



AND



FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

# CALL FOR PAPERS:

## Irregular Warfare

### Lessons Learned Since 9/11

The Department of Defense's Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) and the Foreign Policy Research Institute's (FPRI) Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare will co-host a two-day conference on September 17 and 18, 2024, to discuss irregular warfare lessons learned since 9/11 at the U.S. Naval Institute Jack C. Taylor Conference Center, Annapolis, Maryland.

***This is a call for papers in support of the conference.***

The conference aims to capture lessons learned, including positive and negatives examples, in the conduct of irregular warfare operations around the world by U.S., allied, and partner nations and non-state actors after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Submissions should describe lessons learned from one of seven conference topics: Information Operations; Human Terrain; Logistics, Supply, and Maintenance Operations; Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Operations; Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities; Engaging with Partner Forces; and Utilizing Local Police and Militia Forces in a Counterinsurgency. While Afghanistan and Iraq were the most prominent of the post-9/11 wars, the conference welcomes papers that draw on lessons learned from irregular warfare operations in the Philippines, Horn of Africa, the Sahel region of Africa, or elsewhere. Some suggested sub-topics within the seven main areas are:



## **INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

- How did enemy misinformation and/or disinformation efforts affect U.S and Coalition operational planning and execution?
- How were U.S. and Coalition information operations integrated into various post-9/11 irregular warfare campaigns and what specific effects did they produce?
- How did units determine measures of effectiveness for their information operations?

## **HUMAN TERRAIN**

- How did an understanding of Human Terrain (e.g. an understanding of the local population's culture, politics, alliances, sponsors, patronage, and likely contacts with the adversary) support irregular warfare operations and conversely how did misunderstandings hamper them.
- How did misunderstanding the human terrain in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere affect long-term stability?
- What was missed in human terrain analysis that led to not anticipating Afghanistan's rapid fall to the Taliban after the U.S. withdrawal?
- How useful were Human Terrain Teams and how were they best employed? Were Human Terrain Teams able to inform commanders as to who their enemies were and who their allies were in the local population and why?

## **LOGISTICS/SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE**

- What were the main logistical, supply, and maintenance challenges in the various irregular warfare campaigns after 9/11 for U.S. forces and how were these overcome?
- What were the main challenges in developing logistical, supply, and maintenance capabilities with indigenous partners and how can these efforts be improved upon in the future?
- Can any lessons learned in these areas can be applied to future conventional warfare operations against peer competitors?

## **MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY OPERATIONS**

- What new advances were made in medical, dental, and veterinary operations after 9/11 and how did these come about?
- Were Coalition Forces adequately trained to provide prolonged field care to combat casualties when there was a lack of MEDEVAC platforms?
- How were medical, dental, and veterinary operations used during counterinsurgency operations, what were the best practices for incorporating them into a campaign plan, and could they have been used more effectively?



## **INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

- How well did we integrate with indigenous intelligence networks and how adequate or useful were they in providing information that could not have been collected by our own assets?
- What intelligence and counterintelligence gaps were identified during post-9/11 irregular warfare operations and how were these gaps addressed?
- What specific instances where there when understanding the human terrain assisted in conducting intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
- What were our greatest weaknesses regarding intelligence and counterintelligence activities in post-9/11 irregular warfare operations and what is needed to fix these weaknesses for future contingencies?

## **ENGAGING WITH PARTNER FORCES**

- What were the best practices for engaging with allied and indigenous military, paramilitary, and guerrilla forces?
- What aspects of U.S. culture (military and civilian) kept us from better engaging with allied and indigenous forces?
- How should partnering be done in the future with regards to the selection, training, and support of U.S. advisors assigned to partner forces?

## **UTILIZING LOCAL POLICE AND MILITIA FORCES IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY**

- How were local police and militia forces best utilized in a counterinsurgency campaign?
- What were the main challenges in recruiting, training, supplying, communicating with, and operating with local police and militia forces and how were these overcome?
- Based on our post-9/11 irregular warfare experiences, what should be the proper balance of emphasis between creating and supporting indigenous military forces and capabilities and creating and supporting indigenous police and militia forces? Should counterinsurgency strategies be primarily military focused or police focused?

### *The conference hosts particularly welcome:*

- Case studies from specific campaigns (i.e. The Al Anbar Awakening) or programs (i.e. Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police) that cover one or more of these topics;
- Lessons learned from lesser-known campaigns in the Philippines, Horn of Africa, Sahel, or elsewhere;
- Papers that provide allied, partner force, and indigenous perspectives of the conference topics.



Papers should be no more than 5,000 words, Times New Roman 12 pt font, 1.5 spaced, and in Word. Papers must be received by **August 1, 2024**. Please email papers to [submissions@fpri.org](mailto:submissions@fpri.org) and include your name, contact information, phone number, and a short biography in the email. Your name should not appear anywhere on paper.

Authors of papers chosen by IWC and FPRI will be invited to present their papers at the Lessons Learned Conference in Annapolis either in-person or by video. Selected papers may also be published by FPRI's Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare on their website.