides multiple challenges to U.S. policies in the region, particularly given the Northern Triangle's geographic proximity to the United States and its historic economic, cultural and immigration ties there. Current U.S. policy, as reflected in the recent trip of President Obama to Mexico and Costa Rica, is focusing more on trade and economic issues and less on counter drug and interdiction efforts than in the past. This mirrors the changing priorities within the Northern Triangle governments, who view mitigating violence as the priority, rather than interdicting cocaine.

Yet the road ahead is fraught with complex problems and tensions. Much of the U.S. aid and policy agendas remain rooted in the traditional assumptions that the states receiving the aid can and will tackle organized crime as a serious issue, while seeking to build the rule of law and more transparent economic systems that will lessen corruption. The current shift in priorities could only bear fruit under those circumstances. However, as

TOC groups gain ascendancy these basic assumptions no longer appear to hold true.

Because of the TOC influence at all levels, U.S. law enforcement officials are finding fewer interlocutors with whom to build relations of trust. The TOC penetration at the senior levels of each government means the same holds true across the spectrum of diplomatic and intelligence interests.

much of the U.S. aid and policy agendas remain rooted in the traditional assumptions that the states receiving the aid can and will tackle organized crime as a serious issue

The minority of uncorrupted law enforcement agents within each country have no mechanism to work with trusted counterparts in other countries – an urgent issue given that almost no major crime in the region is "local." Most of the TOC groups work across the region and most of the criminal enterprises span the three countries, meaning the lack of government cooperation greatly increases the levels of impunity.

It will be hard to increase trade with the Northern Triangle if TOC groups are managing more of that trade with strong economic interests that will only be strengthened through that trade. There is little incentive to create a more transparent system in economies ever more dependent on money laundering structures and illicit products rather than legitimate commerce.

One would be hard-pressed to find one major political party that does not have multiple members of its senior leadership directly tied to one TOC group or regional *Transportista* syndicate or another, rendering the electoral process increasingly less relevant in the creation of sustainable democratic structures with functioning judiciaries or manageable prisons.⁴⁹

The situation will likely worsen considerably in coming months as the effects of reduced



Walking the Tracks on Flickr

Mara Salvatrucha graffiti

interdiction efforts due to sequestration begin to be felt. With fewer U.S. assets deployed on the sea, in the air and on the ground the flow of cocaine will likely grow as the chances of being caught drop, thus leaving the region even more awash in illicit commodities than it already is. In this environment the United States must choose its partners carefully and reassess the assumptions underlying current programs of aid and security.

For example, rather than focusing on broad police reform in an era of scarcity and uncertainty over who one can work with, priority should be given to creating small vetted units in each country that have the capacity to talk to each other and share data. This felt need is repeated in almost

every meeting with law enforcement officials across the region. Another priority should be training for these small units in investigating complex, multi-jurisdictional crimes in order to develop the skill sets necessary to truly tackle TOC organizations on multiple fronts.

A further priority should be gaining an understanding of the economic implications of the new TOC-controlled companies and structures, including massive land purchases. While increasing trade with the region is a priority, one must understand the nature of the trade and the beneficiaries. This should be a future priority research area.

Ultimately the people and governments of the Northern Triangle will have to determine

their own destinies and the United States, as a long-timer partner with important security and economic interests, must support them in efforts to combat TOC, fortify their democratic structures and construct the rule of law. However, in the current alignment of forces this requires additional care and a rethinking of how to achieve those goals. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ The descriptions of “positive” and “negative” sovereignty are drawn from Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29. Jackson defines negative sovereignty as freedom from outside interference, the ability of a sovereign state to act independently, both in its external relations and internally, towards its people. Positive sovereignty is the acquisition and enjoyment of capacities, not merely immunities. In Jackson’s definition, it presupposes “capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters”. The absence of either type of sovereignty can lead to the collapse of or absence of state control.

² U.S. Department of State, “2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy,” Volume 1.

³ The use of the node model is based on Patrick Radden Keefe’s study: Patrick Radden Keefe, “The Geography of Badness: Mapping the Hubs of the Illicit Global Economy,” *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization*, edited by Michael Miklaucic and Jaqueline Brewer, Center for Complex Operations, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 97-109.

⁴ For a broader definition and look at how “criminalized states” in Latin America operate, see; Douglas Farah, “Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism and Criminalized States: An Emerging Tier-One Security Priority,” *U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute*, (August 2012).

⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment,” (September 2012), 13.

⁶ There are significant cases falling under each of these typologies that will be examined in the next phase.

⁷ According to the International Centre for Prison Studies of the University of Essex (<http://www.prison-studies.org/info/worldbrief/>) Guatemala’s prisons have a capacity for 6,974 people but a prison population of 12,835, an overcrowding of 184 percent, with 54 percent

of that population awaiting trial. In Honduras the official prison capacity is 8,625 and the prison population is 12,336, an overcrowding of 143 percent, with 50 percent of the inmates awaiting trial. In El Salvador the prison capacity is 9,060 and the prison population is 26, 639, an overcrowding of 254 percent, with 27 percent of the prisoners awaiting trial.

⁸ Clare Ribando Seelke, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 3 January 2011), 9, available at <http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf>

⁹ For details of the gangs and the truce see: Douglas Farah and Pamela Phillips Lum, “Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal Organizations: Changing Relationships in a Time of Turmoil,” February 2013, accessed at http://www.ibiconsultants.net/_pdf/central-american-gangs-and-transnational-criminal-organizations-update-for-publication.pdf. The “Violence Free” municipalities where the government’s security forces are withdrawn and gang members can leave without interference in exchange for promises of non-violence, are highly reminiscent of the “Distention Zone” the Colombian government granted the FARC during peace negotiations in 2000, which ended in disaster. The FARC used the time and territory to solidify its drug trafficking structures and to rest and rearm its troops.

¹⁰ For example, one recent study found significant ownership changes in the Petén region of Guatemala between 2005-2010, including 90 percent of land changing hands in municipalities of San José and La Libertad. See: Miguel L. Castillo-Giron, (Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center: Florida International University, February 2011), accessed at <http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac/20>

¹¹ National Security Council, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security,” July 2011. The Strategy grew out of a National Intelligence Estimate initiated by the Bush administration and completed in Dec 2008, and is a comprehensive government review of transnational organized crime, the first since 1995.

¹² Congressional Research Service, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress,” (21 February 2012).

¹³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment,” (September 2012), 49.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Gabriel Marcella, “American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment”, Monograph No. 10, (September 2007).

¹⁶ For a robust discussion of this dynamic see: Phil Williams, “Lawlessness and Disorder: An Emerging Paradigm for the 21st Century,” edited by Michael Miklaucic and Jaqueline

Brewer, Center for Complex Operations, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 15-37.

¹⁷ Williams, *Op Cit*.

¹⁸ There are multiple studies on the number of homicides in the region, which vary slightly in the exact numbers put arrive at the same general number. These studies show the homicide rate in El Salvador almost doubling from about 37 per 100,000 to about 71 per 100,000 in 2009. For official National Police statistics see: "Número de Víctimas y Tasas de Homicidios Dolosos en El Salvador (1999-2006)," accessed at http://www.ocavi.com/docs_files/file_386.pdf, September 3, 2010. Also see: Edith Portillo, "Gestión de Saca Acumula 16 mil homicidios," December 29, 2008; and "Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats," February 2010. The figure on homicides among young people was taken from: "Latin America Has the Highest Homicide Rate for Young Adults in the World," November 26, 2008.

¹⁹ Romina Ruiz-Goiriena, "Guatemala Weighs Drug Legalization," February 13, 2012, accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/13/guatemala-drug-legalization_n_1274717.html

²⁰ <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/once-again-el-salvador-ignores-narco-congress-links>.

²¹ For an examination of the "cultures of contraband" and their implications in the region see: Rebecca B. Galemba, Ph.D. dissertation, (Brown University Department of Anthropology, 2009).

²² Sergio Arauz, Óscar Martínez, and Efrén Lemus, "El Cartel de Taxis," May 16, 2011, accessed at: <http://www.elfaro.net/es/201105/noticias/4079/>.

²³ The investigation was carried out by a special commission formed in 1992, composed of the nation's human rights ombudsman, a representative of the United Nations Secretary General, and two representatives of the Salvadoran government. The commission was formed by a political agreement among all the major parties due to resurgence in political violence after the signing of the historic peace accords. See: "Informe del Grupo Conjunto Para la Investigación de Grupos Armados Ilegales con Motivación Política en El Salvador," *El Salvador*, July 28, 1994, accessed January 26 at <http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/grupo.html>

²⁴ For a more comprehensive look at the demise of the Colombian organization and the rise of the Mexican structures see: Steven S. Dudley, "Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras," (San Diego: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, May 2010).

²⁵ For a more complete look at this phenomenon see: "Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and

the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment," *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* (September 2012), 11-13.

²⁶ For more complete studies of this shift see: Samuel Logan, "The Sinaloa Federation's International Presence," *Combating Terrorism Center, West Point* (April 2013), 6, no 4, and Steven Dudley, "Part I: The Incursion," *InSight Crime*, September 7, 2011, accessed at <http://www.insightcrime.org/the-zetas-in-guatemala/part-1-the-incursion>

²⁷ Antonio L. Mazzitelli, "Mexican Cartels Influence In Central America," *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center*, Paper 45, no. 5 (September 2011), accessed at <http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac/45>

²⁸ Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment, *Op. Cit.*, 23.

²⁹ Jeremy McDermott, "The Zetas Set Up Shop in Honduras," *InSight Crime*, February 4, 2013.

³⁰ "Mexico Fears Its Drug Traffickers Get Help from Guatemalans," *The New York Times*, September 30, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/international/americas/30mexico.html?_r=0

³¹ "How the Zetas Took Monterrey," *InSight Crime*, December 16, 2012, available at <http://www.insightcrime.org/zetas-monterrey/how-the-zetas-took-monterrey>.

³² Author's interviews with Guatemalan intelligence services, Guatemala City, January-February 2010.

³³ For more on the Zetas' incursion, see "Part I: The Incursion," *InSight Crime*, September 7, 2011, available at <http://www.insightcrime.org/the-zetas-in-guatemala/part-1-the-incursion>.

³⁴ "Guatemala 'Drug Boss' Overdick Faces US Extradition," *BBC News*, June 12, 2012.

³⁵ For more on Zetas' modus operandi, see "Part II: The Modus Operandi," *InSight Crime*, September 7, 2011, available at <http://www.insightcrime.org/the-zetas-in-guatemala/part-2-the-modus-operandi>

³⁶ "Part III: A Guatemalan Response," *InSight Crime*, September 7, 2011. <http://www.insightcrime.org/the-zetas-in-guatemala/part-3-a-guatemalan-response>

³⁷ According to the UNODC some 330 tons a year transit Guatemala and some 280 tons transit Honduras, while only 5 tons go through El Salvador. Yet an analysis of seizure data estimates show El Salvador's traffic is likely significantly under reported. Revised estimates by international narcotics sources but the amount at 10 tons to 15 tons, still far less but more not unimportant.

³⁸ Rev. Andreu Oliva, "El crimen organizado," *Revista ECA* (El Salvador), 67, no 731, (October-December 2012), 473.

³⁹ Herbert Saca is the cousin of former president Antonio Saca, accused by his own political party of stealing more than \$400 million during his presidency (2004-2009). For details see: Efrén Lemus and Óscar Martínez, "Camioneta contaminada con cocaína vincula Herbert Saca

con red de narcos,” *El Faro*, April 19, 2013, accessed at <http://www.elfaro.net/es/201304/noticias/11788/>

⁴⁰In May 2011 the online newspaper *El Faro* published an extensive investigative series for the first time publicly identifying the little-known Cartel de Taxis, its leadership and those leaders’ extensive political protection network. The series brought death threats against the authors. See: Sergio Arauz, Óscar Martínez and Efrén Lemus, “El Cartel de Taxis,” *El Faro*, May 16, 2011. See also: Efrén Lemus, Óscar Martínez and Sergio Arauz, “Los extraños negocios del diputado con Ulla Sibrián,” *El Faro*, April 6, 2013, accessed at <http://www.elfaro.net/es/201304/noticias/11613/>

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⁴⁵In May 2011 the online newspaper *El Faro* published an extensive investigative series for the first time publicly identifying the little-known Cartel de Taxis, its leadership and those leaders’ extensive political protection network. The series brought death threats against the authors. See: Sergio Arauz, Óscar Martínez and Efrén Lemus, “El Cartel de Taxis,” *El Faro*, May 16, 2011.

⁴⁶Author interviews with MS-13 members and Salvadoran National Police experts. Also, see: Elyssa Pacheco, “Salvador Drug Cartel Targeted in Rare Arrest,” *InSight Crime*, 28 May, 2012, accessed at <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/secretive-el-salvador-drug-cartel-targeted-in-rare-arrest>

⁴⁷Farah and Lum, *Op Cit.*

⁴⁸Underscoring the lack of confidence in the current political class, in one recent poll of presidential candidates in Honduras “none of the above” outpolled the four leading presidential candidates and voters who call themselves undecided. “None of the above” drew 22 percent while the leading candidate drew 20 percent. See: “Xiomara Castro y Salvador Nasralla disputan triunfo en las encuestas,” *El Heraldo* (Honduras), April 21, 2013, accessed at <http://www.elheraldo.hn/Secciones-Principales/Pais/>

Xiomara-Castro-y-Salvador-Nasralla-disputan-triunfo-en-las-encuestas



Displacement and discrimination continue to affect Rohingya

A U.S. Asian-Pacific Pivot Point: Burma's Natural Resources

By Kirk Talbott, John Waugh, and Douglas Batson¹

*Ship me somewheres east of Suez, where the best is like the worst,
Where there aren't no Ten Commandments an' a man can raise a thirst;
....On the road to Mandalay, Where the flyin'-fishes play,
An' the dawn comes up like thunder outer China 'crost the Bay!*

from Kipling's Mandalay

Burma wavers on the cusp of a transition from conflict, plunder, and risk towards peace and a more open, stable society. A half-century of armed warfare, largely financed by the rapid exploitation of high-value natural resources, may be coming to an end in mainland Southeast Asia's largest nation. The use and extraction of environmental assets will continue, however, to determine Burma's political and economic future. Unfortunately, natural resources too often play a perverse role in preventing needed reforms in countries emerging from protracted conflict. In an era of fiscal constraint, "sequestration," and a decade of Iraq and Afghanistan nation-building fatigue, how can the U.S. best aid Burma's transformation? The on-the-ground situations in Burma, namely, ethnic conflicts, land grabs, internally displaced persons, each undergirded by a deep distrust of the central government, are as varied as they are fluid. U.S. foreign policy issues regarding the nation also known as Myanmar, beginning with that nation's toponym,² are so complex as to defy the Interagency and Tactical Conflict Assessment Frameworks, respectively vaunted by U.S. government civilian agencies and military services.

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Advancing business investment is paramount to continue advancing human rights interests in Burma. Significant challenges to U.S. foreign policy aims of improving human rights and promoting responsible investment are legion. Illicit transnational business networks hinder national reconciliation and societal integration. These well-entrenched networks, including the Burmese military, also impede building an effective civil society that would promote shared benefits and responsibilities of managing Burma's natural resource wealth. Along Burma's borders lurk resource-hungry neighbors, two with billion-plus populations, eyeing the U.S. foreign policy "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region with suspicion. Burma has attracted a deluge of foreign aid and commercial interest, ostensibly invited in as new trading partners to balance competing interests among China, Thailand, India, etc., but with ravenous resource appetites of their own. In response the Burmese government is enacting new laws and policies, including in resource governance, and is beginning to receive some donor support for reforms. Good governance, encompassing both business and human rights agendas, provides just the anchor that U.S. foreign policy needs to interface with, as opposed to intervene in, "the new Burma."

This article argues for strengthening land tenure and community-based property rights and agreements for the equitable sharing of natural resources as a point of entry for the U.S. to support Burma's transition. As that fragmented nation faces its ethnic divisions and the arduous tasks of reconciliation and peace building, natural resource governance provides direction and substance to democratization and tangible investment incentives. With landlessness among Burma's rural population ranging from 30-50 percent,³ and a dearth of capacity and experience in land administration and dispute resolution, the challenge is a daunting one. The prospect of an open, prosperous, and stable Burma, based on rule of law, hinges on its capacity to manage its natural resources sustainably for the benefit of the entire nation of 55

million people and not its small but powerful and well-connected elites.

Burma: at the Crossroads of South and Southeast Asia

In the late 19th century, Rudyard Kipling penned *Mandalay*, a poem that British soldiers in Burma identified with licentious freedoms to enjoy its exotic beauty. The 21st century may well see a Road to Mandalay, but in the form of a high-tech information highway, both physical and cyber; in other words, an Indo-Pacific-Corridor that links India to Thailand via Burma. In the absence of rule of law, however, the increasing number of actors coveting Burma's rich natural resources may also evoke more than "thunder out of China," whose influence with Burma's rulers may no longer be paramount. Renowned for its valuable teak reserves, copper mines, and gems, Burma is also endowed with huge natural gas deposits as well as the potential for much hydropower from the region's great rivers. Stretching 2,000 km south to north, from the Andaman Sea coasts to snow-clad Himalayan peaks, Burma stands at the geographic crossroads of India, China, and Southeast Asia. Extensive river valleys, mountainous watersheds and rich soils have long provided valuable yields whether in food, logs, cash crops, or poppy. Burmese natural resource riches have long factored into the national political economy and internal territorial competition.

For centuries Burmese practiced traditional agriculture through evolving rules and customary laws regarding the use, allocation and transfer of land, water and natural resources. A diverse array of ethnic minorities (Shan, Karen, Chin, Kachin, Wa, etc.) comprising 40% of the population of 55 million, ring the majority ethnic Burmese, who chiefly dwell in the central lowlands and river deltas.⁴ Most minorities inhabit mountainous border areas and the once heavily forested uplands, mainland Southeast Asia's largest.

Pre-colonial exploitation of Burmese forest, water, and wildlife was often regulated through

centuries-old customary laws and traditional resource management systems. Collective land and natural resource management (NRM), promulgated and enforced by traditional leaders and social bonds, protected remote communities from outside commercial interests. The Burmese, 70% of whom still rely on farming and fishing for their livelihoods, remain dependent on the sustainability of their agro-ecological systems and natural resources, forests, and watersheds in particular.

Burma experienced relative prosperity in its first 15 years of independence after WWII. The early government administrations built on remaining British colonial infrastructure to capitalize on the nation's rich natural resources, particularly in the agricultural and mining sectors. During this brief period, Burma was Southeast Asia's second largest rice producer and its literacy rate was among Asia's highest. With an economy comparable to that of Thailand at the time, Burma is now a desperately poor country with per capita GDP by purchasing power parity of just US\$ 822.⁵ In 2011, Burma ranked 149th out of 186 countries on the UN Human Development Index, and desperation has driven hundreds of thousands of migrants into Thailand.⁶

The Burmese Military Regime: Fifty Years of Plunder, Power and Control

For fifty years Burma has been ruled by a series of increasingly repressive and powerful military governments ushered in with General Ne Win's 1962 nationalist coup d'état. A half a century long experiment in autarky styled as the "Burmese Way to Socialism" nationalized teak production, mining and other major industries. The country receded into isolation, poverty and "rent seeking" behavior, which ignited long-simmering internal tensions.⁷ After 1988, the military regime switched to a quasi-market economy, opening up the country, particularly to Thai and Chinese investors.

The *Tatmadaw*, the regime's armed forces, approximately 400,000 strong and Southeast Asia's second largest (after Vietnam), provided the

regime with the means to penetrate the rugged regions bordering India, China and Thailand. The heavy hand of the *Tatmadaw* in the economy fueled corruption, forced labor and relocation; reports of the use of rape as a war tactic have been numerous and ongoing for many years.⁸ Economic and political refugees as well as those simply fleeing conflict have numbered in the hundreds of thousands, mostly living in Thailand, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and elsewhere in the region. Stripped of citizenship and rendered officially stateless by the regime's 1982 citizenship law, the *Rohingya* population, continue to be subjected to severe legal, economic and social discrimination. The government requires prior approval for travel outside their villages of residence, limits access to higher education, and imposes several work restrictions. Authorities also require *Rohingya* to obtain official permission to marry and have imposed a one-child policy. The 800,000 *Rohingya* constitute one of the world's largest stateless populations. Sadly, violence that has sporadically erupted in Burma's western Rakhine State since June 2012 has produced, by one estimate, more than 140,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁹

While Western nations shunned Burma due to the litany of human rights abuses, China and Thailand have invested heavily and profited greatly from the booming natural resource extraction. India, long preoccupied with security concerns from Pakistan and China, also initiated a "Look East" policy in the mid-1990s. Once supportive of fellow democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, India shifted its attention to the regime in light of Burma's strategic position as a resource-rich neighbor. India's engagement has steadily increased, although it does not match China and Thailand's extensive involvement in Burma's economy.¹⁰

Beginning in the late 1990s, the military government pressed into territories in the non-Burmese ethnic hinterlands in search of locations for pipelines and transport infrastructure, and prime agricultural real estate. The development of and



Photo by Leon Meerson on Flickr

Mandalay

production from the Yadana natural gas fields off the southeastern coast became an unprecedented resource bonanza for the regime. Hydroelectric power provided another vehicle for the regime to extend its control over large swaths of ethnic minority lands and profit from local natural resources.¹¹ For example, in the eastern Shan State, the region surrounding the Tasang Dam on the Salween River underwent intensive militarization that displaced over 300,000 members of ethnic minorities.¹² A similar pattern of logging, mining, hydro- and agri-business expansion, which had denuded much of Shan and Karen States, expanded into the more remote, northern Kachin State. The 2011 suspension of construction on the Chinese-backed hydroelectric Myitsone (meaning confluence) Dam has, for the time being, eased tensions in Kachin. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,

Michael H. Posner, notes that “war is being waged there for both reasons of political autonomy generally and control over these resources specifically. [...] In the past when the military and business join forces, often we have observed patterns of land confiscation, forced labor, environmental destruction, and severe human rights abuses on local populations around these projects.”¹³

Kevin Woods, a scholar of Burma’s political economy and natural resources, provides a valuable perspective on the role of ceasefires and the military regime’s solidifying control over ethnic minority areas:

“Ceasefire agreements between the Burmese government and ethnic insurgent groups have created unique geopolitical spaces (the so-called ceasefire zones). Different territories, and the authorities that control them,

overlap to create conditions where national military and state officials both share power and compete with non-state authorities, such as ceasefire political organizations, insurgent groups and paramilitaries. These overlapping authorities all participate in decision-making in the complex, poorly delineated mosaic of political territory that is created through the ceasefire zones. These ceasefire accords legitimize the new territorialized military-state spaces, and therefore hold serious political implications.”¹⁴

For half a century Burma's military government tightened its grip on power and control over land, resources, and people. Decades of natural resource plunder have dispossessed millions of citizens of land and usufruct rights while billions of U.S. dollars in natural gas revenues remain unreported. Profits, from natural gas in particular, have generated the wealth to build and entrench the interests of many groups connected to the regime. These interests, whether military, government, or private, will not easily yield. Fortunately, Burma still has enormous natural resource wealth, the reason that NRM stands as the decisive factor in Burma's transition from military rule.

Rapidly Improving U.S. and Burmese Relations

Over the past two years the United States, Canada, the European Union, and others have gradually eased sanctions on Burma following changes to its authoritarian political system that saw nearly 800 political prisoners freed. In the past 12 months the rapid pace and high profile faces of improved relations between the U.S. and Burma have been staggering. Secretary Clinton traveled to Burma in November 2011, the first visit by a U.S. Secretary of State in more than a half a century. Then, after a period of 22 years, the United States and Burma increased their diplomatic engagement by exchanging Ambassadors. In June 2012, the U.S. Senate confirmed Derek

Mitchell as the new United States Ambassador to Burma. In September 2012, democratic icon and Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, head of the National League for Democracy (NLD), traveled to Washington DC to receive the Congressional Gold Medal. Aung San Suu Kyi now sits with other NLD members in Parliament. Also in September 2012, Burmese President Thein Sein made his first visit to the USA as head of state to attend the United Nations General Assembly. Lastly, in November 2012, President Barak Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Burma, reciprocated in May 2013 when President Thein Sein became the first Burmese head of state to visit the White House since the visit of General Ne Win in 1966. According to W. Patrick Murphy, acting Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, this bilateral diplomacy has catalyzed further reform. “The Burmese Government committed to international standards on human rights, good governance, nonproliferation, transparency, and trafficking in persons. Many of these commitments have already yielded positive results, including improved international humanitarian access to conflict areas, dialogue with armed ethnic groups, and greater freedom of association.”¹⁵

Other recent developments bear on Burma's upcoming transformation milestones that, Special Representative Murphy states, are closely linked to the success of reform. 2013 has already seen a flurry of USAID and other international development agency activity in Burma's former and new capital, Rangoon and Naypyidaw, respectively. In 2014, Burma will assume its first rotation as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair, a prominent leadership role in tackling complex regional issues and in engaging fellow Pacific powers. Also in 2014, Burma will undertake its first national census since 1983, the results of which will shape its political and economic landscape for years to come. In 2015, the country will attempt, for the first time in the memory of its citizenry, multiparty national elections that adhere to international standards.¹⁶

John Blaxland, senior fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, views military engagement as critical to achieving a democratic, market-oriented state in Burma, because the army is the pivotal institution in the country. “The authorities in Myanmar clearly want to diversify their strategic security relationships,” Blaxland said. “They have had a very close relationship with China in recent years, India has made overtures, they’re part of ASEAN, so the opening up of the opportunity of participating (as observers) in (the humanitarian assistance portion of the joint U.S.-Thai military exercise) Cobra Gold is actually a very important step.”¹⁷ While not “military-to-military” in nature, U.S.-Burma engagement, especially the recent reestablishment of a USAID mission there, can only improve the dismal Burmese record on human rights. USAID’s goals for Burma, to strengthen democracy and the rule of law; to promote transparent governance; and advance peace and reconciliation, would work to curb the inordinate military influence on the Burmese economy. Says Murphy, “We hear from a range of Burmese stakeholders who urge us to engage the armed forces to build support for the reform agenda.”¹⁸ And security sector reform is the watchword when Burmese police, seemingly unaware of less odious means to disperse protesters, spray Buddhist monks with white phosphorous! The incident occurred as villagers rallied against forced relocations to make room for an expansion of a copper mine co-owned by a Chinese company and the Burmese military.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Burma watchers warn international organizations to maintain vigilance and caution given the nervous and mercurial nature of Burmese military and police and their reluctance to cede their vested interests and privileged positions.²⁰

Posner states that “the U. S. should remain committed to serving as a long-term partner in the reform process as long as it continues to move forward.” He then suggests a way forward for Burma in the near-term. “An important element of strong, democratic societies is adherence to the rule of law,

which in turn depends on a strong constitution that has broad public support. Civil society actors, ethnic nationality representatives, and international human rights experts alike have repeatedly called for changes to Burma’s 2008 Constitution so the document may better reflect the country’s new democratic aspirations. The Constitution is the foundational document of any society — in the run up to the 2015 national elections there is an opportunity for the people and government to debate and decide how best to address these issues.”²¹

Burma’s vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change havoc adds to the complexity of U.S. engagement. Burma, an environmentally as well as a socially fragile state, holds tremendous potential for shocks in one domain to reverberate to others. Climate change poses such a shock, given that Burma ranks in the top ten nations vulnerable to climate-related disaster.²²

Near Neighbor Comparisons

After Cyclone Nargis slammed into the Irrawaddy Delta in 2008, current President Thein Sein, former Chairman of the National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee, toured the devastation wrought by the storm. The view from his helicopter exposed a staggering lack of infrastructure and widespread poverty. A corrupt, ineffective regime was responsible for thousands of lost lives, and Thein Sein committed to change. Burma would do well to heed lessons-learned from its Southeast Asian neighbors and focus on the role of natural resource use and allocation in post-conflict peace and democracy building.

The infamous “resource curse” abounds in post-conflict settings where populations and socio-economic expectations soar. Procyclical economic policies—ones that amplify economic fluctuations—are more pronounced in resource-dependent economies. Spending revenues from resource extraction, to the exclusion of savings and reinvestment, follows a procyclical path. An appetite for revenue can drive demand for more

resources, which accelerates the depletion of the resource base while adding volatility to a fragile economy and increasing the potential for conflict over resources.²³

This pattern accompanying cessation of armed warfare can lead to plunder and ecosystem degradation. Instead of managing and exploiting natural resource assets for the nation's development, those with access and power use these resources to reward supporters and strengthen their position; the net result is tantamount to looting. Cease-fires and peace agreements can have the unintended effect of permitting the well-connected and powerful to make huge profits at the expense of the country as a whole while undermining its economic base.

Burma faces three possible future scenarios if, indeed, it succeeds in transitioning to a post-conflict environment, with an end to armed warfare in Kachin and Rakhine states and sectarian violence in Meiktila Township. Like Cambodia, Burma can easily degenerate into an extractive, authoritarian regime. Or, like Indonesia, it can move towards democracy, while retaining an extractive economy. In either case, the familiar pattern of despoiling the nation's resources for the benefit of the few would ensue. A third, far more promising scenario, hinges on the accountable, transparent, inclusive governance of land and natural resources.

Cambodia Two Decades Later

In 1993 Cambodia emerged from a nightmare that had begun during the final years of the Vietnam War, and peace finally appeared possible. The remaining Khmer Rouge soldiers and many leaders had recently defected or died. United Nations peacekeepers provided security and the international community made massive investments. Despite the horrors of war, Cambodia's rich forests, water, agricultural and other resources had remained relatively intact. Unfortunately, Cambodia's example is one of post-conflict plunder of natural resources and an opportunity lost. Outside its national parks, Cambodia's forests

have been heavily logged since the 1980s, when tropical forests covered around 60% of the country and it was viewed as "the green lungs" of Southeast Asia. In the 15-year span between 1990 and 2005, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) documents a decline in primary forest from 766,000 hectares, to 322,000 hectares.²⁴ Fueled by poverty and widespread corruption, land grabbing; and illegal mining, logging and fishing have compromised Cambodia's future.²⁵ The small nation of 14 million remains near the bottom of most UN development rankings. Hundreds of thousands of Cambodians have been rendered landless, forced to migrate to the swelling, violence-prone slums around Phnom Penh and other large cities.

Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand: Democracy without Restraint to Post-Conflict Plunder

Indonesia, unfortunately, also suffered in many respects from poor natural resource governance since the end of major armed conflict and the fall of the Jakarta-based, military government in the late 1990s. Too often, rampant, localized, over-exploitation of frontier forest and marine ecosystems has replaced the Suharto regime's centralized, authoritarian grip on natural resources. Much of Sumatra and large swaths of Kalimantan's tropical forests have recently been burned and converted to palm oil plantations, generating discontent and marginalizing thousands of citizens. Despite impressive civil society gains, Indonesian democratization has also perpetuated, and, in some cases, exacerbated widespread natural resource over-exploitation and ecosystem damage. Unfortunately, fewer profits in local timber extraction generally defines the major factor slowing "wild logging" across much of Indonesia.²⁶

The Philippines and Thailand, on the other hand, turned the corner towards improved natural resource governance, but only after losing much of their natural patrimony. Both nations experienced wholesale deforestation across most of their national territories, except for protected



Displacement and discrimination continue to affect Rohingya

zones, and even these had come under increasing pressure from people relocating from other areas. The degradations include extensive soil erosion, localized droughts, and marked declines in inland and coastal fisheries. Largely unplanned real estate and infrastructural growth, a population boom, and declining land fertility have all increased the growing populace's vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters in both countries and much of Southeast Asia.

Burma's Window of Opportunity

The remedy to the resource curse usually advanced by the multilateral financial institutions is a "rule-based fiscal framework" to reduce volatility and promote fiscal sustainability. The problem rests with the interpretation through the so-called "Washington consensus:" the solutions fail to take into account the political

constraints to apparently rational economic prescriptions. Economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson explain why these "solutions" fail: "Attempts by international institutions to engineer economic growth by hectoring poor countries into adopting better policies and institutions are not successful because they do not take place in the context of an explanation of why bad policies and institutions are there in the first place, except that the leaders of poor countries are ignorant. The consequence is that the policies are not adopted and not implemented, or are implemented in name only."²⁷

This revelation gives pause with regard to crafting measures intended to transform Burma and requires a deep understanding of the interrelationships between economic development, political power, and resource extraction. Change in post-conflict environments may have to be

incremental, and not conducive to the quick wins that the international community typically seeks; on the one hand demonstrating “value for money,” and on the other, “optimal impact.” The situation militates strongly in favor of starting with very practical bottom-up approaches.

Co-author and Department of Defense geographer Doug Batson observed in Ghana the kind of grass roots land rights documentation that may be appropriate in Burma. There, the USAID-funded *Title Registration and Microfinance Project* captured “best available evidence” from customary land tenure to generate paralegal property folios. This first-time documentation of (orally bestowed) customary rights and interests in land not only serve as collateral for microfinance loans, it also offers a step forward in bringing lands under customary tenure into the formal system over time.²⁸ In the case of “stateless” ethnic minorities, the same documentation might also be used in a pathway to Burmese citizenship.

Such a bottom-up approach provides a double benefit given that Burma’s judiciary does not engage in resolving land disputes, an anomaly among nations. According to the Burmese Farmland Law, Farmland Management Committees hold the responsibility for resolving them. Unfortunately, it is only at the village level where these committees include representation of farmer’s associations and village elders. Above the village level, the Farmland Management Committees are comprised of government officials only resulting in an often-biased dispute resolution body. In the absence of documentation, this situation bodes badly when disputes over land or resource rights and responsibilities emerge between households or communities and large-scale investors, the government, or military. The natural resources sector provides a logical place to begin to address peace-building in Burma—by documenting land use, claims, rights and interests—where even paralegal property folios provide “best evidence.” The following paragraphs offer some pragmatic measures that can lead to stability in Burma with its transformation rooted in rule of law.

Free and prior consent of local communities and transparent and equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms can bring affected communities into the mainstream of a natural resource dominant development model. Extant models for such mechanisms remain few, with most either imperfect or immature; here the U.S. has the opportunity to help Burma to avoid the mistakes of its neighbors. In that direction, Burma has initiated the process of becoming a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), begun legal reforms, and welcomed environmental and institutional capacity building in its transition.²⁹ Burma could look to lessons learned from revenue-sharing models as diverse as Alaska’s Permanent Fund and Liberia’s post-conflict forest reform process, positive and negative, respectively, on sharing resource revenues.

with one of the highest deforestation rates of any tropical forest nation, but significant remaining forest resources, Burma could be a candidate for forest carbon mitigation investments

With one of the highest deforestation rates of any tropical forest nation, but significant remaining forest resources, Burma could be a candidate for forest carbon mitigation investments. The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) portfolio under the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change could give forest communities and investors a mutual stake in a well-regulated, fair, and transparent system of forest management. Achieving this will require inclusive management employing best financial practices and equitable land and resource tenure policies, combined with benefit sharing with stakeholders. If successfully implemented it can help to build civil society and strengthen the governance of Burma’s national resources.

Many international organizations have accumulated valuable experience from Indonesia, East Timor, Liberia and other resource-rich developing nations on how to address the “resource curse.” The U.S. is engaging with Burma to reform natural resource extraction and revenue sharing. From field visits, USAID has gained an appreciation of the key issues and constraints, and has developed a number of NRM recommendations for Burma.³⁰

Support the development of a land policy and a comprehensive land law and related implementing rules and regulations.

- Improve tenure security for vulnerable populations, women in particular, and reduce landlessness.
- Bring compulsory acquisition policies in line with international best practices.
- Promote expansion and improvement of community forest user groups.
- Support more sustainable water management and the regulation of the mining industry.


As national consultations and, hopefully, reconciliation occurs, Burmese public and private representatives can agree to adhere to minimal industry standards to develop the country’s resources. One such example is USAID’s aim to assist the Settlement and Land Records Department of the Burmese Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation to implement its process of registering land rights and enhance citizen awareness and capability to participate in the land registration process.

Land Tenure and Property Rights: the Crux for Sustaining Democracy and Peace in Burma

Throughout the previous conflict-ridden half-century to the present, the majority of people, particularly in Burma’s vast ethnic minority territories, have lacked clear rights to their lands and

resources. Approximately 10 million Burmese remain “landless” agricultural laborers. The 1991 Wastelands Law provided the military government the ability to legally allocate large areas of land to private investors. A criticism of the recently-enacted Farmland Bill and Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management Law is that it enables even greater government control over local peoples’ lands. As multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, humanitarian, conservation, and religious organizations and others race into Burma, few seem to be aware that Burma’s future depends in large measure on sustainable stewardship of its natural resources on the one hand, and on the other, greater inclusiveness of its citizens in the benefits from resource exploitation.³¹ In the words of Burmese Minister of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, U Win Tun, “in many areas of development and environment we are starting from scratch.”³² Indeed, achieving sustainable and equitable development in the face of entrenched, vested interests stands as Burma’s primary challenge in its political-economic transition. Its people need international support sensitive to the underlying causes behind Burma’s poverty and weak governance. Burma’s ability to build on recent positive political developments is inextricably linked to the allocation and use of natural resources.

So, how, in an age of government fiscal austerity, can the U.S. best support efforts of the quasi-civilian Burmese government to promote the conditions for peace and prosperity? A historic, if tenuous, opening for reform in the natural resource extraction and management sector now exists; a mainstay of the Burmese economy. Rather than trying to perfect a former authoritarian regime or its corrupt economy, the U.S. should focus on supporting good local governance and sustainable use of natural resources based on the principles of accountability, transparency, representation, and equity. Together, they provide the necessary political (human rights) and economic (investment) foundations to build a legal and institutional framework for a successful natural

Figure 1: Continuum of Land Rights

resource-based economy. A key indicator of effective engagement in Burma is private investment from risk- and reputation-sensitive western business interests. “Investment grade” projects in the natural resources sector in particular will depend not only on legal safeguards, but also on environmental and social safeguards only possible with a functional rule of law. Land administration and resource tenure reform offers a critical step in this process.

Development experience worldwide has demonstrated that insecure tenure and unclear resource rights undermine food security, sustainable resource use, and livelihoods. Clarifying and negotiating an on-going, enforceable framework of tenure and property rights-related agreements between local people, governments, and other parties offers a way forward for Burma. Since the time of the world’s first agricultural settlements, land tenure and property rights (LTPR) have played a central role in building prosperous, stable societies. Today, Afghanistan, Burma, and many other countries in, or emerging from conflict, face LTPR issues as core challenges of peace and nation building. Defined as “a right or mode of holding or occupying over time” (Black’s Law Dictionary), tenure includes the bundle of rights and associated responsibilities in owning or occupying land vis-a-vis all others. Ownership is not

absolute; and almost invariably local people do not hold fee simple ownership or unmitigated usufruct rights. Instead, a continuum of rights, to include non-statutory customary interests in land that protect livelihoods, provides options for LTPR support programs. For each right, access to public forestlands and the right to practice traditional *swidden* agriculture, for example, relies on a concomitant duty such as maintaining long enough fallow to sustain the soil for other uses.

In a landmark six-volume study, *Post-Conflict Peace-building and Natural Resources Management*,³³ to which the three co-authors contributed chapters, the Environmental Law Institute and its partners examined NRM experiences in more than 60 conflict-affected countries and territories. They identified lessons learned showing how effective NRM can encourage post-conflict peace building and the rule of law. These lessons include supporting an independent judiciary, accountable legislative and executive bodies, and institutional capacity building in civil society. Postponing institution building in the short term, experience shows, “risks destabilizing a country when donor fatigue sets in and political elites and rent-seeking groups attempt to regain power over the resource sector.”³⁴ Coordinating and sequencing strategic reforms in the legal system and institutions requires adherence to the

basic principles of good governance and decision making. That said the U.S. foreign policy agenda for Burma should focus on rights of access to land and resources for communities, a human rights agenda item, and the protection of investor and business interests. This two-pronged approach of legal and policy reforms can shift authoritarian state control to a more partnership-based NRM approach with local communities that provide incentives for land improvement and environmental protections.³⁵ Delineating resource rights often depends on surveys, participatory mapping by communities, and presenting best evidence to substantiate community claims. Elsewhere, efforts to “bring state to custom” have demonstrated simple but durable steps to build good will between citizens and government.³⁶ Their successes rely on transparent sharing of cadastral data and judicial proceedings in forging new public-private partnerships to restore the environment and reconstruct society with trust between former adversaries.

an effective framework for addressing systemic inequities builds on good governance and improves recognition of rights and interests in land for both individuals and groups

Customary legal systems emphasize community ecosystem management rather than individual, state, or corporate ownership rights. Traditional rules and practices governing resource use for millions of people have proven vital and resilient in LTPR initiatives. Customary laws also include cultural and religious belief systems that often perpetuate gender biases, ethnic tensions, and discriminations against females, the young, and other vulnerable groups. Given varying degrees of literacy and weak capacity for civil society building, particularly in post-conflict societies, combining statutory laws with appropriate customary practices and rules strengthens LTPR.

An effective framework for addressing systemic inequities in negotiations and land and resource disputes builds on good governance, utilizes synergies in customary and statutory laws, and improves recognition of rights and interests in land for both individuals and groups.

Batson suggests how the U.S. whole-of government approach might employ a low-cost peace-building tool, the Social Tenure Domain Model (STDM), which, in November 2012, became the basis for the first international standard for land administration—ISO 19152.³⁷ He advocated that the Federal Geographic Data Committee vote “yes” on the model not for use in the U.S. homeland, but for its efficacy in defense, diplomacy, and development:

“Future peace operations will be conducted in areas where the ground truth about people and land is often unknown or ignored in formal land tenure arrangements and statutory legislation. As a result, many people caught up in or fleeing conflict are invisible to host nation governments and international actors because their secondary land rights, such as access to forests and water, are not documented. The STDM is an initiative of UN-HABITAT to address these land tenure gaps [...] it identifies relationships between people and land independent of levels of formalization or the legality of those relationships. It signally improves human security by realizing the [...] aim of including every human being in some form of Land Administration System. The STDM can contribute to poverty reduction, as the land rights and claims of the poor are brought into the formal system over time; it opens new land markets, and aids development by equipping communities with land management skills, helping them deal with the future challenges of population pressures and climate change.”³⁸

Identifying and addressing local community concerns from the earliest possible point safeguards locally-functioning land tenure and resource rights. International standards for conducting environmental and social impact analyses for any large-scale natural resource project bring local community concerns into the decision-making process. With enormous infrastructural growth around the natural gas and oil pipelines, road networks combined with the Greater Mekong Sub-region initiatives, many more Burmese face major changes and disruption in their once-secluded lives. The allocation of benefits to communities impacted by the resource extraction and production should be guaranteed as a component of any land or resource extraction deal. In Burma, this might include:

All transactions are based on transparent legal contracts with terms and conditions predetermined by the counterparts, including the traditional occupants of the land. Burmese public and private representatives agree to adhere to minimal industry standards to develop the country's resources.

Contracts, judicial resolution, clear property rights and duties, etc. must be at least minimally enforceable to replace the specter of military rule, with its attendant human rights abuses, and to attract long-term investment.

Some form of direct benefit sharing with affected communities should be undertaken, drawing lessons from experiences in recent forest sector reform processes that support local, even customary, NRM.

In sum, the U.S. can assist in building the capacity of civil society institutions that can deliver the benefits of secure land tenure and resource rights, including protection from the rent-seeking practices of those in, or close to, military, political, or private sector power. As a rule, documented social agreements and benefit-sharing mechanisms reflect human rights and constitute increasingly enforceable components of international investments. A major constraint is the lack of information and communication technology in much

of Burma, meaning that data collection will be laborious and data entry will be prone to error. If the 21st century Road to Mandalay is indeed a cyber-highway, road construction should begin with support for information and communication technology to speed up the process of land registration and data collection. With USAID assisting the Settlement and Land Records Department of the Burmese Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation to implement its process of registering land rights and use, U.S. support for Burma's transition is well situated. Issuance of land-use certificates based on participatory mapping, cadastral and census data lays the groundwork for improved human rights and future development efforts.

Conclusion

A new wave of foreign investment and assistance, coupled with the active engagement of the U.S. whole-of government community, can play pivotal and complimentary roles in Burma's transition, but only with a thorough understanding of the constraints that have created the current situation. Now, with Western embassies opening and international corporations demonstrating strong interest in investing in one of Asia's last natural resource-rich countries, leverage to support better resource governance exists. Compared to recent reconstruction and stability efforts in the Near East and Central Asia, building governance capacity in Burma can prove cost-effective but requires a long-term commitment. The long-view U.S. foreign policy agenda of prioritizing local resource and land tenure security, transparency, and accountability stands to strengthen the most human rights and safeguard the most livelihoods for the greatest number of people and groups who comprise Burma's 135 officially-recognized "national races" that still exclude the *Robingya*. Posner reiterates: "Making Burma a home for all of its peoples requires broad, grassroots engagement by the widest possible range of its citizens, from ethnic leaders and bloggers, to lawyers and lawmakers, to factory workers and human rights

advocates. All of these groups will need to push for structural changes from the bottom up, at the same time as the political leadership works to push reform from the top down. Where these two forces meet is not for the United States to say. It's up to the Burmese to build trust on both sides and to negotiate a space where they can coexist peacefully, and in so doing to begin to make durable, systemic change. Reforming the system from within is an immense task. It will require political will from the top down, dynamism from the bottom up, and for those who have profited from power to share it.³⁹

Strengthened capacity to govern the wealth of gas and oil, agriculture and forests, water, and many other natural resources can sustain political and economic gains to the benefit all the peoples of Burma. A U.S. foreign policy that aids Burma's transition through the governance of its rich natural resources should be its Asia-Pacific pivot point. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ This article builds on and updates a shorter article by the same authors, "Sharing the Wealth: Burma's Post-Military Rule and Natural Resource Governance," *Small Wars Journal*, October 26, 2012, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sharing-the-wealth-burma%E2%80%99s-post-military-rule-and-natural-resource-governance> Approved for Public Release, NGA Case Number 13-273. Mr. Batson's expressed opinions are his own and do not represent the positions of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

² Per U.S. Government policy, the country's name is Burma. See "Obama Calls Country 'Myanmar,' to the Delight of Its Leaders," *Wall Street Journal/Southeast Asia*, November 20, 2012, available at <http://blogs.wsj.com/sear-ealtime/2012/11/20/obama-calls-country-myanmar-to-the-delight-of-its-leaders/> Accessed June 4, 2013.

³ "Burma Country Profile," *USAID Land Tenure and Property Rights Portal*, May 2013, accessed at <http://usaid-landtenure.net/burma>

⁴ The term "ethnic minorities" is commonly used in Burma to describe approximately 40% of the non-Burmese population. Most of the ethnic minorities fit the United Nations definition of indigenous peoples. Burma,

it should be noted, is a signatory to UNDRIP (the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2008, a non-binding resolution. For more perspectives on indigenous peoples' issues in Burma, see Kanbawza Win, "Myanmarnization of the Ethnic Nationalities – the Betrayal of the Ideals of Bogyoke Aung San," *Asia Tribune*, January 23, 2012, available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2012/01/23/myanmarnization-ethnic-nationalities-betrayal-ideals-bogyoke-aung-san>

⁵ "Restarting Burma," *Asia Sentinel*, August 2, 2012, available at www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4753&Itemid=214

⁶ "Myanmar Country Profile: International Human Development Indicators," *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)*, available at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MMR.html> accessed June 4, 2013.

⁷ As opposed to profit-seeking, which is the creation of wealth, rent-seeking behavior is the extraction of existing wealth through the manipulation of institutions and access to centers of power.

⁸ "Burma Country Report," *U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, (Washington; Department of State, 2011), 36, accessed at www.state.gov/documents/organization/186475.pdf

⁹ "Limited health options for Myanmar's Rohingya IDPs," *IRIN News*, May 31, 2013, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/98135/limited-health-options-for-myanmar-s-rohingya-idps>.

¹⁰ Recently, a 15-member business team accompanied Indian President Singh to Naypyidaw, the new capital city located 320 kilometers north of Rangoon (Yangon). The Indian industry delegation explored a range of new opportunities for India's burgeoning industries and appetite for gas, timber, minerals, and other natural resources. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), reports that India and Burma have recently seen substantial increase in their bilateral trade... "This implies that the sky is the limit." *India Knowledge@Wharton blog*, June 14, 2012, available at <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4689>.

¹¹ Yuki Akimoto, "Hydro-powering the Regime," *The Irrawaddy*, 12, no. 6 (June 2004), available at http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=3757

¹² "Recent Dam and Water Diversion Plans," *Salween Watch*, available at http://www.salweenwatch.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=60

¹³ "Human Rights in Burma: Testimony of Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor," *U.S. Department of State*, February 28, 2013, available at <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2013/205475.htm>

¹⁴ Kevin Woods, "Ceasefire Capitalism: military private partnerships, resources concessions, and military style

building in the Burma-China borderlands," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38, no 4, (September 14, 2011), 747-770.

¹⁵ "Human Rights in Burma: Testimony of W. Patrick Murphy, Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma," *U.S. Department of State*, February 28, 2013, available at <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2013/02/205487.htm>

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Danielle Bernstein, "Military Outreach Seen as New Step in Engaging Burma," *Voice of America News*, October 20, 2012, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/military_outreach_seen_as_new_step_in_engaging_burma/1530172.html,

¹⁸ W. Patrick Murphy testimony, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁹ Thomas Fuller, "Myanmar Police Used Phosphorus on Protestors, Lawyers Say," *The New York Times*, January 30, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/world/asia/myanmar-troops-used-phosphorus-on-protesters-lawyers-say.html?_r=0

²⁰ Bertil Lintner, "Realpolitik and the Myanmar Spring," *Foreign Policy*, November 30, 2011, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/30/democracy_myanmar_china_clinton

²¹ Michael Posner testimony, *Op. Cit.*

²² Michael Bittner, "Climate Change Vulnerability: Country Rankings," *EHS Journal*, October 24, 2010, available at <http://ehsjournal.org/http://ehsjournal.org/michael-bittner/climate-change-vulnerability-country-rankings-maplecroft/2010/>

²³ For an in depth discussion of the resource curse, see Alberto Alesina, Filipe R. Campante and Guido Tabellini, "Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?," *the Journal of the European Economic Association* 6, no.5, (2008), 1006-1036, available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/tp/jeu-rec/v6y2008i5p1006-1036.html>; Philip R. Lane, "The Cyclical Behaviour of Fiscal Policy: Evidence From the OECD," *Journal of Public Economics*, 87, no.12, (December 2003), 2661-2675, available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v87y2003i12p2661-2675.html>; Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, "The Voracity Effect," *American Economic Review*, 89, no.1, (March 1999), 22-46, available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v89y1999i1p22-46.html>. For a useful discussion of the resource curse that includes Burma as an example, see Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases", *International Organization*, 58 (2004), 35-67, accessed at <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/IO%202004.pdf>.

²⁴ FAO, *Global Forest Resources Assessment*, (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2010).

²⁵ Jake Brunner and Kirk Talbott, "Post Conflict Biodiversity Loss: Burma's Challenge," *Burma Debate*, 8, no.4, (Winter 2001/2002), 17.

²⁶ C.V. Barber and Kirk Talbott, "The Chainsaw and the Gun: The Role of the Military in Deforesting Indonesia," in Steven Price (Ed.), *War and Tropical Forests, Conservation in Areas of Armed Conflict*, (New York: Haworth Press, 2003), 161.

²⁷ Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, (New York: Crown Business, 2012).

²⁸ Douglas E. Batson, *Ground Truth in Building Human Security* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2012), 40-44, available at <http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/papers/paperreview.cfm?paperID=31>

²⁹ "Myanmar appoints EITI lead," *EITI*, December 17, 2012, available at <http://eiti.org/news/myanmar-appoints-eiti-lead>.

³⁰ "Burma Country Profile." *USAID, Land Tenure and Property Rights Portal*, May 2013, available at <http://usaid-landtenure.net/burma>

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³² Tiffany Stecker, "Facing Daunting Challenges, Myanmar Seeks to Protect its Forests," *ClimateWire*, April 23, 2013, available at <http://www.eenews.net/cw/>

³³ Carl Bruch, David Jensen, Mikiyasu Nakayama, Jon Unruh, eds., *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Natural Resource Management*, 6 vols., (London: Earthscan, 2011-2013).

³⁴ Rustad, S. A., P. Lujala, and P. Le Billon. "Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons from the Management of High-Value Natural Resources," *High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. P. Lujala and S. A. Rustad, (London: Earthscan, 2012), 608.

³⁵ Resource security helps reduce landlessness and promote investments in greater agricultural productivity, and is an important, if not sufficient, step in slowing the conversion of natural habitat and protecting Burma's rich biological diversity.

³⁶ International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), *Making Land Rights More Secure: International Workshop for Researchers and Policymakers*, (London: IIED, 2002), 164, available at <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9446IIED.pdf>.

³⁷ "ISO Standard for Land Administration Approved," *GIM International*, November 6, 2012, available at http://www.gim-international.com/news/land_management/cadastral_surveying/id7015-iso_standard_for_land_administration_approved.html

³⁸ Douglas E. Batson, *Ground Truth in Building Human Security*, *Op. Cit.*, 39

³⁹ Michael Posner testimony, *Op. Cit.*



A voter from Zam Zam Internally Displaced Persons Camp, North Darfur, submits her ballot on the first day of Sudan's national elections.

Towards a Taxonomy of Militaries in Contemporary Africa

By Alan Doss, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills¹

“What a society gets in its armed forces is exactly what it asks for, no more no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces, it is looking in a mirror; the mirror is a true one and the face that it sees will be its own.”


General Sir John Hackett²

The African development and governance picture is today highly differentiated with some countries developing successful democracies while riding a wave of growth, others facing outright institutional failure, and a great number in-between. Critical to understanding the different paths that countries have taken, and the likely even greater divergences in the future, is the relationship between civilians and soldiers. Starting soon after independence in the early 1960s, the seizure of power by soldiers was emblematic of the problems African states faced in promoting good governance. Now, at a time when most soldiers are back in their barracks, economic growth has accelerated and democratization has progressed. However, the picture varies greatly from country-to-country. In this paper, we develop a taxonomy of African militaries to understand why some countries have better civil-military relations than others, what is the likely path in the future, and the potential role, if any, for outsiders. African militaries are characterised, just as African states themselves, by different capacities and civil-military records.

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Gregg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation¹.

Figure 1: Sub-Saharan and Global Conflicts

While sub-Saharan Africa has enjoyed the best post-independence growth decade on record during the 2000s, at over 6%, it remains an exceedingly poor continent, with an annual per capita income level of just over US\$1,200 (in current terms). The patterns of growth have however been highly differentiated between states: some have got richer, while others have faltered or failed. This is, however, overall a positive phenomenon, showing that African countries no longer fall into a single category (if they ever did), but, as in other developing regions, there are all kinds: performers and failures; big and small (which usually perform much better in Africa); landlocked and littoral; autocratic and democratic (by now the overwhelming majority). In particular, Africa's larger and resource rich countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, for example) have generally had a poor development record since independence, which in part is due to the extent of territory and the complex make-up of their societies, consisting of many groups within a single state, which has made effective governance that much harder.

The state of democracy is also healthier in Africa today than 20 years ago, with more than

40 countries regularly conducting multiparty elections although, again, across the region there are significant variations in the integrity of these elections. Extreme predatory warlordism, once evident in Sierra Leone and Liberia, is also apparently on the decline. However, there are, as will be argued, less obvious but no less insidious ways in which military actors engage in the political economy of African societies. Indeed, such a role is not only made possible by the liberation credentials of some militaries and by their relative monopoly on violence, but by the contemporary African trend towards state involvement in economies as evident for example in the resource nationalism debate.

Continued differentiation is therefore perhaps the most important "master narrative" in Africa. Accordingly, this paper considers the abovementioned taxonomy of African militaries, highlighting in turn where and how external parties might play a useful role. But, first, how has the role of African militaries changed and how does this relate to the overall governance record?

African Militaries and Security

One consequence of the degeneration of politics during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was the high

Figure 2: Number of Coups (successful and attempted) by Sub-Region

	1960-69	1970-89	1990-2010
West Africa	19	49	36
Central Africa	8	14	13
Eastern Africa	10	26	12
Southern Africa	0	10	6
Total	37	99	67

incidence of violence in Africa. The end of the Cold War enabled some conflicts (e.g. in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique) to eventually wind down, but there was also an intense period of strife after 1990, as the geopolitical cards were reshuffled. Wars in Central Africa, West Africa and Sudan, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea, signalled a continent in crisis. The failure of the United States and the United Nations in Somalia in 1993 and the Rwandan genocide in 1994 suggested that the continent could not count on external intervention to end conflict, even though at the same time the continent was host to several UN peacekeeping missions. And still, in the 1990s, Africa was shaking off the last of its colonial or liberation struggles with the advent of a multiracial democracy in South Africa in 1994.

Much has changed. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the wars in West and Southern Africa have wound down, although there is still conflict in the Horn and Central Africa. As the table below illustrates, Africa has seen a substantial decrease in the number of conflicts, from 15 in the 1990s to five between 2000 and 2010. Accordingly, there has been a decrease in the number of global battle deaths from 160,000 a year in the 1980s to 50,000 annually in the 2000s.³

The remaining conflicts appear to be concentrated in “hard cases,” such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that have no immediate or obvious resolution. New conflicts will undoubtedly break out in sometimes surprising places, such as Mali, but it is hard to believe that the continental level of violence will revert to what was seen in the 1990s. The fall in the level of violence parallels the aforementioned change in democratic structures.


Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, much of the African continent had become militarised. Relatively few states avoided military coups, and those that did had to find some accommodation with their armed forces.

As the table below⁴ further illustrates, more than half the total of regime changes in this period comprised coups. But violent regime change has declined significantly as a percentage since 1990 and even further since 2000. The number of successful coups in Africa declined from a peak of 21 between 1960-69, to 20 in 1970-79, 20 again in 1980-89, 17 in the 1990s, and just seven between 2000-09.⁵

Aside from the implications of these military adventures for African civil-military relations, and their effect on democracy and accountability, the militarisation of society generated a culture of violence and stimulated the growth and proliferation of armed gangs, warlord formations, the contemporary surge in piracy, death squads, guerrilla armies and proxy forces of all kinds with truly devastating human consequences, especially for women and children.⁶ Restoring civil governance, stability and the rule of law thus requires, as a first step, keeping the military in the barracks and putting armed non-state actors out of business.

Africa’s Democratic and Governance Trajectory

Ending conflict can have at least as large an impact on poverty as improved growth rates. Indeed, as the World Bank’s argues, peace is likely to lead to increased growth. The opposite also holds true: as Paul Collier has shown, “Civil war is development in reverse.” Three-quarters of those people

Figure 3: Reasons for Leaving African Office


considered by Collier to be in the “Bottom Billion” (of those 58 states, most of which are in Africa, which are slipping behind) are or have recently been in civil war.⁷

The 2011 World Bank report notes that Ethiopia, at peace now since the end of its devastating border war with Eritrea in 2000, has for example increased access to improved water from 13% of the population in 1990 to 66% in 2009, while Mozambique, once it ended its civil war, tripled the primary school completion rate from 14% in 1999 to 46% in 2007. By contrast, those countries affected by conflict are falling behind in reducing poverty. The report notes: “For every three years that a country is affected by major violence [...] poverty reduction lags behind by 2.7 percentage points. For some countries affected by violence, poverty has actually increased.”⁸

While African countries have been growing economically, albeit with a mix of trajectories and from different starting points, they have, to the surprise of many, at the same time liberalised their political systems. Indeed, one of the most stunning developments in Africa was the sudden outbreak of

multiparty elections and, to some extent, democracy after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Much has been written about why the one-party, no-party or military regimes that dominated Africa in the 1970s and 1980s fell. But the most interesting development is that, after roughly 50 years of independence, the democratic election, admittedly of radically varying quality, is today the norm in most African countries.⁹

Of course, it is very hard to measure how much freer countries have become over time. Freedom House measures of political and civil rights provide one useful indicator, especially as the organization has developed a long time series and has broad coverage in Africa and the rest of the world. The figure, below, presents the continental evolution of the average of the political rights and civil liberties scores over time. Freedom House uses a scale from 1 to 7, divided into three broad categories: “Free” (1 to 2.5), “Partly Free” (3 to 5.5), and “Not Free” (5.5 to 7). The data series, which averages the political rights and civil liberties scores, began in 1972, when many African countries had already lost the veneer of democracy roughly applied in the rush to

Figure 4: Evolution of Freedom Status over Time

decolonisation and had largely eliminated formal multiparty electoral competition – although, as always, there were variations across the continent.

The above figure graphically depicts the stagnation in the extension of freedom in Africa between the early 1970s and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Early in Africa’s post-independence history, the grip of one-party or no-party states was strong and there were many intellectual arguments against democracy in Africa. In the 1960s, it was argued sincerely (and, of course, insincerely in many cases) that democracy was not appropriate for Africa, most notably by Julius Nyerere and other theoreticians of the one-party state. In the 1970s, there were those who made the case that solving Africa’s economic problems required military men or benign authoritarians. At the same time, a number of countries adopted communism as their official ideology. Finally, the international community did not promote democracy. The strategic and ideological orientation of African countries, rather than their economic or democratic performance, often determined their international alliances and levels of aid.

Political liberties and civil rights in Africa generally began to improve in a dramatic fashion after 1989, and there were particularly important changes in the first five years of the post-Cold War era. Many of the one-party or no-party states simply collapsed because of poor economic management and the withdrawal of support from their erstwhile Cold War sponsors.

In contrast to the 1960s, today there is no intellectual alternative to democracy, even though the urge to democratise across Africa is far from uniform, and there are many who have used current political developments for their own ends. The Chinese “model” also seems to have some ideological attraction for Africa, especially among regimes that have authoritarian tendencies. The citizens of many African countries continue to support elections even when they are disappointed with the systems that have evolved. Now it is the norm in almost all of Africa to hold elections, and there has been a gradual evolution of other democratic institutions and consolidation of democratic practices. Of course, one can also argue, more cynically, that many African authoritarians have learned how to

Figure 5: African Countries Ranked 'Free' by Freedom House

1972	1975	1980	1985	1990
Gambia	Botswana	Botswana	Botswana	Botswana
Mauritius	Gambia	Gambia	Mauritius	Gambia
	Mauritius	Ghana		Mauritius
		Nigeria		Namibia
1995	2000	2005	2010	
Benin	Benin	Benin	Benin	
Botswana	Botswana	Botswana	Botswana	
Cape Verde	Cape Verde	Cape Verde	Cape Verde	
Malawi	Ghana	Ghana	Ghana	
Mali	Mali	Lesotho	Mali	
Mauritius	Mauritius	Mali	Mauritius	
Namibia	Namibia	Mauritius	Namibia	
São Tomé & Príncipe	São Tomé & Príncipe	Namibia	São Tomé & Príncipe	
South Africa	South Africa	São Tomé & Príncipe	South Africa	
		Senegal		
		South Africa		

keep a hold on power even in a more open environment and despite elections, as is perhaps best illustrated by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

In part, the democratic improvement is also due to changes of attitude at the continental level. For the first few decades of independence, African countries, especially through the now defunct Organization for African Unity (OAU), claimed that it was no one's business who ruled sovereign nations. Now, the African Union (the OAU's successor) has taken relatively strong stands at least against those militaries overthrowing elected governments. Thus, the "red-card" sanctioning of African military coups from 1999 (through the Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in 1999 and the subsequent Lomé Declaration the following year) has helped consolidate democracies. Still, there have been efforts to usurp elected civilian order, for example; the Central African Republic (2003 and 2013), Chad (2006) Mauritania (2008), Guinea-Bissau (2008 and 2012), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), and Mali (2012).

The above figure also reflects some deterioration in freedom since the high-water mark in 2005. There have been setbacks in the form of military coups and contested elections, such as in Mali and Zimbabwe. Such reverses are to be expected, given the fragility of most liberalisation experiments and how hard it is to create the institutions and culture of a democracy. However, the movement backward is relatively slight in continental terms and does not detract from the conclusion that democracy is the preferred political regime for most people across the continent, no matter how difficult it is to institute in practice. Still, we need to understand clearly how complicated the environments of most African countries are for leaders and others to operate in, especially when they are trying to create pro-growth constituencies.

There are other dramatic signs of political opening across Africa, some caused by political developments and others driven by technology. For instance, in many African urban areas there are vibrant, almost riotous radio talk shows that allow listeners to call in and debate issues. This is

a sharp departure from the 1970s and 1980s, when most African capitals were starved of information and debate.

As impressive as African political progress has been, there is, again, considerable variation from country to country. This diversity is especially important to understand given that the average African country has moved from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” according to the Freedom House index. “Partly Free,” while obviously hard to define precisely as a category, does accurately describe the position of many African countries. They have elections, but they have not managed to consolidate democracy by developing a robust set of those institutions that normally support a free society. Thus, while electoral competition seems a given, the population cannot be certain that the next electoral cycle will be fair and, critically, that those elected will leave power peacefully at some future date. Of course, the willingness of those in power to leave office when voted out is the absolute bedrock of democracy, failing which people would be tempted to contest every election violently and illegally, fearing it is the last. Likewise, there is considerable uncertainty over the ability of other democratic institutions – including the parliament, the press, the armed forces, and the courts – to play a constructive and enduring role.

Towards a Military Taxonomy

The general trend toward democratization across Africa implies some significant, albeit varied, gains in civilian control of the military. Today, in only a limited number of states is fear of an outright military coup palpable. Rather, the questions around military involvement in politics are now more subtle as the military becomes simply another group, albeit armed, jostling for power behind the scenes and competing for resources. Inevitably, the military seeks a share of the budget, bringing it into conflict with other priorities, although this can, up to a limit, be considered normal politics that also play out in Washington, London and Paris. Of greater importance to understand is the

military’s potential role in commercial activity as officers seek to enrich themselves through business now that they no longer directly control the state. Concerns about the military’s role in business coincide with debates across the continent about what roles the state should take on to promote development.

Given the significant, and increasing, variations in democratization and civilian control of the military, it should be useful to develop a taxonomy of armed forces across the continent. The following chart focuses mainly upon observed military actions and must therefore be considered tentative because the armed forces themselves are divided and very little is known about their internal dynamics. For instance, until the 2012 coup, the Malian military was seen as generally supportive of that country’s fledgling democracy. Some of the classifications involve judgement calls and should also therefore be seen as tentative.

The first and fourth categories are the easiest to understand: countries where soldiers currently rule and those that have never deviated from civilian supremacy, although permanent residence in either category is not guaranteed. Given the general drift toward democratization across Africa over the last twenty years, the “Red-Carders” will inevitably face domestic and international pressure to formally give up power and they are likely to do so at some point. The military may want to “civilianize” themselves, as many of the “Legitmitators” have done in order to stay at the top of the hill, but transition management is inherently difficult given the perquisites available to those who stay in power and their uncertain fate if they were to return to the barracks. Others in those countries will be opposed to any role for those who formerly ruled through the barrel of a gun, such as has been the case in Zimbabwe. The politics of this group will therefore be inherently fraught.

Speculating on the origins of “Red-Carders” is difficult given that this is a dynamic category and that democratic missteps resulting in a period of military rule are possible in many countries,


Figure 6: An African Military Taxonomy

Red-Carders	Military or other regimes which have come to power unconstitutionally.	CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania
Legitimizers	Military or armies which have morphed into civilian regimes through elections or otherwise	Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Gambia
Transformers	Countries with a history of military rule where civilians now rule.	Benin, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Seychelles, Niger
Abstainers	Countries with no history of formal rule by soldiers.	Botswana, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia

given the difficulty of establishing institutionalized democracy. The fact that civilian leadership in France – usually thought of as a well-institutionalized country – was threatened by military dissidents in the late 1950s gives some idea how hard it is to curtail the men with weapons and how perilous it is to predict the trajectory of any given country. What stands out now is that the countries in this category are mostly Francophone and, perhaps more important, generally poorer than the African average. The relative poverty of the group highlights, perhaps more than anything else, the exceptional nature of the African democratic project where an unprecedented number of poor countries are attempting to democratize at per capita incomes much lower than the level at which many in East Asia undertook political reform. It is therefore not surprising that some of the especially poor states have seen their political systems overthrown by soldiers. As the African Development Bank (AfDB) notes in this regard, “Sub-Saharan African countries with low, or negative, per capita GDP growth since independence have experienced more military coups than countries with higher per capita GDP growth rates. Outstanding examples include Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Sierra Leone, among others.” It goes on to explain further this correlation in terms of recent coups that, “The very low performers in terms of real GDP (average

growth rate from 2000 to 2012) are Guinea-Bissau (2.2%), Madagascar (2.7%), and Mauritania (3.9%), and all these countries experienced more than one military coup and attempted coup during 2000-2012 (four in Guinea-Bissau and three each in Madagascar and Mauritania) [...]” The AfDB report goes on to observe that, “One interesting finding ... is that, in some instances, successful military coups occurred a year or two following a decline in GDP growth rate. For instance, in Guinea-Bissau, a successful military coup took place in 2003, a year after the country experienced a recession with a GDP rate of -7.1% in 2002. Similarly, in Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, military coups succeeded respectively in 2006, 2008, and 2010, following a year of declining GDP growth rate or very poor economic performance.”¹⁰

The longer soldiers stay out of power in those countries labelled “Abstainers”, the more likely it is that they have institutionalized civilian rule. Institution building is still necessary across this category, especially developing the norm that the inevitable losers in elections and resource contestation not turn to the military to redress their grievances. The refusal of the Malawian military to disrupt the transition that led to then Vice President Joyce Banda becoming president, despite pleadings from the deceased president’s family, is a good example of what has to occur across this group of countries. External military assistance to this

Figure 7: GDP Per Capita (Constant 2000 US\$)

group of countries can focus productively on further professionalization and war-fighting, as many of these countries will be called upon to undertake significant peacekeeping responsibilities.

While countries in this category vary (justifying our relatively weak label that describes their commonality in only what they have not done – seize power) – coming from different regions in Africa and in different sizes – there are some clear biases. First, many of the countries are from Southern Africa (at least as defined by the Southern African Development Community), suggesting an emerging norm in that area. Second, many of the countries have per capita incomes well above the African average. It is, of course, not completely clear if they are relatively richer because the military has stayed in the barracks or because they adopted relatively productive economic policies which soldiers were loath to disrupt.

The “Legitimators” are soldiers who came to power through the barrel of the gun via liberation armies or coups. They then transitioned

themselves through elections and are nominally civilians. Some (e.g., Mugabe, Museveni) have been in power many years as civilians. Some leaders and their parties (as in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) emerged out of national liberation struggles while others came from militaries that were established after independence. Despite their differences, their initial military background gives them an important constituency in the armed forces which they depend upon and manage. These countries (notably Angola, Rwanda and Uganda) are especially likely to foster significant involvement by the military in business as leaders seek to reward their former comrades and control society through the tentacles of the armed forces. The murkiness of such a transition to democratic rule is perhaps inevitable but, irrespective of their other nominal democratic achievements, civilian supremacy in these countries will be suspect because the military remains a bastion of power.

Africa is not the only place where militaries have an influence in the economy. In Latin America



U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Timothy L. Solano/Released

A fire team of Senegalese naval infantry commandos crouch beside a wall during a final training exercise during Africa Partnership (APS) 2011 in Toubakouta, Senegal, April 26, 2011.

(e.g. Brazil, Argentina) and Asia (e.g. Thailand, Indonesia, China, Vietnam), the military, directly or indirectly, has had an important role in business. The economies of some of these countries have grown dramatically, so it is not automatically a bad thing per se, especially if it gives the military a stake in economic growth and in so doing assists the process of demilitarization of politics. This is not the same as the militarisation of the economy along the lines of North Korea or Pakistan, where the state budget is heavily skewed to military expenditure largely outside of accountable political control. Ultimately, however, while such elite economic co-option may be a useful short-term expedient, it can quickly give way to predatory lawlessness and does not guarantee social cohesion. To the contrary, it risks institutionalising crony

capitalism, economic un-competitiveness, low growth and elite-focused development.

Moreover, outsiders who engage in these countries will have to be particularly careful of the domestic dynamics they face because the civilians still are very much tied with the armed forces and it may not be completely clear at all times who controls, and where the right of recourse to the rule of law is often subjective.

Finally, the “Transformers” have made an important break with the armed forces because those in power are not former soldiers and do not have a history of direct dependence on the armed forces for achievement of power. These countries can still experience the “revolving door” of civilian and military rule that characterized much of West Africa in particular in the past. However, their

prospects for civilian supremacy should be seen as higher than those countries in transition since the military have both formally and informally returned to their barracks. Indeed, the era of formal military rule in countries such as Ghana and Nigeria are now referred to as unfortunate eras in national history, an important legitimator of civilian rule. Of course, the Malian military would have previously been considered in this category, indicating again that classification should be done with caution.

Western (and other) governments that provide aid to the military will need to develop policies toward each of these categories. Policies toward the “Red-Carders” is relatively simple because the overall political situation in those countries will have to be resolved before significant re-engagement with the militaries can begin. Likewise, western powers should feel relatively sanguine about engaging with the “Abstainers” given their history. The focus with this group should be in professionalizing the armed forces so that they can carry out their responsibilities within their countries and also play a productive role in regional peace-keeping. Of course, many (with South Africa in the lead) are already playing important roles in a variety of countries but they do require additional support. The argument for even greater engagement, within current budget realities, can be strengthened because greater engagement will help the prowess of these nations’ militaries and their democratic prospects.

Policies toward the “Legitimizers” will necessarily be more complicated, not least because of their more limited democratic credentials. Western aid can certainly focus on the professionalization of the militaries, not least through exposure to foreign thinking and practices, including seminars and other outreach schemes designed to improve professional awareness and standards. Such assistance would, again, also improve the ultimate democratic prospects because the norm of civilian supremacy would be reinforced and because the military would see a brighter future for itself as

long as it hewed to its responsibilities to prepare for combat. Over time, western assistance could, if used with nuance, help separate the military from the structures of political power, especially as generational change occurs. There will also have to be an important focus on governance, especially on limiting, and ultimately reducing, the militaries’ ties to the economy. Such pressure would be consistent with the desire to develop more professional militaries.

that only relatively dysfunctional armies engage in the direct overthrow of civilian regimes today says something about the evolving norms of military professionalism in Africa

Western engagement will perhaps have the greatest impact with the “Transformers.” These militaries have demonstrated their democratic credentials yet operate in almost-by-definition difficult political situations. Greater assistance in promoting their military capabilities and professionalization may well pay very high dividends because Western aid could be critical in changing the calculus of those who might seek to derail their country’s democratic prospects.

A phenomenon somewhat at cross-purposes with the above analysis is absolute military capability. The most adept, well-funded, and coherent armies when it comes to actually fighting—a list that might reasonably include Angola, Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zimbabwe—are found across the different categories except, tellingly, in the “Red-card group.” That only relatively dysfunctional armies engage in the direct overthrow of civilian regimes today says something about the evolving norms of military professionalism in Africa. Western interests will necessarily be focussed, to some extent, on the absolute prowess of African militaries because few western powers are likely to be engaged in regional peacekeeping

in Africa in the near future and there will therefore be the continuing need to engage and promote the militaries that can fight. The impetus to engage these militaries means that western powers will have to be especially careful of the differences between these armed forces.

while there are exceptions, attention has overall shifted towards improving operational standards and military professionalism

Here a further, different taxonomy can be developed, a categorization of African military capabilities – distinguishing at least in terms of peacekeeping capacity between “enablers”, “providers” and “followers.” The reality is that the African military is generally under-resourced for the roles it is expected to assume, financially and in terms of available skills and equipment. Obviously, as with every area of government, hard choices will have to be made on capabilities. Inevitably the biggest African gaps exist, as in most areas of government, in management, logistics and, more controversially, in the way in which militaries can and should respond to emergencies, through humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and the delivery of logistical capabilities. One important principal stands out. While there are sometimes exceptional circumstances, the military generally cannot be stronger than the national economy can afford. A corollary is that it should not do anything to undermine the economy. This includes the furthering of military over national interests. All this raises questions about where and how external actors might assist African militaries as they continue their transition out of politics to traditional roles and capacities. External assistance should be guided in this regard by sustainability, cohesion and relevance. Changes that are instigated by outsiders but cannot endure without their support, have historically failed and should not be attempted.

Understanding thus why externally-directed solutions fail is essential. It usually goes beyond money, and to the heart of the design of the solution, and to the extent of local ownership. External assistance should also distinguish between explicit military support and strengthening the civil institutions in which militaries are located or those the military has to work with, including the police. Above all else, leadership mentoring, and especially training for local budgetary, procurement and logistics processes would help to reinforce the essence of a modern military. Teaching soldiers how to fight is not the principal problem. Rather it's the logistical and bureaucratic system that supports them which is lacking. Better systems can promote a positive cycle. Improved capacity and less stress over resources will in turn help to keep the military focused on national rather than partisan political interests.

Conclusion

As the taxonomy above illustrates, the involvement of militaries in African politics is today highly differentiated. While aspirational in some cases and fraught with setbacks, their role has increasingly moved over the past quarter century to align with western-based norms of civil-military separation. While the military's role in African politics has reflected both historical tradition and contemporary circumstances, since 2000 it has been limited by a legacy of past military excesses, the expansion of African civil society, the African Union's moratorium on *coups d'état*, and by the reluctance of external powers to accept military take overs.

As a result, while there are exceptions, attention has overall shifted towards improving operational standards and military professionalism. While never an easy task for outsiders to encourage, nurture and institutionalize, and vulnerable to the extent (or not) of local will and resources, there have been notable successes. We argue that these efforts should acknowledge the differentiation of African militaries, notably their origins,

experience in power, and if they have devised a way of exiting from formal military rule. While there is no substitute for granular knowledge of a particular country, these general categories can serve as a useful framework.

We freely admit that countries will move from category-to-category and that these shifts, as in Mali, may come as a surprise. Still understanding the relative positions of an African military compared to their counterparts across the continent is valuable and can provide a guide to effective engagement.

At the most general level, in spite of the undoubted progress made in governance and democratisation over the past twenty years, the challenges facing African countries are formidable. A failure to meet the basics of political, economic and social security will, if the Arab Spring is anything to heed, result in social and political tensions and potentially a fruitful recruiting ground for extremist groups. Yet meeting these challenges is no small order, not least given the rise in population numbers, especially in cities, and the absent corollary of employment and education opportunities, especially for Africa's burgeoning youth. It is thus important for all institutions in African countries – notably including the militaries – to play productive roles. However, the military remains unique in its potential to utterly disrupt the trajectory of a country should either the soldiers become interested in seizing power or fail in their fundamental responsibility to provide security. Thus, cognizance of the differentiation of militaries, how they will evolve in the future and the options this implies for external supporters is especially important. **PRISM**

Notes

¹The authors wish to express their appreciation for the input of a number of expert sources, including Professors Martin Edmonds and Deon Fourie, Colonel Hugh Blackman and Theresa Whelan. Thanks are also expressed to Anthony

Arnott for his role in generating statistical data. The views herein, however, remain solely those of the authors. Please note that “Africa” in this context is taken to refer to sub-Saharan Africa.

²John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*, (London: Macmillan, 1983).

³“World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development,” *World Bank*, 51. The table is compiled from a variety of sources, including data accessed at http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/trends/sipri_publications/yearbook/yb0201a.

⁴The table on coups and changes in government is sourced from Arthur Goldsmith, “Donors, Dictators, and Democrats,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39 no.3 (2001). Adapted from Roger Southall and Henning Melber, eds. *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 2006), 2.

⁵Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013. The two coup tables are sourced from Habiba Ben Barka & Mthuli Ncube, “Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d’Etat a Never-Ending Phenomenon?” *African Development Bank* (September 2012), available at <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic%20Brief%20-%20Political%20Fragility%20in%20Africa%20Are%20Military%20Coups%20d%E2%80%99Etat%20a%20Never%20Ending%20Phenomenon.pdf>.

⁶Eboe Hutchful, “De-militarising the Political Process in Africa,” *African Security Review*, 6, no. 2 (1997), available at <<http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/6No2/Hutchful.html>. p.3>.

⁷See also Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁸World Development Report 2011, *World Bank*, *Op. Cit.*, 60.

⁹This paper draws, in part, on Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, *Africa's Third Liberation*, (Johannesburg: Penguin, 2012).

¹⁰AfDB, 2012, *Op Cit.*

(U.S. Army photo by Master Sgt. Kevin Doheny, U.S. Army South Public Affairs)



The Guatemalan Minister of Defense, Gen. Ulises Noe Anzueto Giron, talks to Maj. Gen. Frederick S. Rudesheim, U.S. Army South commanding general at the international bridge connecting Guatemala and Mexico.

Joint Deployable Training Teams: Helping to Focus the Effort

By Andrew Straley

“Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think.”

- Winston Churchill -

While he was First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill once stated, “Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we must think.”¹ Conducting increasingly diverse, global operations while simultaneously fighting on multiple fronts has become more challenging due to constrained budgets. Conditions where the United States could simply throw large amounts of resources at a problem and solve it through sheer volume no longer exist. This new reality has forced combatant commanders and combined joint task force (CJTF) commanders to be more effective with limited resources when conducting operations across their joint operational area.

The Joint Operational Environment (JOE)

The 2010 *Joint Operating Environment* report describes current threats to the US and extrapolates those threats through 2030.² As depicted, today’s JOE is chaotic, complicated, and inherently unpredictable; combatant and CJTF commanders operate in complex battle-spaces affected by violent struggles among state and non-state

actors vying for influence. Threats range from single individuals and loosely organized networks to full-scale border stand-offs such as found on the Korean Peninsula. Threats are especially prevalent within weak and failing states that offer fertile ground for violent extremists. Today’s joint force must therefore be prepared to conduct a wide range of military operations ranging from traditional and irregular warfare, defense support

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of civil authorities (DSCA), foreign humanitarian assistance, and even countering threats from cyberspace.

Winston Churchill also stated, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies—and that is fighting without them.”³ The days of unilateral military initiatives throughout the world are gone. Conventional and nonconventional threats can only be countered through “unified action” involving whole-of-government, multilateral, international, and coalition efforts, also known as inter-organizational efforts. This unified action will involve all elements of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—and will seek to balance regional and international stakeholders, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

the days of unilateral military initiatives throughout the world are gone. Conventional and nonconventional threats can only be countered through “unified action” involving whole-of-government, multilateral, international, and coalition efforts

As noted above, combatant and CJTF commanders operate throughout the world in very complex environments. They deal with what are often called “wicked problems” in order to meet US strategic objectives.⁴ These commanders and their staffs must consistently learn, adapt, and execute within this environment as adversaries rapidly change their methods and objectives. In addition, joint task forces such as JTF Haiti (formed in response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake), CJTF Horn of Africa (a standing JTF focused on regional issues), and JTF Tomodachi (formed in response to the 2012 Japan earthquake and tsunami) provide examples of how joint forces have responded to diverse missions and humanitarian assistance

challenges, always working in concert with other US departments and agencies and often in support of other nations or organizations.

As discussed above, the environment (JOE), the method (Unified Action), and the current fiscal reality combine to create a perfect storm. This storm requires us to challenge the way in which we currently do business. We must consistently look at how to operate more efficiently while simultaneously becoming more effective. How joint force commanders and their staffs organize and manage their headquarters provides multiple areas for improvement. Their internal and external collaborative efforts across all warfighting functions are force multipliers, which, if executed effectively, will enable mission success. Strategic communications, sustainment (manning and logistics), intelligence, planning, operations, command and control, and targeting are just a few of the critical joint functions that must be vertically and horizontally integrated within the inter-organizational, multilateral landscape. An important factor is how these staff functions support the commander’s decision cycle and how they enable educated decisions. In the eye of this perfect storm, commanders and staffs must consistently adapt and learn in order to maintain mission success.

Joint Staff J7 Deployable Training Teams

Fortune 500 companies spend millions of dollars on external teams to study and evaluate numerous aspects of their business functions, operations, and industry in order to get an alternate view or additional perspective on their unique challenges. Because it is often those who are too close to the problem that have the hardest time identifying the solution, outside agencies can offer powerful recommendations based on industry best practices, which can yield a significant return on investment. This is very similar to the Joint Staff J7 Deployable Training Team (DTT) approach.

To understand who and what a DTT is, a good place to start is to describe what they are



(U.S. Army photo by Master Sgt. Kevin Doherty, U.S. Army South Public Affairs)

U.S. Army South commanding general at the international bridge connecting Guatemala and Mexico.

not. For many years the DOD establishment had what are called exercise controllers, evaluators, or inspectors to provide feedback on the performance of individual units. They often operated with a zero-defect approach that ultimately ended with either a thumbs-up or thumbs-down grade on performance. They arrived at exercises with detailed check lists, point systems, and rubrics to objectively measure and grade how well a unit performed, along any number of functions or events. This approach often resulted in an adversarial relationship and lack of trust between all parties. The inspectors were well-intentioned professionals who simply followed the prescribed regulations for their functional area. The inspected units, often operating under constrained timelines and juggling multiple priorities and real-world contingencies, would do what they could to check the box, conceal problems, and/or placate the inspectors. In the end, the grade would ultimately mean very little to the operational readiness of the unit, and

did little to help the commander and staff think through the problem-set they faced. Instead of looking “up-and-out,” they were often times forced to look “down-and-in.” In addition, the findings from these reports and inspections were used more as a grading tool for a specific time-in-place instead of an aid to heighten the operational capabilities of the unit. These approaches, while well-intended, often stifled the trust necessary for the commander and staff to build a learning organization and rapidly improve while executing operations. This inefficient system often did more harm than good. This is precisely why the Deployable Training Teams are different.

The Joint Staff DTTs are located in Suffolk, Virginia, under the newly realigned Joint Staff J7. DTTs are organized across the key functional areas of plans, operations, information sharing, intelligence, sustainment, assessment, legal, communications strategy, inter-organizational/inter-agency, and cyber operations. The teams consist



U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Bobby J. Gonzalez/Released

U.S. Marines with Maritime Raid Force, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, listen to a brief after completing gas and oil platform seizure training during Exercise Leading Edge 13.

of professionals from across the military Services, with significant and proven experience in their respective functional area of expertise. Individual team members, called observer/trainers, or O/Ts, are graduates of Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II (JPME II), who undergo a rigorous training and certification regimen once assigned to the DTT. They are subject matter experts (SMEs) trained within their specific functional area and experienced through multiple deployments to both contingency operations and major exercises around the globe. They focus on the strategic and operational art of joint operations in order to enhance the readiness of combatant commands and JTF headquarters. The 2011 publication of *Joint Operations, Insights and Best Practices* describes the DTT as:

“...afforded the unique opportunity to visit and support commanders and staffs of joint headquarters worldwide as they

prepare for, plan, and conduct operations. We [the DTTs] gain ‘insights’ into their challenges and derived solutions. We also analyze and compare techniques and procedures among the different headquarters, reflect on their various challenges, collaborate with other agencies and the Services, and subsequently draw out and refine what we term best practices.”⁵

The teams are formed and deploy globally to support standing exercises, mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs), staff assistance visits (SAVs), and academic seminars. Prior to deploying, the DTT chief will study the supported command’s mission and get guidance from its senior leadership and/or commander on where the team should focus its efforts. The team is then tailored to the supported command’s request and requirements. Once the team is formed, early interaction between the functional O/T and the supported staff counterpart

allows further focus before an event begins. The direct interaction between the O/Ts and their counterparts on the supported command staff enhances the value of the DTT recommendations. These recommendations often come in the form of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) based on insights and best practices observed at other combatant commands and/or JTFs, allowing a “cross-pollination” of best practices globally. O/Ts gather information for future events relative to the supported headquarters and capture positive and successful techniques or methods being applied by the unit under observation. They also note concerns or issues where the supported unit may be struggling—and they can convey those concerns or issues to higher or adjacent units for resolution without judgment.

Every combatant command conducts one or more major exercises per year, which are often supported by the Joint Staff J7. These exercises include US Pacific Command (PACOM) *TERMINAL FURY*, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) *JUDICIOUS RESPONSE*, and US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) *GLOBAL LIGHTNING*. These annual events serve as the framework for command headquarters to exercise joint mission essential tasks (JMET), cross-functional collaboration, and complex problem solving. The DTT offers academics leading up to the exercise, provides direct observational training and support during the exercise, and for *UNITED ENDEAVOR* events,⁶ follow-up with assistance 60 to 90 days after the headquarters has deployed forward to theater. This support provides commanders with multiple touch-points over a period of time as the command transitions through training, work-ups, and deployment. The DTT also works closely with the Service training organizations such as the Army’s Mission Command Training Program (MCTP), the Navy’s Maritime Operation Center (MOC) Training Team, and the Marine Corps’ MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) to provide a comprehensive framework for the supported command’s joint training efforts. Whether the command is training

for deployment or preparing for major contingency operations, the DTTs provide support.

At the end of an event or exercise, the DTT, along with the command leadership, conducts a facilitated after-action review (FAAR). This venue allows continued learning as the commander and his staff discuss the various topics and issues identified during the event. In addition, the DTT provides the commander with a commander’s summary report (CSR) outlining specific recommendations based on observations of the event. The CSR is provided only to the commander and does not belong to the DTT; the supported command has complete control over any further distribution of the report. This requirement is strictly enforced in order to maintain trust and confidence between the supported command and the DTT. As previously noted, the DTT is not an exercise controller or grader. The DTT does not certify the command or issue a performance evaluation on anyone. The DTT simply provides recommendations based on best practices, along with functional area coaching and mentoring.

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Over the course of fiscal years 2013 and 2014, the DTTs anticipate supporting 56 events around the world, including combatant command exercises, deployments to commands throughout Afghanistan, and multiple joint task force events. In addition, members of the DTT continue to support the *UNITED ENDEAVOR* series of exercises to train units prior to rotation into Afghanistan, including MRXs and SAVs.

Insights and Best Practices

One of the greatest benefits the DTT brings to a combatant command or CJTF are the insights and best practices captured from other commands. The DTT can shorten the delay between current

practices and doctrine development. As the former JFCOM and CENTCOM commander, General James Mattis, often remarked, “Doctrine is the last refuge of the unimaginative.”⁷ The DTT is not doctrinally “bound” but uses doctrinally “sound” practices. The DTT looks at doctrine as a starting point that establishes a common frame of reference. From there, the DTT tries to fill the gap between the necessities and current best practices being used on the ground and what current doctrine has to offer. The DTT also publishes focus papers on insights and best practices captured from combatant commands and CJTFs within each of the above listed functional areas. Not every JTF or combatant command is the same; each has its own unique challenges within its area of responsibility (AOR) or functional responsibilities, and with those difficulties come unique approaches to addressing challenges. The DTT’s goal is to capture those approaches and share them across the combatant commands and JTFs.

the DTT enables combatant commands and JTFs to assess their processes and capabilities and offers best-practice improvements

Recent DTT support to both US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and US Army South (ARSOUTH) during their INTEGRATED ADVANCE exercise in February 2013 proved beneficial to both commanders. INTEGRATED ADVANCE was a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) exercise based on a scenario of mass migration within the Caribbean waters. This exercise required both HQs to collaborate and integrate their efforts with US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other US departments and agencies. Numerous recommendations from the DTT helped the DOD commanders make significant decisions in preparing their headquarters for potential support to humanitarian operations. Major General Frederick Rudesheim, the ARSOUTH commander who led

the JTF HQs during the exercise, stated, “We knew we could always improve if required to execute a JTF-level HADR operation. The question was where and how could we focus our efforts in order to prepare. The DTT was an integral partner in helping my staff self-assess and take our training to the next level.”

The complexity of the INTEGRATED ADVANCE exercise required significant collaboration at multiple levels, between numerous stakeholders. Having two DTTs observing the exercise at both commands enabled a vertical, integrated view for the commanders and their staffs during this high-operational, unified-action event. After the exercise, both commanders and their staffs were able to pinpoint required training and specific process development, in order to increase the speed and accuracy of the commander’s decisions during these complex operations. Major General Rudesheim also stated, “The significance of the observations and recommendations provided by the DTT can’t be overstated. Having an external eye during the exercise enabled my staff to focus their valuable time on improving specific processes and procedures.”

The Future

Today’s joint operating environment is rapidly changing and increasingly more complex; it will continue to challenge our efforts, regardless of the geographic location of the combatant command or JTF. U.S. military forces must remain committed to operating in a unified-action manner, in a fiscally constrained environment. Joint force commanders and their staffs should leverage every tool available to them to effectively respond to these challenges – the DTT is one of those tools. The DTT enables combatant commands and JTFs to assess their processes and capabilities and offers best-practice improvements.

Governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations can also leverage the DTT in developing ways and means to synchronize their efforts while collaborating with combatant

commands and JTFs. Involving the DTT in inter-agency and multi-organizational exercises will enable heightened learning for future civil-military cooperation, especially as the DTT will ensure the capture and sharing of observed best practices and lessons learned from these events. During major exercises and multi-tiered headquarters training events, joint commanders and their staffs could benefit from DTT insights while involving multiple stakeholders. More importantly, before and during the forward deployment of joint headquarters, the DTT will offer unique and innovative methods that have proven results within a battlespace. **PRISM**

Notes

¹The quote is attributed to Winston Churchill and was accessed on 2 January 2012 at <http://www.military-quotes.com/Churchill.htm>.

²Joint Futures Group J59, *The Joint Operating Environment* (US Joint Forces Command, 2010).

³The quote is attributed to Winston Churchill and was accessed on 2 January 2012 at <http://www.military-quotes.com/Churchill.htm>.

⁴C. West Churchman, "Guest Editorial," *Management Science*, 14, no. 4 (December 1967).

⁵General Gary Luck (Ret), *Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices*, Third Edition (Suffolk, Virginia: US Joint Forces Command, Joint Training Division, Joint Warfighting Center, 2011).

⁶UNIFIED ENDEAVOR series exercises are semi-annual, joint, operational-level exercises designed for joint task force component commanders and their staffs.

⁷General James Mattis, "Keynote Speech," *Joint Warfighters Con*

U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. William T. Greeson Jr./Released



U.S. Marines en route to stabilization operation, May 25, 2009

Response to the Decade of War

By James Dobbins

Last summer, in response to a directive from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey, the Joint Staff issued a short summary of lessons learned from the past decade of military operations. The document, entitled *Decade of War, Volume 1* frankly and cogently acknowledges mistakes made over this period, and particularly during the first half of the decade, that is to say between the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 and the surge of troops into Iraq in early 2007. Among the admitted deficiencies were the failure to adequately grasp the operating environment, a reliance on conventional tactics to fight unconventional enemies, an inability to articulate a convincing public narrative, and poor interagency coordination. The document is testimony to the capacity of the American military for self-criticism and eventual correction, albeit not always in time to avoid costly setbacks.

This Joint Staff critique nevertheless fails to address two of the most serious errors of that first half-decade. The most glaring mistake was the decision to attack Iraq on the basis of an erroneous intelligence assessment. Surely there can be few greater failings than to invade a country by mistake. Blame for this failure has fallen principally on Central Intelligence Agency and its then Director, George Tenet. Yet among the multiple American intelligence agencies, several of the most important of which are lodged in the Defense Department and headed by serving military officers, only the tiny intelligence bureau of the State Department demurred from the judgments that Saddam Hussein had active WMD programs and indeed

actual such weapons, neither of which turned out to be true.

The second major point on which *Decade of War* is silent is any judgment regarding the level of forces originally committed to the post-conflict stabilization of Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq. The document acknowledges that the planning for this phase of both operations was inadequate, but it makes no mention of the most serious effect of that flaw, which was the failure to deploy forces numerous enough for the purpose in either country. As with the flawed assessment of Iraqi WMD, the Bush administrations civilian leaders were ultimately responsible for this error as well. Some senior officers, most notably then Army

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U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Pete Thibodeau/Released

The Counterinsurgency Field Manual produced in 2006 under General David Petraeus' direction recommends a force of one soldier for each fifty inhabitants.

Chief of Staff Erik Shinseki, argued for a larger occupation force, but his was a rather isolated voice within the country's top military leadership.

the fact that troop strength had to be continuously increased through 2007 in Iraq and 2011 in Afghanistan is pretty compelling evidence that the original levels were too low

This second omission may be the more consequential than the first, since it represents not simply a glossing over of a now widely acknowledged failure, but rather reflects a continued inability to come to closure on a still controversial issue. No one contests that American intelligence estimates on Iraq were flawed. As a result, measures have been put into effect to reduce the prospect of any repetition. By contrast, there is continued debate between those who argue that the United States

put too few troops into Afghanistan and Iraq in the immediate aftermath of conventional conflict, and those who argue that it put in too many.

By 2011 United States had ten times more soldiers in Afghanistan than it had in the year after its entry. In Iraq American commanders actually began to reduce the number of troops as soon as Baghdad fell. That decision was reversed as an insurgency developed, but the American troop presence in Iraq only reached its peak of 160,000 in late 2007, four years after the emergence of a violent resistance movement. In both countries, local insurgencies were thus given abundant space and time to recruit, organize, and intimidate the population, leaving the United States to belatedly reinforce its military presence only under threat of strategic defeat.

Decade of War acknowledges those early military setbacks, but blames them solely on insufficient situational awareness, inappropriate tactics, poor public communications and inadequate

interagency coordination. All of these factors contributed to the reverses suffered during these early years, but the fact that troop strength had to be continuously increased through 2007 in Iraq and 2011 in Afghanistan is pretty compelling evidence that the original levels were too low. So why not say so?

The success of the 2007 surge of American troops into Iraq seemed, for a while, to have resolved the debate within the American military and beyond between those who argued that more and those that argued that fewer forces would be more efficacious in securing each of those countries. General Colin Powell's doctrine of decisive force (and General Shinseki's reservations about the planned Iraq occupation force) seemed to have been vindicated and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's preference for low profile post conventional combat footprints repudiated. Unfortunately, the more limited success produced by a similar surge into Afghanistan in 2010 may provide new grist for the mills of those who argue that less is more in such circumstances.

One can certainly argue that the expense of stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq has proved inordinate, that the United States should have confined itself to mere punitive responses in either case, and that whatever the provocation, the United States should not invade and occupy large adversary states in the future. Explicitly acknowledging the manpower and money costs of occupation is indeed a good way to drive this lesson home.

The Counterinsurgency Field Manual produced in 2006 under General David Petraeus' direction recommends a force of one soldier for each fifty inhabitants, or five hundred thousand for a country the size of Iraq, which is about the number actually reached in 2007, including the newly raised and trained Iraqi forces. Acceptance of this figure as an ideal, if not absolutely essential goal in 2003 would have militated against disbanding the Iraqi army and for a much larger American occupation force than was initially deployed. Alternatively, recognition of the need for a force

of this magnitude might well have scotched the whole idea of invading Iraq.

The Obama administration has explicitly embraced the view that counterinsurgency is too resource intensive to be done, at least by Americans, on any but a very small scale. But policies can change overnight, whereas military adaptation to unforeseen circumstances takes much longer, as *Decade of War* makes abundantly clear. Creating a doctrinal basis for sizing large-scale stabilization missions (or extending that in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) to stability operations more generally) will encourage skeptical questioning when such ventures are considered in the future, but will also help ensure that these are appropriately resourced if embarked upon. Rather than sweep this controversial issue under the rug on the grounds that the United States not going to engage in operations of this scale any more, our military authorities should include force sizing among those matters critically examined in the light of the past decade of war. **PRISM**

An Interview with Dennis Blair

What lessons have you personally drawn from the decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Blair: The decade of war is really two decades of war—from the time the Cold War ended in about 1989 through the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the involvement of the United States in a series of individual military actions. What I’ve learned is that we need to do a better job thinking these conflicts all the way through before we engage in them. Because it turns out that we are relearning an old lesson, which is the use of military force is only a part of improving a situation and protecting American interests in a particular country or region. Too often, we think that a military victory itself will cause the desired result. In fact many other factors come in to play; economic development, social development, government improvement. These are not accomplished by the U.S. alone, and certainly not by American military force alone, but often with allies and other partners, and with other civilian capabilities. I think we have not thought them through carefully as to the end state that we are trying to achieve. Next we need to be realistic about the resources that are required; military, civil, and other. I’m afraid these are old lessons that need to be relearned, not new lessons, but they certainly have been borne out as some of the shortcomings of the interventions we have made in recent years. I would add, by the way,

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Wikipedia

that I am not one who says our military interventions since 1989 have all been disasters. I think on the whole they have made the world a better place; bad people who were around then aren’t around now, from Manuel Noriega to Saddam Hussein through Slobodan Milosevic and others; so it is not that our military interventions have been wasted. On the contrary—but we need to make sure that we get the maximum possible benefit from them and intervene in a smart way.

You have just published an impressive book on the role of the armed forces in democratic transitions.¹ What inspired you in that effort?

Blair: It was my personal experiences. I served in the Pacific in 1998 through 2002 and watched Indonesia in particular go through a transition from an autocratic government to a

democratic system of government; and watching the Indonesian armed forces both partially lead that effort and partially be dragged along with it. I realized that I could have done a better job when I was Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC); that I could have been better informed about civil-military dynamics in that country. I could have played a stronger role in my interaction with the Indonesian armed forces. The Philippines were also going through troubles at that time – there was the so-called EDSA II Movement, similar to the one that ousted Ferdinand Marcos years earlier, and I realized thinking back over it that senior military officers – in fact all military leaders, can contribute to helping other countries move towards democracy. At a minimum they can keep from gumming it up in our military relations.

Often our military relations are one of the more powerful bonds we have with other countries yet we do not use them as effectively as we should for this purpose. In addition I guess finally that promoting democratic development is probably the single most important long-term thing that the U.S. can do to make the world the kind of place that we, the U.S. and our friends, would like to live in. So that was the impetus for the book.

Now that you have surveyed historically a lot of other transitions in addition to those in the Pacific, is there any common trend or were there decision points that you found amongst those various examples that can tilt the quality of the armed forces engagement in one direction, say towards democratization or the other direction toward military autocracy?

Blair: I found there were several keys. I should say first that the role of outsiders – and military officers who work with other countries are definitely outsiders – is secondary to what is going on within the country itself when big movements are under way in countries that are experiencing a change in governance. So we shouldn't delude ourselves that we can sit there like a master puppeteer

and manipulate what is going on in these countries. However, what we can do is understand what is going on in the countries and have a much finer understanding of the role that the armed forces are playing within these countries; which generals and admirals are playing positive roles moving their countries towards democracy, and which are really playing negative roles and supporting dictators that are oppressing their people. We can cooperate better with other countries that have military contact with them. The U.S. has the most extensive engagement program worldwide, but other countries have historical ties that can be very important for individual countries. I think we also have to understand the roles that the armed forces play within their societies in these countries, which are quite different from what they are in established democracies. Understanding all of this – basically trying to help a country move to a more democratic system using the military to military bond that we all have who serve in uniform. I think our armed forces can play, if not a decisive, certainly a positive role. The one bar that you hear about is the notion that somehow we need these other countries for strategic military purposes and therefore we should not push them too hard on what kind of government they ought to have. This was certainly true in the Cold War; anybody who was a friend of ours against the Soviet Union was not looked at too hard in terms of its government. The modern equivalent of that situation are oil-producing countries or countries that are supporting the U.S. against terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. What I found is that this is an over-simplistic contradiction. In fact, we can do both; we can work for gradual transition to democracy at the same time that we cooperate with these countries on common objectives, which are their objectives as well as ours.

Can I ask you to parse one part of the statement that you just made? You said that we should be sensitive to the different roles that militaries play in other countries vice

our own country. Could you elaborate that a little bit? What are some of the different roles played by militaries in our partner countries?

Blair: To an extent that we no longer grasp – since our independence history is 250 years in the past now – many of these countries won their independence in recent years through military force, and their armed forces feel they have a responsibility for how their country moves. It was true in virtually all the countries in Latin America for example. They obtained their freedom by military revolutions. In addition in many cases the armed forces are the best functioning, most organized, most advanced organizations within a country and therefore have both power and prestige. They feel a sense of responsibility for what goes on in their country, and have independent sources of power and prestige. These armed forces are in a much more powerful position in their countries than we are in ours. It is no good to simply say to them, “Subordinate yourselves to civilian control and give away power. Establish a ministry of defense. Give up all of your factories and other forms of economic enterprises that you run.” That advice will fall on deaf ears. You have to appeal to the military leaders’ sense of patriotism, the good side of their sense of responsibility for where their country goes, and convince them. And it’s not a difficult sell that both their armed forces, they personally, and their countries are better off under a more representative democratic system.

In your forthcoming book you refer to, and I quote, “Influencing the guys with the guns.” What kinds of skills should our armed forces try to develop and convey to foreign counterparts to influence the guys with the guns?

Blair: I think we have the skills on the influencing side. When you are with a military counterpart from any other country you have a lot in common. You probably joined your armed forces

for roughly the same sorts of reasons. If you are navy officers, you have bonds, if you are an army officer you have bonds with an army officer. There is a certain sympathetic understanding just by the nature of being in the same profession. The key is to turn that influence and sometimes even friendship into convincing the other person that in the long run for himself, his service, and his country, a democratic system of government is the best. The underlying advantage that democracy has over a dictatorship from a military officer’s point of view is that democracy will not order you as a military officer out into the streets to gun down your fellow citizens, to support a government that is disliked by most of its citizens; and that is something that military officers just don’t want to do, as it goes against their basic ethic. On top of that, there is a series of ways that have been worked out for armed forces in democratic governments to play a respected, honored, and personally satisfying role without being in charge. We can point around the world to the waves of democratic development which have moved most of the world in that direction and talk to our counterparts in other countries and say, “Get on the tide of history, do the right thing for your country in the right way.”

How can we avoid the kinds of mistakes that have been made in the past, where for example the U.S. supported military leaders that became dictators?

Blair: I don’t think we are going to ever hit 100% in that category, or that every single military leader in a dictatorship will become a democracy advocate. However, I think we can be smarter if we look at it as a question, do our intelligence work, compare notes and know who these people are. In my own experience in Indonesia it was pretty clear that there were two factions within the Indonesian armed forces; one led by General Wiranto that was committed to democratic reforms; and one led by General Prabowo that was not. It turned out we had a lot more contact with General Prabowo

than we did with General Wiranto, but what was needed was a recognition of which leader was better for the long-term goals that we thought were right in Indonesia, and to back that one and not the other. It is also a case of doing both things at one time. For example take the recent experience in Mali – although I don't know all of the inside details. Apparently we trained a lieutenant colonel battalion commander and a very confident counter terrorism force and it turned out that he and most of his battalion conducted a coup against the government. We did the tactical training fine but either we didn't evaluate, educate, or talk with him about these larger questions which I think should be carried along with all of the activities that we do. I think we need to be smart about identifying and then backing the people that we think are going to be good for their country in the long-term and certainly not support or even block those who are not.

In your book you point out and describe quite a few different mechanisms of military to military relations and tools available for promoting democratization of armed forces; confidence building visits, exchange programs, training and education, joint exercises, just to name a few. In your experience and in your analysis are there any that have worked more effectively than others or any that we should focus on as opposed to others?

Blair: I think the one that has had the best long-term payoff has been the presence of international students in our higher military education institutions, whether they are here at the National Defense University, the service war colleges, or at the staff colleges. The experiences of officers who come over and actually live in this country are an extremely important way to maximize influence. In the book I point out some ways that we can improve these experiences, but the basic idea is good. At the other end of the spectrum, [we need to influence] the actions of the armed forces during a government crisis in another country

– Egypt was a recent example when it was pretty clear that President Mubarak was leaving and that the Egyptian armed forces were going to allow him to go. At that time there happened to be a high-ranking Egyptian military delegation here in Washington for meetings. So naturally the meetings with their counterparts included advice from American officers that they [Egyptian military leaders] needed to take the side of their own people, not the side of the dictator, and so on. However, my experience is that when you get to one of these crises it is rare that you have the right people with the right contacts in the right jobs to talk with counterparts. For instance, in my own case, as the Indonesian crisis was well underway when I became the Commander for PACOM, I didn't yet have a personal bond with General Wiranto, General Prabowo, or with any of the others. I was trying to get to know them at the same time that I was trying to work with them. However, in the armed forces of the United States, there are many people who have friends in these countries and they maintain friendships over the years. I think we should form virtual joint task forces at the time of a crisis to bring in officers who know counterparts now in key jobs where the crisis is. My recommendation is – and I was able to do a little of this when I was on active duty, but much more can be done – to find the people who do have the contacts, the knowledge of the country but are often in other jobs at the time. Bring them on board. The task force can be headed by a Combatant Commander or by a team here in Washington or whichever way we want to do it, and use those contacts both for information and for influence. On both ends of the spectrum, I think we can up our game, if we realize that this is important and think about how to do it.

Going back to the role of the war colleges and National Defense University for example, is there anything that the joint professional military education system should be doing and anything that it should be developing to

make the U.S. more successful in this kind of undertaking.

Blair: I think there are several things. One of them is that for all the international fellows – and this is true in the UK, France, and Australia as well as in the United States – we teach civil-military relations and the history of civil-military relations in our own country context; the American constitution, the American separation of powers, etc. These may not be the most relevant models to many other countries. In fact, I would say it is probably less relevant in the experiences of countries that have achieved their independence more recently. Instead they will have different structures to get to the same point, which is the right role of the armed forces in a democracy. In our seminars with international students we should teach and talk more generally about the principles of democracy. In the handbook, I lay out seven principles that are characteristic of the role of the armed forces within a democratic country; we should talk about those in general with many examples that are not American or Anglo-Saxon; places like Korea, Japan, Senegal, South Africa, and so on rather than what we have here. That's number one. Number two is that officers from authoritarian countries don't trust what they hear in the classroom; in their own classrooms they are given a lot of propaganda and what comes from the podium is pretty slanted to reflect the current regime's views. When they sit in a classroom in one of our institutions they have this same sort of mistrust. What surveys have found they are impressed by and do pay attention to is what happens outside the wire. Many of them have host-families they are paired up with while they are here; they travel within the U.S.; and what we have learned from many surveys is what really makes an impression on them is how democracy actually works. We should emphasize this for the international students and have them meet successful ex-military officers now in business or working at non-profits, and show them this continuum of service to country that can transcend

their time in uniform. Have them talk to defense reporters who in many cases make the military uncomfortable because they write about leaks and they break stories that we would just assume not be publicized. They are a part of this role of a democratic country controlling and using its armed forces. Have them talk to members of Congress and their staffs who are on authorization or appropriations committees. I think we need to widen and deepen this understanding of the essentials of the armed forces in a democratic society in a much more structured way with our international students than we do currently.

You mentioned several attributes of a military or armed forces within a democratic society; can you elaborate on those you feel are the most important attributes?

Blair: Sure, let me talk about them; they will take different forms in different countries, but these seem to be the primary attributes of organizational relationships with authorities that cement the armed forces into their role in the democratic society. Let me start with the human dimension; in democracies the armed forces have adequate pay, they have the respect of their citizens, they have a fair system for promotion. It seems obvious, but you find in dictatorships this is often not the case; and it matters to military officers. Another important attribute is that the mission of the armed forces is external defense; it is not internal suppression. If you look at the classic example of armies in communist countries, they were explicitly tools of a political party, not of the national government. To this day the People's Liberation Army (in China) answers to the Central Committee (of the Communist Party), which is a party organization, not a national organization in China. Whenever the armed forces are used in democracies for internal missions, everything from humanitarian assistance to suppressing insurgencies, they must be under extremely careful legal and oversight constraints. They have a relatively free

hand in external missions – to attack the enemy and so on – but when they are used internally they are under a different, more careful and temporary set of measures and this is very important. In democratic countries there is a civilian Ministry of Defense that acts as a connective tissue between the high politics of a country and the actual military leaders. This is so that the armed forces are not reporting directly to the president and are not grading their own papers when it comes to budget requests and legal actions. There is a Minister of Defense appointed and confirmed in some fashion in his country that turns over all political direction into military orders and takes the military advice provided by the armed forces and makes sure it is injected into the political system. Building a competent Ministry of Defense turns out to be a more difficult task than you would think, especially in many newly independent countries that are created from scratch, but it is important to have that nonetheless. An open press that comments freely on the armed forces is really a backstop on other processes within the government. If you have a press that has experts on military affairs who are constantly running stories about it, you find that if bad things are going on within the military and are quickly exposed, things are brought to light that might not normally see the light, and that's a good thing. The role of the legislature in overseeing the military is also very important in a democracy. A legislature should not only approve a defense budget, but it should have some expertise and the time and skill to look at the military pieces (of legislation). In many dictatorships there are rubberstamp parliamentary organizations that simply approve what the government puts in; in a democracy the legislature knows what it is doing when it passes the budget and has oversight responsibilities. In addition, the legislature should at a minimum approve senior officers; they should be proposed by the executive branch, but they should have to be confirmed by some form of a legislative branch. Finally, there must be a military justice system, which is integrated into the overall justice system

for the country. You find in many autocratic countries, the military justice system is completely self-sustained and is run by the armed forces. It is not connected to the overall justice system of the country. In a democratic system the military legal system cannot be a self-contained, but must be governed by laws passed by the legislature, and have an appeal system outside the armed forces. Those are some of the major elements, and as you can tell just by my description of them, these are not things you can just snap your fingers and whistle up if you have been under a dictatorship for years or decades. In fact many of these things are the hardest to establish in a newly democratizing country, and the lack of them is often what will allow a country to slip back into a more repressive form of government for a period of time. In many cases of military democratic development there are bumps and starts for a period of years; it doesn't happen miraculously after one demonstration in the town square.

Some of the developments you are describing are cultural and social and very definitely long-term which raises the question, is this kind of effort we are discussing – military to military relations to help armed services of partner countries contribute to democratization in their own country – is that a form of state-building?

Blair: I think it is in the long run. It is a good form of state building. I'm not one who subscribes to the McDonalds theory of democracy; that no two countries that have a McDonalds have ever fought a major war. We have tremendous differences of viewpoint and good strong debates with other democracies around the world. By encouraging democracy around the world, I'm not thinking that this is going to make the role of the U.S. easy in the world, but I think we find over time that those countries that are democratic in their form of government are ones that the U.S. can work with and help us form the kind of world where all of our citizens achieve the things that are important

to them. The needs [of people] to rise according to their merits, the freedoms an individual has, the respect that minorities have, these are the things that we should be working for. I think that military relations can contribute to that long-term goal.

As you said, in many countries the military is the most powerful, best-established, most functional organization in the country. What would you think about the militaries of our partner countries engaging in other internal roles, not internal suppression, but infrastructure development, public education, public health, and those kinds of activities?

Blair: I think that when you look at the development of countries around the world, the armed forces have often played a very important role. One of the ones that I wasn't aware of until I did the research for this book was Senegal, which has a very impressive team. The general in charge of the armed forces and the president [at independence] realized that the armed forces had capabilities in construction, health, and education, and they explicitly turned them (the armed forces) to the task of improving the country. The Senegalese armed forces built bridges in remote areas where no private contractor could go. They established hospitals in areas in which the civilian universities were not educating doctors. I think when it is done as an explicit task under controls, funded by the legislature and openly done; I think it is an important consideration.

We have also seen areas in which it has boomeranged and one of those has been the Philippines. For example, the armed forces were thrown into the fight against insurgent forces around the Philippine islands and found that in many cases they were the only ones fighting the insurgencies, that local government officials were corrupt or didn't care. And this made the officers very cynical – in fact it fueled their feeling that they needed to mount coups and change the government. It is important that when you turn the armed forces to

the task of helping the country that they are not the only ones doing it and it is not done as a substitute for these other parts that the government needs to be doing. So it is important, but it needs to be done right.

Since we are talking about a form of state-building, and a range of internal engagements, when the U.S. military is engaging with their counterparts how should they divide the labor between U.S. military and the civilian agencies that have been more traditionally engaged in development and state-building such as the State Department and USAID.

Blair: That question has been a big one ever since the end of the Cold War, in these 20 years that we have been involved in combat operations, and then rebuilding operations in other countries. We have plenty of very good examples and we have plenty of pretty bad examples. I think that what we've learned is that the use of actual military forces to accomplish a particular civilian civil task should be quite limited. If you need a bridge to get to an area where food has to be distributed, that is something that the Seabees or their equivalents in other services could do. If you need to get grain to a starving part of a country, then put it on C-130s and get it there. It is pretty limited and short term compared to the development needs of even the smallest country. In fact, if you look at what can actually be done by outside groups in these areas, again the inherent capacity of outsiders to come in and actually do things is pretty limited compared to the needs of people. The real key is to build the capacity of a country to undertake these activities themselves. In addition, if outsiders do these things [initially] at some point there needs to be a transition to the people in that country doing it, and the more that is done by the outsiders the more difficult it is to make that transition. In general, you should be limited in the number of things done either by the foreign military forces or by other outside forces in a country. You should

push very hard trying to help the local sector, both government and private, to do it. What this means is that you need to have a longer time horizon. Many international efforts to put countries back on their feet are driven by getting this done in a few months or years and then moving on to other ones. It is just very difficult to build the kind of sustainable capacity for these things in that short a time. I think we need to, back to my answer in your first question, be realistic about time frames, capabilities, and their importance as we go into these situations. The armed forces can play a role, but I think their primary roles in most of these situations we have been talking about are to provide security and then to help security forces in that country provide security. These are essential so that non-military functions can resume.

Admiral Blair I want to thank you for this conversation, but before we conclude I would like to ask you if you would like to share any additional insights or any other alibies from your forthcoming book?

Blair: The single most important thing we can do in this regard is to place the support to a democratic transition up as a high priority for our military relations. If we give that direction to our Combatant Commands, to our military colleges, to our commanders who are going out visiting countries or doing exercises, to our sergeants and non-commissioned officers who are working in many countries around the world, and if we work with the other democracies as partners in this venture, then the great officers and non-commissioned officers and troops in our armed forces and those of the other democracies will go to town on it and really do it well. I think it is really a case of not being seduced by this idea that you can either have oil or you can have democracy, you can either have a good counter terrorist program or you can have democracy, but to place democratic development as a high priority is the key and then good things will follow after that. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions (Volume One: Overview), Dennis Blair, Brookings Press, March 27, 2013.w

Book Review

The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War

By Fred Kaplan

Simon & Shuster, 2013

422 pp., \$14.99

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REVIEWED BY JEFF RICE

Fred Kaplan's *The Insurgents* is a highly successful and compelling intermingling of three stories: the rise and eventual fall of General David Petraeus; the intellectual history of counterinsurgency; and the broadening of the learning culture within the United States Military during the Iraq war. Indeed, the heroes of the book are the "insurgents" within the U.S. Army who all but overthrew the dominant paradigm of kinetic warfare in favor of ideas derived from England and France during the end of the colonial era.¹ Kaplan's book picks up on the story told by Tom Ricks in *The Gamble*² about how this intellectual insurgency transformed the way the U.S. fought the war in Iraq, preferring the counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to protecting civilians from insurgents and lowering their casualty rate, and building alliances in order to reduce the number of insurgents. For Kaplan this is nothing short of a profound alteration of the American way of war, one that caused enormous consternation amongst certain sectors of the military who were wedded to a more conventional approach to war.

To this point Kaplan is telling a story others have told. A perusal of journals such as *Small Wars*

Journal, *Military Review*, *Army*, and *Parameters* makes clear that within the military establishment this was a widely debated transformation. It is this debate that Kaplan is so effective in reproducing in this book; indeed, as in his earlier book, *The Wizards of Armageddon*³, he is able to weave intellectual history through good old-fashioned anecdotes (if not gossip) to show the institutional ebbs and flows of innovational eclecticism in its confrontation with institutional conservatism. If computational analysis leading to rational decision-making is the central argument for *Wizards*, then COIN is the heart of *Insurgents*. And just as Kaplan finds the comedy and tragedy of the RAND "geek squad" in the 50s and 60s, he is able to locate similar narrative tensions in the Iraq War. If the assessment fetish of RAND types led to some real errors in Vietnam, the Vietnam War was truly in the rear view mirror for the COIN advocates in Iraq.

It is important at this point to consider the context from which counterinsurgency emerged, namely the attempt on the part of the British and French to preserve their empire. From the novel *The Centurions*, through the work of David Galula (a French military officer who fought in Algeria, Indochina, and advised the U.S. in Vietnam), John Nagle, David Kilcullen, and David Petraeus became increasingly aware of the principles espoused in the practice of counterinsurgency. Within the COIN paradigm, war is 80% political, 20% military; protect civilians and do not try and create insurgents through collateral damage. Kaplan is not afraid to invoke the key variable in all this when he speaks of the U.S. having a legitimate government with which to partner. He is quick to point this out with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan, but inadequately notes that past French and British efforts at counterinsurgency failed because they had no legitimate government with which to partner. It is uncanny to me, at this late date, that there are no references in

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Nagl or in other authors, that recognize a critical flaw in the French or British strategy: the goal of preserving empire. Kaplan understands that there are two key obstacles that must be talked before COIN can succeed: the legitimacy of the government in office, and the counterinsurgent force not being perceived as an occupying army.

I would argue that counterinsurgency, as a means of defeating rebel nationalist forces, has historically been a near total failure. Many would point to the counter example of Malaysia—an atypical case since in order to bring non-Chinese Malays into alliance against the Communists, British General, Sir Harold Briggs had to promise them independence from the United Kingdom. Also, the “enemy” was immediately identifiable as they were Chinese, not Malay. Briggs’ own plan to establish secure villages succeeded because the land to which peasants were moved was better than they had previously occupied. In a private conversation with David Kilcullen, he made the point that unlike Vietnamese villagers whose roots in their home hamlets went far back, the Malays’ were not. If you add the pioneering counterinsurgency against Mau Mau in Kenya, the British won the war, lost the peace, and Kenya became independent in spite of the best efforts of the settler population.

One of the key features of COIN is the expectation of cultural and linguistic awareness. Becoming an occupying force is antithetical to this, and Kaplan is well aware that it stands to generate a countervailing nationalist force. Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki both objected to being run over by American policies prompting Petraeus and others to threaten them with American fiscal and military withdrawal. “Karzai threw a fit. He told them, ‘I have three main enemies’—[the Taliban, the United States, and the international community]—and ‘if I had to choose today, I’d choose the Taliban!’”⁴

The Insurgents takes off when Kaplan details the gap between what Washington thinks is going on and what is actually transpiring in Tel Afar and Mosul. Improvising on the ground, General

Herbert McMaster and Petraeus actually garner success in terms of winning the peace. This is defined as bringing warring factions to the table, negotiating power sharing, and identifying some common enemies (usually Al Qaeda in Iraq). Fighting against the ineffective policies of the former Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator, Paul Bremer and much of President George W. Bush’s Pentagon team, there were some significant advances made by employing some modifications of Galula’s strategy.

This brings us to another key argument of Kaplan’s book about not quite playing by the rules while simultaneously innovating. The concept of “clear and hold” was not new to this war. It was difficult in a manner that is true for many irregular wars. It was adding “build” to the equation that constituted the biggest challenge. Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli took the lead in this pursuit by developing the notion of SWET (sewage, water, electricity, and trash collection).⁵ Chiarelli innovated in the face of the \$18.6 billion that was allocated for reconstruction. Securing a mere \$100 million, he went into Sadr City (where months earlier his own soldiers were being shot at) and hired locals to build a landfill and “lay PVC pipe to remove ankle high sewage from the streets.”⁶ When General George Casey and Ambassador John Negroponte put an end to the project the Mahdi army resumed their attacks.

What for me was one of the strongest moments in Kaplan’s book—perhaps because it was one of the deeper instances of progress in opening up the learning culture within the U.S. Army—was the incorporation of data surveys to pinpoint insurgent activity. Of course, this is a throwback to both the so-called *Wizards of Armageddon*, but also the flawed data collection and misinterpretation conducted by RAND in Vietnam. For Vietnam, one only has to look at the Hamlet Evaluation Surveys⁷ as well as the Bombing Survey. In neither case was the data collected understood; indeed, it was too frequently misunderstood to the point of creating “accidental guerillas.”⁸

In Iraq, some of this task was left to three women on General Ray Odierno's staff, known locally as "the coven." By analyzing the data on bomb-making sites and "the supply routes they followed into Baghdad,"⁹ they were able to map the homes and transportation networks of the various militias, especially where these points intersected with the resulting friction. However, it was the interpretation of this data, which made the difference.

This discovery wasn't merely interesting: it uncovered a major flaw in the impending plan for President Bush's troop surge. Putting all five of the extra Army brigades in Baghdad wouldn't solve the problem, because the bombs were being built—and the militias inside Baghdad were being supplied—by extremist leaders in the belts outside the capital. At least some of the brigades had to attack the belts and interdict the supply routes.¹⁰

While not meaning to suggest that data collection and interpretation was new to the surge, I think Kaplan is right on target when demonstrating that the use of this data within the context of COIN presented a more holistic analysis of hostile actors. This geographical mapping allowed a targeted response that, at least in theory, could keep the civilian casualties down.

It is worth noting that the quarterly reports the Military provided Congress for Iraq contain some of the most fascinating data we can imagine for measuring progress in a war. In contrast to the Hamlet Evaluation Survey in Vietnam, this data provided quarterly progress on violent incidents, civilian deaths, and U.S. troops lost, but also information about electricity and running water provided both in Baghdad and nationwide. On the assumption that the United States broke the electric grid and given the nature of Iraqi weather, to not have electricity posed quite a problem for civilian relations. To get electricity up and running was a measure of progress (albeit very slow and frustrating).

By the time Kaplan gets to Afghanistan the flaws in COIN become palpable. Concepts like

government legitimacy are frequently mentioned within the text; in its absence the struggle to stabilize and nation build become nearly impossible. In Afghanistan, to this day, the quandary as the U.S. prepares to leave is which insurgent movement, which warlords, which factions of the Taliban can the U.S. work with should the Karzai government fail. In Kaplan's view Iraq worked better, perhaps because the U.S. could more effectively leverage Maliki into cooperation; perhaps because there was a tradition of central government that was more recognizable than that in Afghanistan. Perhaps, it was more likely because the U.S. was able, at critical moments, to undo some of Bremer's errors, put militants on our payroll (Sons of Iraq), flip some other groups (including, for a time, the Sadr Brigade), and utilize counterterrorism to neutralize AQ and other hostiles who were preying on the population.¹¹

This is Fred Kaplan's story, but what makes this a most invaluable book is the manner in which this tale is woven into the organizational analysis of a fundamentally conservative institution with a very slow learning curve. John Nagl, in his now classic *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*¹², makes the case that the U.S. Army learns and forgets only to learn and forget again. David Petraeus' ambition led him to take on the intellectual and institutional restraints the Army had to offer.¹³ His victory led to some success in Iraq, but not so much in Afghanistan. Kaplan provides a ready-at-hand explanation as to why Afghanistan has not succeeded on the one hand, and why Petraeus personally succeeded on the other. In just a few pages at the end of the book Kaplan lays out Petraeus' final downfall. The brevity of this account reflects the tragic ending at the length it deserves.

If one were looking to read one book on COIN or the Iraq War, Fred Kaplan's *The Insurgents* might well be the one to choose. There are some missing aspects (namely, a discussion of the real intellectual flaws behind a strategy originally designed to save the empire), but one should be careful to avoid reviewing the book one wishes the author

had written rather than the one in hand. This is a terrific addition to the literature of the modern American way of war, and while many soldiers might not want to participate in Military Operations Other Than Warfare, the war against extremism indicates that this is in America's future. **PRISM**

educational process. Whether it is in the books by the ubiquitous Emma Sky or Sarah Sewall or the many Kagans, this is its own story.

Notes

¹ This group would include, *inter alia*, General David Petraeus himself, John Nagl and David Kilcullen (early importers of counterinsurgency theory), Andrew Krepenevich, Herbert McMaster, Conrad Crane, Sarah Sewall, Kalev Sepp, Peter Chiarelli, Celeste Ward, and Emma Sky. The latter would include, *inter alia*, David Galula, Bernard Fall, and T.E. Lawrence.

² Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).

³ Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (Stanford: University Press, 1991).

⁴ Kaplan, *Op. Cit.*, 346.

⁵ Kaplan, *Op. Cit.*, 185.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ During the Vietnam war, the Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HEM) counted the number of communists "eliminated" or "rallied" (those who joined the government) and the number of villages under South Vietnamese control. See, Robert K. Brigham, *Iraq, Vietnam, and the Limits of American Power* (Philadelphia: PublicAffairs, Perseus Book Group, 2006) 47.

⁸ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford: University Press, 2009). It has only been in the last decade that Stathis Kalyvas and his students at Yale have reanalyzed the data in an effort to determine what we could have been learning had we made a better effort to think the data collection techniques and results through.

⁹ Kaplan, *Op. Cit.*, 257-58.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ For the best account of on-the-ground operations against Iraqi hostiles, especially behind insurgent lines, see J.B. Walker *Nightcap at Dawn: Ameriban Souldiers' Counterinsurgency in Iraq* (New York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2012).

¹² John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat the Soup with a Knife* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005).

¹³ Another piece to this story, which Kaplan addresses, is the role civilian and semi-civilian advisors played in this



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